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Chapter 1
Introduction and Summary
“Finance is powerful. As the last few years demonstrate, financial
innovations can be used as tools of economic destruction. But
the last few centuries demonstrate that financial innovation is
crucial, indeed indispensable, for sustained economic growth and
prosperity.”1
Ross Levine, February 23rd, 2010
During the last decades the development of the financial system has
received growing attention among academics, policymakers and the gen-
eral public. The United States has been considered a prototype of a well-
functioning economic system, for which a sophisticated financial industry is
one of the key factors for a strong economic prosperity. Financial markets and
the banking system provide vital services that allow productive enterprises to
seize new business opportunities and expand them to desirable levels. Levine
(2005) describes the role of finance as providing the following essential ser-
vices: “(i) production of ex ante information about possible investments,
(ii) monitoring of investments and implementation of corporate governance,
1See Levine (2010).
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Notes: The figure shows the evolution of the mean of financial development for 3 major country groups.
Financial development is measured by the amount of private credit by deposit money banks and other
financial institutions as a ratio to GDP. Data come from Beck et al. (2000). Advanced economies are: Aus-
tralia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. Emerg-
ing economies are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia,
Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Thai-
land, Turkey and Venezuela. Developing economies are: Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Coˆte d’Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Kenya, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Niger,
Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Senegal, Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Togo,
Tunisia and Uruguay.
Figure 1.1: Global patterns of financial development
(iii) trading, diversification, and management of risk, (iv) mobilization and
pooling of savings, and (v) exchange of goods and services”.2
However, the quality and scale of financial services differ widely across
countries. Figure 1.1 depicts the evolution of financial development, mea-
sured by the level of domestic credit to private sector as a ratio to GDP, for
advanced, emerging and developing countries during the period 1970-2004.
Obviously, there is a pecking order of country groups, which starts with de-
2See Levine (2005), p. 870.
2
Introduction and Summary
veloping countries having the least developed financial institutions and ends
with advanced countries having the strongest ones. Moreover, since the mid
1980s the observed gap between the 3 country groups even widened. Devel-
oping economies showed almost no improvements in their financial system,
while emerging market economies experienced a nearly 50% increase in their
private credit measure, and advanced countries even doubled their level of fi-
nancial development. Therefore, a natural question is whether these observed
differences across countries may have contributed to the different economic
development. Levine (2005) surveys the empirical literature on finance and
growth and concludes that there is indeed a “strong positive link between
the functioning of the financial system and long-run economic growth”.3
While in general economists do not doubt that financial services are indis-
pensable for a well-functioning market economy, the recent global financial
crisis demonstrated that these services may be used as a “tool of economic
destruction”.4 In particular, advanced countries like the US and the UK have
been the indisputable leaders in financial innovation during the last decades.
The financial systems of these countries provided new, innovative instru-
ments for firms and households to cover their borrowing and saving needs.
For example, households now widely use credit cards and home equity loans
to borrow money whereas they invest in diverse assets, such as stocks, bonds,
mutual funds and derivatives.5 Further, enterprises have access to bond and
stock markets in addition to their traditional bank borrowing in order to fund
their investments.6 Firms also rely on many different financial instruments
to hedge their exposure to interest rate or exchange rate risk. Finally, banks
found a way to fund their activities not only through traditional deposits but
also via the securitization of assets.
3See Levine (2005), p. 921.
4See Levine (2010).
5See International Monetary Fund (2006), p. 105.
6See International Monetary Fund (2006), p. 105.
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Tufano (2003) refers to “addressing persistent agency concerns and in-
formation asymmetries” as one of the key functions of financial innovation.7
However, considering the recent global financial crisis, which erupted in 2008,
one of the crucial questions which arises is whether some of the recent finan-
cial innovations really alleviate the problem of asymmetric information? As-
set securitization, the creation of new liquid securities out of less-liquid assets,
arised as a new financial innovation in the 1970s. Originally, this technique
aimed at improving the risk-sharing opportunities for financial institutions,
especially banks, and was considered as an alternative way of efficient financ-
ing. However, the excessive use of this financial innovation, in particular in
the US housing market, is blamed to have triggered the financial crisis which
turned into the most severe global economic crisis since the Great Depression
in the 1930s.
In this thesis I empirically investigate the role of finance in explaining
the patterns of international capital flows and differences in productivities
across firms as well as their export participation. Futhermore, I research how
a particular financing technique - asset securitization - affects the behavior
of banks.
Chapter 2 looks on the link between financial development and the direc-
tion and composition of cross-border capital flows. Recent empirical patterns
of international capital flows can hardly be explained by traditional models
with neoclassical features. Over the 1984-2004 period there is evidence that
foreign direct investments (FDI) flow on net to emerging or developing coun-
tries but at the same time significant net flows of portfolio debt investments
are directed to developed countries. Recent theoretical literature empha-
sizes the importance of financial system development in explaining these
global patterns. Using a 21-year panel of up to 122 developing, emerging
and developed countries this chapter provides consistent evidence that the
7See Tufano (2003), p. 308.
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cross-country differences in financial development influence the direction and
composition of global capital flows. Using dynamic panel estimation tech-
niques that are able to account for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity
issues I find that ceteris paribus countries with a better developed financial
system observe on average net FDI outflows and simultaneously net debt
inflows. This finding is robust and independent of the impact of the quality
of institutions other than financial ones.
Chapter 3 investigates the link between financial constraints, the produc-
tivity of firms and their export participation. Using a large panel of firms
from 179 three-digit US SIC industries in up to 28 Western and Eastern
European countries during the period 1995-2004, this chapter provides evi-
dence that financial constraints are an important determinant of firm-level
total factor productivity as well as firms’ export participation. The results
are consistent with newly established trade literature on heterogeneous firms
and credit constraints. These models argue that firms entering export mar-
kets face substantial fixed costs, e.g. for marketing, advertising, distribution
etc., which have to be paid before revenues are generated. Since firms typi-
cally do not have enough liquidity to finance them, they have to rely on ex-
ternal finance. Using a difference-in-difference approach this chapter shows
that, other things being equal, firms operating in more credit-constrained
industries are on average more productive and are more likely to export in
countries with a better developed financial system.
Finally, chapter 4, which is a joint work with Desislava Andreeva, pro-
vides evidence on the driving forces behind banks’ securitization as well as
on the incentive effects which arise with the decision of banks to securitize.
Contrary to most previous studies we find evidence of a regulatory arbitrage
motive in securitization using panel data on large US commercial banks. We
propose a corrected measure for capital adequacy that does not suffer from
endogeneity and using it our results suggest the following pattern of secu-
5
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ritization activities: while capital arbitrage drives both the extensive and
intensive margins, access to debt capital at lower costs via securitization
seems to be important only for the intensive margin. The data also sug-
gest that securitization impairs the incentives for screening and monitoring
by originating institutions. The commonly used techniques for overcoming
such incentive problems - seller-provided credit enhancements - do not help
remedy moral hazard and adverse selection. Sufficient levels of capital at
credit institutions rather than the retention of a first-loss piece leads to the
origination and securitization of better quality assets. Our research indicates
that capital adequacy regulation is a double-edged sword: whereas loopholes
in the regulatory framework can seduce banks to securitize assets just for the
sake of not having to hold regulatory capital, sufficient levels of capital do
give banks the right incentives for prudent behavior.
In summary, chapters 2 and 3 emphasize the positive role of financial
institutions in channeling efficiently international savings to profitable in-
ternational investment projects and providing sufficient amount of external
finance to financially constrained firms. In contrast, chapter 4 casts doubts
on the belief that all financial innovations alleviate the problem of asym-
metric information in financial relationships, based on the particular case of
asset securitization. Should we therefore blame further developments in the
financial system to be destructive? Levine (2010) points out that financial
innovation (development) like all innovations bears risks. He puts it that
way: “... drugs are dangerously abused. But just as we should not conclude
that medical research does not promote human health because of drug abuse,
we should not conclude that financial innovation does not promote economic
growth because of the devastatingly costly crisis through which we are now
suffering.” Therefore, in my view financial system development is essential
for sound economic prosperity. However, appropriate regulations and policies
should fight excesses in financial markets to prevent future financial crises.
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Financial Development and Capital Flows
2.1 Introduction
During the last three decades a gradual liberalization of goods and financial
markets led to a significant increase in worldwide trade and capital flows. In
particular, a remarkable surge in cross-border capital flows has been docu-
mented in the literature. According to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) the
scale of international financial integration, measured by the ratio of the sum
of foreign assets and liabilities to GDP, jumped from the year 1970 to the
year 2004 by about 700%.1 Moreover, this growth in worldwide financial
flows even outpaced the growth in the trade of goods and services. This was
especially driven by the asset trade of industrialized countries. Whereas in
the early 1970s the stock of cross-border asset holdings by these countries
was less than 200% of trade flows it rose to more than 700% in 2004 with a
remarkable acceleration since the 1990s.2
At the same time interesting and important patterns of international fi-
nancial flows emerged, which in general turn out to be not consistent with
theoretical predictions. Standard neoclassical models assume that only one
type of capital exists and predict that capital-abundant (rich) countries will
export capital to capital-scarce (poor) countries. Therefore, we should ob-
serve only one-way capital flows. However, empirically different types of
capital, e.g. FDI, portfolio equity, bank loans, bonds, etc., may flow in the
same or in different directions, so one can observe simultaneous capital in-
and outflows. Further, even the same type of capital may flow in and out of
the country in the same period. For example, horizontally motivated FDIs
between developed countries lead to two-way capital flows, whereas simul-
taneous in- and outflows may emerge when investors buy foreign equities or
bonds for reasons of international diversification of their portfolios. Even
when one focuses on the total flows the picture drawn by neoclassical theory
1See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), p. 235, Figure 3.
2See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), p. 236, Figure 4.
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may be misleading. Lucas (1990) states in his influential paper that there
is an empirical paradox because the theoretically implied rates of return on
capital would lead to large capital flows from rich to poor countries. However,
in reality we do not observe such patterns.3
However, the lack of capital flows is not the only failure of neoclassical
theory. Prasad et al. (2006) point out a “new” paradox of total capital even
flowing in the opposite direction, i.e. from poor to rich countries.4 While
FDI patterns are generally consistent with the theoretical prediction, i.e.
they flow from rich to poor countries, the total flows do not seem to be.
Therefore, looking at aggregate figures only may mask important develop-
ments of different types of flows. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) investigate
the composition of international capital flows. They draw a general picture
of advanced economies that are “short debt and long equity”, pointing out
the observation that they import on net debt capital and at the same time
export portfolio equity capital and FDI. On the other hand, many devel-
oping and emerging market economies are “short equity”, i.e. they are net
recipients of FDI and equity flows. Hereby, there is another important ob-
servation. Most of these countries had positive net debt liabilities in 2004,
which is explained by the heavy reliance on and accumulation of debt finance
of these countries until the mid 1980s. However, since this time the net debt
liability position of developing and emerging countries has been shrinking,
which suggests that they export debt capital on net. Therefore, in summary,
since the mid 1980s we observe advanced countries exporting FDI and equity
on net, but importing debt. Emerging and developing countries display the
opposite pattern.
Standard neoclassical models are thus unable to explain these “perverse”
3Lucas resolves this puzzle by including human capital as a missing factor of produc-
tion in these models, which lowers the rate of return differentials between poor and rich
countries.
4Equivalent evidence is that poor countries run current account surpluses whereas
advanced economies run current account deficits.
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empirical patterns. Mendoza et al. (2009) argue that the observed “global
financial imbalances” may result from an increased financial integration com-
bined with cross-country differences in financial markets’ development. In-
deed, despite a gradual improvement in financial development during the last
decades for both developed and emerging economies, there is still a large gap
between the two groups with advanced countries ranked on the top.5 Recent
theoretical models, e.g. that of Ju and Wei (2007) among others, depart
from the assumption of perfect capital markets made by standard neoclas-
sical theory and show that the empirical patterns of capital flows may be
explained by cross-country differences in financial market development. In
this model capital-scarce countries offer good investment opportunities be-
cause the (effective) marginal product of capital is high. However, savings
cannot be efficiently intermediated by the local undeveloped financial sys-
tem. The inefficient financial system is bypassed by two-way capital flows
where domestic capital is invested abroad in the form of debt while domestic
projects are financed by FDI. It is therefore interesting to test the predictions
of the model.
Using a 21-year panel of up to 122 developing, emerging and developed
countries this paper provides consistent evidence that the cross-country dif-
ferences in financial development influence the direction and composition of
global capital flows. Applying dynamic panel estimation techniques to ac-
count for endogeneity issues I find that ceteris paribus countries with a better
developed financial system observe on average net FDI outflows and simul-
taneously net debt inflows. Moreover, the quality of financial institutions
is a distinct determinant of capital flows in addition to “property rights in-
stitutions”.6 Improvements in the quality of other institutions lead ceteris
5See Mendoza et al. (2009), p. 374, Figure 1.
6Property rights institutions are an additional important parameter in the Ju and Wei
(2007) model. Recent empirical literature, for example Alfaro et al. (2008) among others,
highlights the role of the quality of other institutions, like the rule of law, that influence
the direction of capital flows.
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paribus to more FDI and debt inflows on net. Overall, the data match the
predictions of the Ju and Wei (2007) model.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First,
it provides evidence that differences in financial development across coun-
tries are important determinants of the direction and composition of inter-
national capital flows where empirical studies that look at this relationship
in a systematic way are rather scarce. Second, this paper does not focus only
on particular country groups, e.g. developing countries. It utilizes a large
sample of up to 122 advanced, emerging and developing countries in order
to provide evidence on the worldwide empirical patterns. Third, previous
studies find it difficult to account for the endogeneity of various explana-
tory variables with respect to capital flows because they use a pure cross
section and the instruments proposed in the estimation can hardly meet the
“exclusion restriction” of having no direct effect on the dependent variable.7
Instead, I use panel data and apply a dynamic generalized method of mo-
ments (GMM) estimation technique proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991),
which deals with endogeneity arising from unobserved heterogeneity across
countries and other simultaneity issues that typically lead to biased estimates
and thus invalid inference. Finally, unlike other studies I focus on net rather
than gross financial flows in order to match the observed empirical patterns
more precisely.8
Understanding the determinants of the empirical patterns of the direc-
tion and composition of capital flows has important implications. On the
7See for example Wei (2006), Alfaro et al. (2008) and Faria and Mauro (2009).
8Moreover, looking only at gross inflows may be problematic for the following reasons.
First, in terms of additional financing of potential profitable investment projects in a
country, the net value is the correct measure. Second, gross values of one type of flow may
be inflated when countries are highly involved in portfolio diversification or when they
act as “intermediation centers” redirecting capital to other countries. Finally, theoretical
models show that cross-country differences in the quality of financial and other institutions
generate a sort of “comparative advantage” that has a net effect on different types of capital
flows.
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one hand, different policies to reduce the “current account imbalances” have
been widely discussed in recent years.9 For example, increased protection-
ism by setting higher trade barriers in advanced countries is aimed to reduce
the trade and current account deficits in those countries while shrinking the
surpluses in developing and emerging countries like China. However, im-
plementing such a policy may even exacerbate the imbalances, as shown by
Antra`s and Caballero (2009). Therefore, policy makers should know the cor-
rect causes of such imbalances in order to make the right decision. On the
other hand, until recently researchers widely ignored the fact that not only
the direction but also the composition of capital flows matters for several
reasons. First, the literature has found higher volatility of debt flows rel-
ative to FDI flows. Thus, the probability of a reversal (capital flight) and
hence a financial crisis is smaller, the greater is the share of FDI of the total
inflows.10 Second, FDI brings relative to other flows in addition technolog-
ical and managerial knowledge, which improves growth.11 Third, FDI (and
equity) have better risk-sharing properties, because foreign investors bear
some of the country investment risk. However, even though FDIs have such
advantages, they come at a cost to the recipient country, which has to pay
higher returns (risk premium) to this type of capital.12 Finally, the global
imbalances literature emphasizes the role of valuation effects.13 The idea is
that different types of capital flows have different rates of return. Then the
composition of the external position would matter. For example, the US has
its liabilities mostly in low-return debt, whereas its assets are mostly in high-
9There is a large amount of literature on the causes and sustainability of large current
account deficits of advanced countries, especially the US, and of the corresponding large
current account surpluses of emerging and developing countries like China. See Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2004), Bernanke (2005) and Caballero et al. (2008) among others.
10See Frankel and Rose (1996).
11See Borensztein et al. (1998).
12See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2000).
13See for example Gourinchas and Rey (2007) on the role of valuation effects in the
sustainability of current account deficits.
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return FDI or equity. This leads to positive capital income for US residents
even though the US is a net debtor, i.e. it has higher external liabilities than
assets, which allows the US to run larger trade deficits.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a review
of the related theoretical and empirical literature. The subsequent section 2.3
provides a brief look at the dataset and the definition and measurement of key
variables, as well as some stylized facts about the direction of capital flows
for different country groups. In section 2.4 I present the empirical model and
estimation results on how financial system development affects the direction
and composition of capital flows. This section provides additional robustness
checks, too. Finally, section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Related theoretical and empirical litera-
ture
In this section I present the most related theoretical literature that derives
testable predictions on the link between the financial development of coun-
tries and the direction and composition of capital flows. Subsequently some
related empirical evidence is reviewed.
Standard neoclassical models predict that capital should flow from rich
to poor countries. These models rely on the assumption that countries pro-
duce the same, single good with the same constant returns technology and
labor and capital markets are perfect. Then poor countries that have a low
capital-labor ratio have a higher rate of return on capital due to the law of
the decreasing marginal product of capital. In perfectly integrated financial
markets international investors will therefore export capital from high-income
countries to low-income countries until the rate of return differentials vanish.
According to Lucas (1990), the theoretically implied capital flows are much
14
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higher than the observed ones. He tries to explain this lack of capital flows
to developing countries by including human capital as a missing factor of
production in the standard neoclassical model. Given that rich countries are
abundant in human capital this generates rates of return across advanced
and developing countries that may even equalize. Alfaro et al. (2008) point
out other factors that involve the technological advantage of rich countries,
capital controls, different tax policies as well as the quality of property rights
institutions. All these fundamentals may reduce the rate of return gap be-
tween countries such that there is less motivation for cross-border capital
flows. The next explanation of the Lucas paradox may be international
capital market imperfections due to asymmetric information. For example,
Gertler and Rogoff (1990) use a standard open-economy intertemporal trade
model where they introduce cross-country differences in domestic financial
market efficiency. They show that in this setting international capital flows
from rich to poor countries may be muted and even reversed. Informa-
tional asymmetries between lenders and borrowers lead to a higher spread
of lending rates over the riskless rate especially in poorer countries, because
there borrowers have only a small amount of wealth and thus can promise to
lenders only lower payment in bad states. Therefore, investment and hence
capital inflows in poor countries are lower than the first-best levels without
informational frictions. In a similar setting Matsuyama (2005) shows that
poor corporate governance and contractual enforcement in the south lead to
capital flows from the poor south to the rich north.
In terms of the composition of capital flows the literature differentiates
mostly between foreign direct investments and foreign portfolio investments.
Albuquerque (2003) uses the idea of differences in the risk of expropriation
across countries. His theoretical model shows that financially constrained
countries should borrow more through FDI than through financial capital.
The reason is that FDIs are less prone to expropriation risk since they involve
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the transfer of intangible assets, like human and organizational capital.14
Therefore, given the lack of enforcement of international contracts, the de-
fault premium for FDI flows demanded by foreign investors is lower than for
portfolio investments. He shows further empirically that the share of FDI in
total inflows is higher in countries with poor country risk ratings. Razin and
Sadka (2007) present an information-based model where FDI investors have
a comparative advantage relative to domestic investors and foreign portfolio
investors to cream-skim high-productivity domestic firms. This advantage
comes from an industry-specific superior knowledge to extract the informa-
tion about the true value of the acquired firm.15 Further, it is shown to be
more pronounced when the host country has poor corporate transparency
and capital market institutions. Therefore, the prediction of their model is
that FDI inflows relative to portfolio inflows will be larger when the target
country has a lower degree of transparency.
The most closely related theoretical papers are those of Mendoza et al.
(2009) and especially Ju and Wei (2007), whose predictions match the ob-
served patterns of the direction and composition of capital flows.16 Mendoza
et al. (2009) build a two-country dynamic general equilibrium growth model
with ex ante identical agents who use financial contracts to insure against id-
iosyncratic endowment and investment shocks. Countries differ only in their
financial development, which measures the degree of enforcement of finan-
cial contracts.17 In the presence of incomplete contracts agents can divert
part of their incomes from creditors. Allowing for perfect capital mobility
the following pattern emerges: in the country with a less developed finan-
cial system there is an excess demand for assets; therefore, asset prices are
14Albuquerque calls FDI “inalienable”.
15This special knowledge leads to lower screening costs for foreign FDI investors. Razin
and Sadka (2007) argue that this sort of comparative advantage may explain two-way FDI
flows between developed countries.
16Therefore, I want to present the results of these models in more detail.
17The key assumption is that the access to insurance of agents depends on the local
financial system.
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high and the rate of return low. After integration there is a flow of financial
(debt) capital to the more financially developed country. On the other hand,
there are also net FDI inflows in the less developed country, because foreign
direct investors are able to insure (almost) perfectly against the investment
risk compared with domestic investors, who rely on the domestic inefficient
financial system. In summary, there are riskless net debt outflows from the
less financially developed country but simultaneously there are risky net FDI
inflows.
In contrast to the previous model Ju and Wei (2007) use a simple static
framework. They make the neoclassical assumption of the decreasing marginal
product of capital where countries differ in their abundance with physical
capital. However, they augment the standard one-sector neoclassical model
by incorporating two kinds of inefficiencies.18 On the one hand, the existence
of inefficient property rights institutions implies that a slice of the marginal
product of capital, i.e. the total return of the investment, may be expropri-
ated. On the other hand, an inefficient financial intermediation yields that
a slice of the marginal product of capital goes to the bank, when agents
choose a financial investment instead of a direct investment, i.e. to be en-
trepreneurs.19 There are two implications due to these inefficiencies. First,
both direct and financial investors have ceteris paribus a lower return on cap-
ital in the country with poor property rights institutions. Second, financial
investors (but not entrepreneurs) receive ceteris paribus a lower interest rate
in the country with the underdeveloped financial system. After opening to
capital flows financial investors would invest in the country with a higher
interest rate, whereas direct investors would invest in the country with the
18Without these inefficiencies the model would predict that capital will flow from rich
(capital-abundant) countries to poor (capital-scarce) economies.
19There is a third parameter in the model, which is based on the moral hazard between
investors and entrepreneurs. In the country with a lower quality of corporate governance
a higher share of the total return is diverted by entrepreneurs. The effect of corporate
governance is qualitatively the same as that of poor financial intermediation.
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higher effective, i.e. after accounting for the risk of expropriation, marginal
product of capital. The case of two-way capital flows emerges when the ef-
fective marginal product of capital is greater in the poor country, i.e. when
the risk of expropriation is not so large, and when the differences in financial
system development are relatively large, such that the interest rate for finan-
cial investors in the poor country is lower in this country. In a sense there
is a “bypass effect” where capital first leaves the financially underdeveloped
country and is absorbed by the foreign financial system. Afterwards it enters
this country again, albeit in the form of FDI.
The empirical literature on capital flows focuses mainly on gross inflows
or gross external liabilities of a particular country group, mostly developing
and emerging countries. In general, “push” and “pull” factors are considered
as determinants of these inflows. Push factors are external determinants like
US interest rates as well as US GDP growth, whereas pull factors are domestic
fundamentals as well as domestic policies.20 In terms of the composition of
capital flows researchers focus on the share of FDI in the total inflows. For
example, Montiel and Reinhart (1999) look at the composition of capital
inflows to Asian and Latin American emerging market economies during the
1990s. They identify capital controls and sterilized central bank interventions
to alter the composition of capital flows. Explicit restrictions to capital
inflows lead to a higher share of FDI relative to short-term and portfolio
inflows, whereas sterilized interventions lower this share.
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2000) investigate different determinants of the
size and composition of gross external liability stocks in 1997. They show
that higher trade openness is associated robustly with more debt and FDI
liabilities as well as a higher share of FDI in the total liabilities. Further,
more financially developed countries, measured by the share of the mone-
20See Calvo et al. (1993), who emphasize the role of external factors during the 1980s
and early 1990s, for capital flows to Latin American countries.
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tary aggregate M2 to GDP, have significantly higher debt liabilities in the
sample of industrial countries, whereas for developing countries the coeffi-
cient on this variable is negative but insignificant. Finally, better developed
stock markets promote the accumulation of FDI liabilities. Faria and Mauro
(2009) also focus on the composition of external liabilities in a cross section
of average stocks during the period 1996-2004. They use data from Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007) and stress that the share of FDI plus equity in the to-
tal liabilities depends positively and robustly on the quality of institutions.21
In order to address endogeneity issues they perform instrumental variable
(IV) regressions using a smaller set of countries where colonial settler mor-
tality, the population density in 1500, ethnolinguistic fractionalization and
legal origin are used as instruments for the quality of institutions.22 The
last and most closely related empirical paper is that of Wei (2006). He
uses a cross section of the composition of foreign liabilities in 2003. Wei fo-
cuses on the different impacts of financial institutions compared with those
of other institutions.23 His main regressions are based on a sample of 65
economies. Similarly to Faria and Mauro (2009), Wei (2006) tries to deal
with endogeneity by using legal origin and settler mortality as instruments
for both institutional variables. The main results indicate that higher levels
of corruption (and an index of institutional quality) discourage both FDI
and debt investments. On the other hand, better financial development is
associated with significantly less FDI. There is further little evidence that
21Alfaro et al. (2008) also highlight the importance of overall institutions. However,
they focus only on the direction of capital flows. Using a cross-section regression with
capital flows per capita as a dependent variable averaged over 1970-2000 they provide
evidence that the paradox of poor to rich capital flows may be explained by the cross-
country difference in institutional quality.
22These instruments originate from the growth and development literature, e.g. Ace-
moglu et al. (2001) among others, where researchers show that property rights institu-
tions influence strongly the economic development of countries. However, recently Albouy
(2008) found that the original settler mortality variable is measured incorrectly. Using an
updated measure he shows that IV estimation suffers from the weak instrument problem
and therefore the estimates are not reliable.
23In a sense he tests the predictions of the Ju and Wei (2007) model.
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financial development positively influences the share of debt (or loans) in
the total liabilities.24 Depending on the specification the coefficient on this
variable changes the sign as well as its statistical significance. There are sev-
eral problems in Wei’s study. First, his IV results rely only on 33 countries.
This may be a problem since instrumental variable regressions are known to
produce biased estimates in such small samples. Second, the instrumental
variables he uses may not be appropriate. The fundamental problem of these
instruments lies in the untestable assumption that for example legal origin
has an impact on capital flows only through financial development. However,
this instrument is likely to affect capital flows either directly or through other
channels. Therefore, this instrument may not meet the exclusion restriction
to be a valid instrument. Finally, Wei uses only gross stocks of a country’s
liabilities. However, we observe increased holdings of assets and liabilities
even for the same type of investments. This can artificially blow up his
measures of the composition of stocks for example for countries that have
simultaneously a huge stock of debt assets as well as a huge stock of debt
liabilities. Then the debt share in the total liabilities will automatically be
high and this may lead to misleading results. Moreover, the previously pre-
sented theoretical predictions apply to net flows (stocks) because the quality
of financial and other institutions generates a sort of comparative advantage.
Therefore, looking at net positions would be more in line with the theory.
In summary, the theoretical and empirical literature identifies countries’
fundamentals, capital controls, trade openness and the quality of financial as
well as property rights institutions as potential determinants of the direction
and composition of capital flows.
24Wei (2006) separates portfolio debt holdings from foreign loans.
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2.3 Data and summary statistics
The major data source is Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), who provide a panel
dataset for 3 broad foreign asset and liability positions: stocks of FDI, port-
folio debt (including loans) and portfolio equities.25 This dataset covers up
to 145 developing, emerging and developed countries during the period 1970-
2004. Table 2.7 in Appendix A provides a full list of these countries. The
estimates of the external assets and liabilities are based primarily on balance
of payments statistics from the IMF. Additional national and international
sources have been used to create the series and to check extensively for in-
consistencies of the IMF data. More importantly, in contrast to the original
data, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti incorporate valuation effects of the stocks of
foreign assets and liabilities. These effects arise when for example exchange
rates and asset prices change. Valuation effects generate capital gains and
losses, which are increasingly important for the dynamics of capital flows
because countries accumulate large stocks of gross assets and liabilities such
that small changes in asset prices may lead to large changes in the value of
the stocks.26 A further advantage of this dataset is the better coverage with
more countries and more years.27 From the underlying stocks of assets and
liabilities I calculate net in- or outflows of each type of investment. In partic-
ular, the net foreign assets (NFA) of a country are defined as the difference
25The remaining categories are financial derivatives and official reserves. Since I am
interested in the decision of private agents, I focus on private capital flows only. Therefore,
reserve assets are not considered. Further, even though financial derivatives gained much
attention in recent years and in the course of the global financial crisis that started in
2008, I do not explore the patterns of such flows. The main motivation is that financial
derivatives play only a minor role for developing and emerging countries, especially until
the end of 2004. Exploring the determinants of such flows for advanced economies would
be interesting; however, it is beyond the scope of this paper.
26On the role of valuation effects see Gourinchas and Rey (2007) among others.
27This dataset has recently been used by Faria and Mauro (2009). An older, smaller
but similar dataset constructed again by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) has been utilized
by Alfaro et al. (2008) to study the effects of the quality of institutions on the capital
inflows.
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Notes: The figure shows the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP for the following advanced economies:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Figure 2.1: Evolution of net foreign assets for advanced economies
between assets and liabilities. A positive net assets position indicates that
this country is a net creditor. Further, an increase in the NFA represents a
net capital outflow in a particular year.
Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 show the evolution of the total NFA position as
well as its main components, i.e. FDI, portfolio equity and portfolio debt,
for three different country groups. Derivative net assets as well as official
reserve assets are omitted for the sake of clarity. For every year the net FDI,
net debt or net equity assets are summed for each group and then divided
by the total size of this group, i.e. the sum of GDP. I group countries into
three sets: advanced, emerging and developing economies. Hereby I follow
the definition by Prasad et al. (2003).28
28See Prasad et al. (2003), p. 72. Emerging economies are called more financially
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The following global patterns of the direction and composition of capital
flows emerge. I focus on the developments since the early 1980s when the
process of financial globalization started.29 Cross-border capital was allowed
to flow more freely to regions with profitable investment opportunities. Fig-
ure 2.1 reports that during the 1984-2004 period there is a trend development
in the NFA position of advanced economies indicating a rise in FDI and eq-
uity NFA whereas a worsening of the debt NFA takes place.30 Therefore,
advanced countries observe simultaneously net FDI and portfolio equity out-
flows, but net portfolio debt inflows. In total there are net inflows of capital
that are explained by the dominances of debt inflows relative to equity-like
outflows.31
Figure 2.2 shows the patterns of capital flows for the group of emerging
economies. Initially these countries have negative net investment positions,
which indicates that these countries were net recipients of equity-like and debt
investments. During the period 1984-2004 emerging market economies expe-
rienced further substantial net FDI inflows, which intensified in the 1990s.32
However, simultaneously since 1984 the net debt liabilities of this group fell
by around 3 times from 28% to 10% of GDP. This implies that substantial net
debt outflows took place during the 20-year period. As a result we observe
the total net outflows of capital, i.e. an improvement in the total NFA, for
emerging countries because the debt outflows outpaced the FDI and equity
inflows.
The last country group consists of 32 developing countries. Figure 2.3
shows the empirical patterns of capital flows for this group. It delivers a
integrated developing countries.
29See Mendoza et al. (2009).
30Within 20 years net debt liabilities rose more than 5 times from 5% to 28% of GDP,
whereas net FDI assets almost quadrupled from 1.8% to 7% of GDP.
31This pattern is not driven by the inclusion of the US. When I exclude the US from
the sample the drop in the debt NFA is somewhat smaller, but still significant.
32Within 20 years the FDI NFA position worsened from -5% to -19% of GDP. Qualita-
tively the same picture emerges for portfolio equity investments.
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Notes: The figure shows the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP for the following emerging economies:
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey
and Venezuela.
Figure 2.2: Evolution of net foreign assets for emerging economies
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Notes: The figure shows the ratio of net foreign assets to GDP for the following developing economies:
Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Costa Rica, Coˆte
d’Ivoire, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Kenya, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Senegal,
Sri Lanka, the Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Tunisia and Uruguay.
Figure 2.3: Evolution of net foreign assets for developing economies
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qualitatively similar picture to those of the emerging market economies. In
the year 1984 this group accumulated on net a significant amount of debt
liabilities and a smaller stock of FDI liabilities. Until the begin of the 1990s
these countries continued to rely on debt inflows as a major sort of external
finance. However, since the begin of the 1990s there has been a trend devel-
opment in NFA for developing countries, which indicates a worsening in FDI
NFA and a simultaneous improvement of the debt NFA position.33 There-
fore, substantial FDI inflows combined with much higher net debt outflows
took place.34 As a result developing countries exported total capital on net
during the 1984-2004 period.
In summary, the global patterns of capital flows draw a general picture of
advanced countries that import debt and export FDIs on net, whereas emerg-
ing and developing countries act exactly in the opposite way by exporting
portfolio debt and importing FDIs.
Now I turn to the description of the potential determinants of these pat-
terns. The main explanatory variable highlighted by theory is financial sys-
tem development. I use data on domestic credit to private sector as a ratio
to GDP from WDI (2006), which is available for almost all the countries
belonging to the sample of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).35 This measure
is widely used in the growth and development literature, where people show
that financially more developed countries grow faster on average, e.g. King
and Levine (1993) and Rajan and Zingales (1998) among others. Private
33Within 20 years the net debt liabilities were reduced from 41% to 31.6% of GDP,
whereas the net FDI liabilities rose from 11% to 26% of GDP.
34Net portfolio equity flows do not seem to be important for these countries. One reason
is that developing economies have poorly developed stock markets.
35Alternatively Beck et al. (2000) provide a database on financial development indi-
cators, which includes a measure of private credit. However, in order to maximize the
sample size, WDI (2006) is preferred. Nevertheless, the two private credit measures are
highly correlated.
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Table 2.1: Cross-country differences in financial development
Variable Advanced Emerging Developing
GDP per capita 20274 4365 1367
Private credit by deposit money banks to GDP 0.73 0.46 0.22
Private credit by financial institutions to GDP 0.87 0.53 0.23
Domestic credit to private sector as a share of GDP 0.86 0.56 0.25
Stock market capitalization to GDP 0.57 0.47 0.14
Stock market value traded to GDP 0.40 0.24 0.01
Stock market turnover ratio 0.61 0.54 0.07
Central bank’s assets to total financial assets 0.03 0.13 0.23
Deposit banks’ assets to central bank assets 0.95 0.85 0.72
Deposit banks’ assets to GDP 0.89 0.58 0.28
Other financial institutions’ assets to GDP 0.61 0.17 0.05
Notes: The table shows for each country group the sample means of the variables during the period 1984-2004. “Domestic
credit to private sector as a share of GDP” is taken from WDI (2006). All the other variables come from Beck et al. (2000).
credit is the most preferred measure of financial development in the litera-
ture for the following reasons. First, Levine et al. (2000) argue that this
measure captures the comparative advantage of intermediaries in reducing
informational asymmetries. This is exactly the key feature of the Ju and
Wei (2007) model, the predictions of which are tested here. Second, it is
available for a larger set of countries and longer time periods. Finally, other
measures that describe the development of the stock markets (e.g. stock
market capitalization to GDP) are less suitable indicators of financial devel-
opment especially for developing and emerging markets. The reason is that
their financial system is mostly bank-based as opposed to the market-based
US system and these countries have only small and illiquid stock markets
during the period 1984-2004. Therefore, I use private credit in the regression
analysis.
Table 2.1 compares various measures of financial development across
country groups. Compared with emerging and especially developing coun-
tries advanced economies have higher levels of private credit to GDP, which
indicates increased activity of financial intermediaries. Moreover, they have
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bigger and more liquid stock markets. Finally, the importance of the central
banks compared with private financial institutions, indicated by their relative
assets, in providing financial services in the economy is lower for advanced
countries.36 In summary, all the indicators in the table give a consistent view
that rich countries have a more developed financial system than poor coun-
tries. Following the theoretical predictions of Ju and Wei (2007) I expect
a positive impact of financial development on FDI outflows and a negative
impact on debt outflows.
I obtain further the variable log of real GDP per capita in PPP from the
WDI (2006) database. It is used to proxy for the capital abundance of a
country. Ideally, physical capital per capita and human capital per capita
should be preferred to capture the physical and human capital abundance of
a country, which is a key feature of neoclassical models. However, reliable
estimates of the physical and human capital stocks for all countries in the
sample are hardly available. Nevertheless, using data from Manova (2008)
for 81 countries over the period 1980-1998 I confirm that GDP per capita
is highly correlated with estimates of both physical capital per capita and
human capital per capita, with correlation coefficients of 0.96 and 0.86, re-
spectively. Therefore, in a regression setting GDP per capita would capture
the effect of differences in capital abundance across countries.37 Neoclassical
models predict that ceteris paribus capital should flow from capital-abundant
countries to capital-scares countries, because the implied rate of return in the
latter is higher. Therefore, I expect a positive relationship between GDP per
capita and capital outflows. However, Lucas (1990) shows that this implica-
tion is not consistent with the empirical evidence. In reality there is a lack of
36In developing countries central banks typically act as a substitute for the poor private
financial system.
37GDP per capita captures further differences in the unobserved total factor produc-
tivity (TFP), which influence the rate of return to capital. Since TFP estimates are not
available for all the countries and years in the sample using GDP per capita seems to be
more advantageous than using capital abundance measures only.
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capital flows to poor, capital-scarce economies. A statistically insignificant
impact of this variable on capital flows would be consistent with the “Lucas
paradox”. However, as shown previously, in recent years there is evidence
of a new paradox, where international capital even flows from poor to rich
countries. This is shown to be driven by debt outflows in emerging and
developing economies. Therefore, the sign may be even negative.
The next two important determinants of capital flows are financial and
trade openness. These variables may have a direct impact on capital flows be-
cause barriers to trade and finance limit the international activities of compa-
nies and investors.38 Traditional theories of FDI suggest that countries with
liberalized trade would attract more vertical FDI where multinational corpo-
rations separate their stages of production into different countries to exploit
factor price differentials. However, horizontal FDI, which aims to overcome
trade barriers, may be discouraged because its attractiveness decreases com-
pared with servicing the market through exports. Moreover, highly trade-
open economies may attract more foreign direct investors to use the country
as an “export platform”.39 Therefore, the direction of the impact of trade
openness on capital flows is generally undetermined. My trade openness
variable is defined as the sum of exports and imports of goods and services
as a ratio to GDP and is calculated using data from WDI (2006). Figure
2.5 in Appendix A shows all three country groups becoming increasingly in-
tegrated into international trade during the 1984-2004 period. Especially
38Further, it seems to be a good strategy to include these variables as controls in order
to reduce the impact of omitted variable bias due to a potential correlation between both
openness variables and financial system development. Rajan and Zingales (2003) develop a
political economy model that explains global patterns of cross-country difference in finan-
cial development. In their model opening to financial and trade flows will drive incumbent
firms and financial institutions to vote for improvement in financial development. Chinn
and Ito (2006) and Baltagi et al. (2009) provide evidence on the link between financial
development and trade and capital account openness.
39Hanson et al. (2001) argue that alongside typical “horizontal” foreign affiliates US
multinational enterprises have many affiliates that produce in the host country but then sell
outside this country. They call them “export platforms”. The authors provide empirical
evidence that higher trade barriers impede such FDI.
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emerging market economies almost doubled their average trade openness.
Capital account controls are also likely to limit the activity of interna-
tional investors. However, their net effect is ambiguous depending on whether
capital controls are set for incoming and/or outgoing investments. When one
makes a plausible assumption that the government of the recipient country
may favor inward FDI whereas outward FDI may be hindered, I expect a
negative impact on FDI outflows. This expectation is consistent with the
evidence by Montiel and Reinhart (1999), who find that higher capital con-
trols increase the share of FDI relative to portfolio flows. I use a capital
account openness index constructed by Chinn and Ito (2008), which is a “de
jure” measure of capital account restrictions. The index of financial open-
ness is based on four dummy variables reported in the IMF’s Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). These
indicate the presence of multiple exchange rates, the existence of restrictions
on current account transactions, the presence of restrictions on capital ac-
count transactions and the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds.
The index is available for 181 countries during the period 1970-2005. Com-
pared with the binary nature of the underlying information from AREAER
this index has the advantage of measuring not only the presence but also
the intensity of openness in cross-border financial transactions. The higher
the value of the index, the more open a country is to international capital
transactions. Figure 2.6 in Appendix A shows the gradual rise in world-
wide financial integration during the 1984-2004 period. Despite a significant
increase in financial openness for developing and emerging countries there
is still a large gap between these two groups and the group of advanced
economies.
The last set of variables is obtained from Kaufmann et al. (2006). The
authors provide 6 measures of governance quality: voice and accountability,
political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regula-
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Notes: The figure shows the mean of the index of institutions over the period 1990-2004 for three country
groups: advanced, emerging and developing economies.
Figure 2.4: Comparison of the quality of institutions across country groups
31
Financial Development and Capital Flows
tory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. They capture the stance
of the institutional environment in a particular country beside that of the
financial system, which can influence the attractiveness of a country to in-
ternational investors. The indicators are indexes that are computed using
hundreds of different variables. Each index of governance is normalized to
take values between −2.5 and 2.5 with higher values indicating better qual-
ity. I constructed an institutional quality index (“Institutions”), which is the
simple average of all 6 measures.40 This measure is used as a proxy for the
“risk of expropriation” variable from the theoretical model of Ju and Wei
(2007), which is a distinct determinant of capital flows and therefore should
be included as an additional explanatory variable. Figure 2.4 shows the
cross-country differences in institutional quality between developing, emerg-
ing and advanced economies. As expected, the pecking order of countries
starts with developing countries having the least developed institutions and
ends with advanced countries having the strongest institutions. Following
the theoretical predictions I expect that the quality of institutions should
have a negative impact on both FDI and debt outflows.
After presenting the observed pattern of capital flows as well as the key
characteristics of advanced, emerging and developing countries I explore in
the next section the causal link between financial development and the di-
rection and composition of capital flows.
2.4 Financial development and capital flows
2.4.1 Empirical model and estimation strategy
Usually previous studies on capital flows have built time averages for every
country and estimated a cross section in order to capture a sort of long-run,
40Indexes are available for the years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2004 only. For
the missing years I linearly interpolate the data.
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steady-state relationship.41 However, this typically leads to a substantial
loss of information. Instead I exploit both the cross-sectional and time-series
variation in the data and apply panel estimation techniques. Baltagi et al.
(2009) point out that building time averages does not necessarily describe
a steady-state equilibrium while identification becomes more difficult due to
a loss of information. Another clear advantage of panel data is the possi-
bility of ruling out biases due to the presence of unobserved time-constant
country-specific heterogeneity in the data. For example, some countries tra-
ditionally receive more capital inflows than others and simultaneously they
have a more developed financial system. Omitting a factor like geography,
which may influence both capital flows and financial development, leads to
the well-known omitted variable bias. In contrast, cross-sectional studies
rely on the inclusion of “as many as possible” control variables or they try
to find a good instrument to estimate consistently the coefficient of interest.
However, typically good, valid (external) instruments are difficult to find.
Even though researchers may show that their instrument is exogenous and
not weak, they usually have problems arguing why the instrumental vari-
able meets the exclusion restriction. It requires the instrument to have an
effect on the dependent variable solely through the variable that is instru-
mented. However, in many cases the instrumental variable has a direct effect,
such that the untestable assumption for a valid instrument fails in practice.
Finally, there is another advantage of panel data in terms of the use of in-
strumental variables. Panel data allow the use of internal instruments to
account for other types of endogeneity. Internal instruments like lagged val-
ues are typically naturally correlated with the variable of interest due to the
underlying time-series process. They are also likely to be uncorrelated with
the error term, which is a testable assumption. Finally, they are more likely
to meet the untestable exclusion restriction, because for example past levels
41See for example Alfaro et al. (2008).
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of financial development may not influence current capital flows once the
current state of financial development is accounted for. Therefore, internal
instruments are potential valid instruments that I exploit in the estimation.
In the next step I present the empirical model of the link between financial
system development and the direction and composition of capital flows. As
dependent variables I use net FDI or portfolio debt outflows as a ratio to
GDP. I rely on this measure for the following reasons. First, looking at the
composition of capital flows ratios of net FDI (debt) flows to total net flows
may be considered. However, both the nominator and the denominator of
these ratios may be negative and they may have different signs. Therefore,
the interpretation of the change in these ratios will be misleading.42 Further,
a lagged dependent variable is included in the model to account for sluggish
adjustment of the series over time. Typically capital flows do not react fully
in a particular year to changes in the variable of interest, which makes them
persistent over time. The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable creates a
dynamic panel data model of the form:
Fit = µ+ αFi,t−1 + βFinDevit + xitγ + ωt + ψi + ξit (2.1)
where Fit is defined as net outflows of FDI (debt) as a ratio to nominal GDP
for country i at year t. By dividing net flows by GDP I am able to ac-
count for potential non-stationarity of the level series as well as for country
size effects.43 FinDevit is domestic credit to the private sector as a ratio to
GDP and measures the level of financial development of country i at time
t. xit represents a vector of control variables, like GDP per capita, poten-
42Ratios of net stocks may have the same problems. Since previous studies use only
gross inflows or stocks of liabilities they do not have these problems. For example, Wei
(2006) and Faria and Mauro (2009) use ratios of gross liabilities only. Montiel and Reinhart
(1999) and Albuquerque (2003) use for example FDI inflows as a share of the total gross
inflows. In the case of net values, however, the use of such ratios is inappropriate.
43Non-stationarity is strong and more problematic for stocks of capital, but flows are
persistent over time as well. Hence, this seems to be a good strategy.
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tially correlated with FinDev. Country fixed effects ψi capture unobserved
time-invariant heterogeneity across countries, whereas time fixed effects ωt
subsume all the time-varying factors common to all the countries in the sam-
ple, like worldwide macroeconomic shocks. Further, the disturbance ξit is
assumed to be independently and identically distributed with a zero mean
and constant variance. Finally, µ is a constant term. The main advantage
of this specification as opposed to a cross-sectional model is that here I can
partially account for the heterogeneity between countries using country fixed
effects. They capture factors like “geography, climate, ethno-linguistic char-
acteristics, as well as all unchanging political economy factors”.44 Moreover,
this dynamic model allows me to test whether the regressors are exogenous
and hence whether the predictions are valid. Using the model in (2.1) I test
the main hypothesis of the models by Ju and Wei (2007) and Mendoza et
al. (2009), namely that countries with a more developed financial system
should experience ceteris paribus higher net FDI outflows (or lower net FDI
inflows) and simultaneously lower net debt outflows (or higher net debt in-
flows). Therefore, the coefficient capturing the effect of FinDev on net FDI
outflows is expected to be positive, i.e. βFDI > 0. On the other hand, the
coefficient for the effect of FinDev on net debt outflows is expected to be
negative, i.e. βdebt < 0.
Estimating the above relationship via simple OLS and treating ψi + ξit
as the composite error term is problematic in several ways. The first reason
is that ψi and Fi,t−1 are mathematically related and this will lead to biased
estimates. A solution would be to eliminate the country fixed effects via
within-group transformation, where I subtract the time mean for each coun-
try i. However, a problem still remains, because although the fixed effects
are eliminated, the transformed term of the lagged dependent variable is cor-
related with the transformed error term through their means. Nickell (1981)
44See Baltagi et al. (2009), p. 287.
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shows that this introduces a bias into the estimates. Clearly this bias will
disappear only if the number of periods T →∞. Further, Judson and Owen
(1999) find that this bias is important (around 20%) even for T = 30. Since I
have a small, fixed T sample I introduce techniques that solve this problem.
In order to eliminate the fixed effects first differences are taken from both
sides of equation (2.1):
Fit − Fi,t−1 = α(Fi,t−1 − Fi,t−2) + β(FinDevit − FinDevi,t−1) +
+(xit − xi,t−1)γ + (ωt − ωt−1) + (ξit − ξi,t−1) (2.2)
Again there is a correlation between the Fi,t−1−Fi,t−2 term and the trans-
formed error term ξit−ξi,t−1. The idea in this case, first proposed by Anderson
and Hsiao (1982), is to use an instrumental variable estimator to solve the
endogeneity problem. They propose the lagged level Fi,t−2 or the lagged dif-
ference Fi,t−2−Fi,t−3 as natural instruments for Fi,t−1−Fi,t−2, because they
are correlated with it, but not with the error term.45 The instruments are
valid if ξit − ξi,t−1 is not first-order autocorrelated or equivalently the level
ξit doesn’t follow a second-order autoregressive process.
46
Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991)
propose a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of equation
(2.2), which is more efficient than that of Anderson and Hsiao (1982). The
reason is that as we go further in time more lagged values can serve as
instruments. This leads to more moment conditions that can be used to
improve efficiency. The GMM framework allows me in addition to test for
the exogeneity of the instrument set, because the system of equations is
45Instrumenting in this manner does not work with the within-group transformation.
46The first-difference representation introduces serial correlation of the transformed
errors (assuming no autocorrelation in levels), but this can be easily treated by using
robust variance-covariance estimators.
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potentially overidentified.47
The following moment conditions can be used in the estimation:
E[Fi,t−l(ξit − ξi,t−1)] = 0 for each t ≥ 3 and l ≥ 2 (2.3)
I decide to exploit the “collapsed” version following Roodman (2009b)
in order to reduce the problem of “too many instruments” and thus the
following moment conditions48 are used:
E[Fi,t−l(ξit − ξi,t−1)] = 0 for each l ≥ 2 (2.4)
The additional usual moment conditions are of the form:
E[(xit − xi,t−1)′(ξit − ξi,t−1)] = 0 for t ≥ 2 (2.5)
where the row vector x contains all strictly exogenous explanatory variables
including financial development. If some of the covariates are potentially
predetermined or endogenous I use suitable lagged levels to instrument the
difference xit − xi,t−1.49
47Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) point out that “difference”
GMM may perform poorly when the time series are very persistent. In this case lagged
levels are poor instruments of first differences, which produce a “weak instrument prob-
lem”. They propose the so-called “system” GMM estimator, where an equation in levels
is added to the system of differenced equations. The intuition here is to instrument levels
with lagged differences. However, a crucial and non-trivial assumption requires the covari-
ance E[Fitψi] to be constant over time (stationary) so that E[(Fit − Fi,t−1)ψi] = 0. This
assumption of initial stationarity of the series is problematic especially for capital flows.
In the sample period of 1984-2004 there were several shocks to the world economy, e.g. the
overall process of globalization, the fall of the “Iron Curtain” and the subsequent process
of Eastern enlargement, the Asian crisis of 1997, the “dot-com bubble” and its bursting in
2000, etc. They represent substantial, persistent shocks to the economic activities in most
countries in the sample. Therefore, it is very likely that the capital flow series are initially
far from their steady states, making the Blundell and Bond estimator inappropriate.
48This problem arises because as I go further in time there are more lags of the depen-
dent variable that can potentially serve as instruments.
49I start to treat these variables as strictly exogenous and perform Difference-in-Hansen
tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets. If these reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity
I use appropriate lagged levels instead.
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I address the following issues in the estimation. First, I decide to per-
form the so-called “one-step” GMM estimation, where an arbitrary (e.g. ho-
moskedastic) variance-covariance matrix of residuals is used. However, since
I am aware of possible serial correlation of the residuals within country groups
and heteroskedasticity across countries, this will lead to incorrect inference.
To produce appropriate test statistics I apply the cluster-robust estimator of
the variance-covariance matrix of residuals, which allows for arbitrary corre-
lation within countries and heteroskedasticity across countries.50 Second, I
test for AR(1) and AR(2) in first-differenced errors in order to check whether
the instruments are valid. In theory there is a negative first-order autocor-
relation in first differences, but there must be no second- (or higher-) order
autocorrelation. I therefore perform the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrela-
tion. Third, I conduct a Hansen (1982) test of overidentifying restrictions
to test for exogeneity of the instrument set as a whole. In addition, to
test whether my financial development measure is exogenous, I perform a
Difference-in-Hansen test. I check further using the same test whether all
the other strictly exogenous explanatory variables are indeed orthogonal to
the residuals.51 Finally, I address the problem of “too many instruments” as
noted above. In the dynamic panel literature there is no guidance on how
many instruments are good. Since I have a relatively small sample of coun-
tries I am aware of “overfitting” endogenous variables when I use too many
moment conditions.52 Therefore, I decide to restrict the lag length to using
50In theory “two-step” GMM estimation produces a heteroskedasticity- and
autocorrelation-robust variance-covariance matrix and is more efficient than the one-step
approach. However, as Arellano and Bond (1991) and Roodman (2009a) point out, stan-
dard errors can be severely downward biased in small samples. In this case standard errors
can then be adjusted using the finite-sample correction of Windmeijer (2005), but since
this is only an approximation I stick to the one-step results.
51I do not present them in the table for the sake of clarity.
52Roodman (2009b) emphasizes that the available instruments may rise quadratically
with the number of time periods. For my basic sample of 21 years the maximum potentially
available moment conditions amount to (21 − 2)(21 − 1)/2 = 380. As a rule of thumb
Roodman (2009b) recommends that the number of instruments should be lower than the
number of countries.
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only up to the first three available lags. In addition I “collapse” them into
a smaller instrument set. As a consequence my system of equations has two
overidentifying restrictions.53
2.4.2 Baseline results
Due to data availability and in order to capture the beginning of the finan-
cial globalization process I choose for the regression analysis a 21-year period
from 1984 to 2004. The panel of countries is unbalanced. The basic sample
includes 122 countries, which is a fairly good size compared with previous
empirical studies.54 In order to reduce the influence of extreme outliers I
winsorize the upper 95th percentile and the lower 5th percentile of the dis-
tribution of the dependent variables. Beside the lagged dependent variable
the main regressors are private credit as a ratio to GDP, the logarithm of
GDP per capita as well as trade and capital account openness. Tables 2.8
and 2.9 in Appendix A provide summary statistics of the variables as well
as pairwise correlations of the regressors. All the explanatory variables are
positively correlated with the highest correlation coefficients between private
credit, institutions and GDP per capita, which range from 0.69 to 0.84.
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 present the baseline estimation results.55 Standard
errors are robust to an arbitrary correlation within countries as well as to
heteroskedasticity across countries. Throughout all the specifications in both
the tables the Arellano-Bond test suggests the existence of negative first-order
serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals at the 1% significance level,
53The number of overidentifying restrictions may be higher when I instrument other
explanatory variables.
54Table 2.7 in Appendix A provides a list of all the countries. From the original 145
countries from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) 23 countries have been excluded due to
missing data on the explanatory variables or because they have only a small number of
yearly observations.
55I use the xtabond2 routine in Stata provided by Roodman (2009a) to obtain my
results.
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Table 2.2: FDI outflows and financial development: basic sample
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L1.(Net FDI outflows to GDP) 0.081* 0.085** 0.084** 0.082** 0.090**
(0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042)
Private credit to GDP 0.035** 0.034** 0.034** 0.034** 0.033**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Log of real GDP per capita in PPP -0.012 -0.013
(0.013) (0.013)
Trade openness -0.021** -0.021**
(0.0083) (0.0082)
Capital account openness -0.0076 -0.0076
(0.0049) (0.0047)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2064 2064 2064 2064 2064
Number of country clusters 122 122 122 122 122
Number of instruments 25 26 26 28 30
F statistic 3.83 4.10 5.01 4.83 6.42
F-Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(1) Test -6.82 -6.80 -6.91 -6.90 -6.99
AR(1) Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) Test -0.45 -0.41 -0.35 -0.45 -0.32
AR(2) Test (p-value) 0.66 0.68 0.73 0.65 0.75
Hansen-J statistic 2.00 2.14 2.03 2.86 2.88
Hansen-J (degrees of freedom) 2 2 2 4 4
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.37 0.34 0.36 0.58 0.58
Diff-in-Hansen statistic for private credit 2.00 2.14 0.16 0.08 0.01
Diff-in-Hansen (p-value) 0.16 0.14 0.69 0.78 0.92
Net FDI outflows to GDP
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on country-level in parentheses. Estimates are one-step Difference-GMM. 
In all columns L2-L4.(Net FDI outflows to GDP) are used as instruments for the (differenced) lagged dependent variable. In 
columns (4) and (5) the (differenced) capital account openness is instrumented with L1-L3 of it's level. The table shows the 
Arellano-Bond-Test for first and second order autocorrelation of the first-differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is no 
autocorrelation. Heteroskedasticity robust test of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen-J-Test) is performed. The null hypothesis is 
that the instrument set as a group is exogenous. Difference-in-Hansen Test for exogeneity of instrument subset (here of private 
credit) is performed. Under the null the instrument excluded is exogenous. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively.
otes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the country level in parentheses. Estimates are one-step
difference GMM. In all the columns L2-L4.(Net FDI outflows to GDP) are used as instruments for the (differenced)
lagged dependent variable. In columns (4) and (5) the (differenced) capital account openness is instrumented with
L1-L3 of its level. The table shows the Arellano-Bond test for first- and second-order autocorrelation of the first-
differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is no autocorrelation. A heteroskedasticity-robust test of overidentifying
restrictions (Hansen-J test) is performed. The null hypothesis is that the instrument set as a group is exogenous.
A Difference-in-Hansen test for exogeneity of the instrument subset (here of private credit) is performed. Under
the null the instrument excluded is exogenous. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Table 2.3: Debt outflows and financial development: basic sample
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L1.(Net debt outflows to GDP) 0.096*** 0.090** 0.096*** 0.096*** 0.091**
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036)
Private credit to GDP -0.051** -0.051** -0.051** -0.050** -0.050**
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Log of real GDP per capita in PPP -0.072 -0.070
(0.044) (0.044)
Trade openness -0.0076 -0.0076
(0.030) (0.031)
Capital account openness 0.015 0.014
(0.014) (0.014)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 2063 2063 2063 2063 2063
Number of country clusters 122 122 122 122 122
Number of instruments 25 26 26 28 30
F statistic 11.2 11.1 10.8 11.2 10.6
F-Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(1) Test -7.56 -7.68 -7.55 -7.52 -7.64
AR(1) Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) Test -0.16 -0.19 -0.15 -0.18 -0.20
AR(2) Test (p-value) 0.87 0.85 0.88 0.85 0.84
Hansen-J statistic 0.35 0.26 0.37 1.87 1.66
Hansen-J (degrees of freedom) 2 2 2 4 4
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.84 0.88 0.83 0.76 0.80
Diff-in-Hansen statistic for private credit 0.27 0.21 0.31 0.08 0.03
Diff-in-Hansen (p-value) 0.61 0.65 0.58 0.78 0.86
Net debt outflows to GDP
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on country-level in parentheses. Estimates are one-step Difference-GMM. 
In all columns L2-L4.(Net debt outflows to GDP) are used as instruments for the (differenced) lagged dependent variable. In 
columns (4) and (5) the (differenced) capital account openness is instrumented with L1-L3 of it's level. The table shows the 
Arellano-Bond-Test for first and second order autocorrelation of the first-differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is no 
autocorrelation. Heteroskedasticity robust test of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen-J-Test) is performed. The null hypothesis is 
that the instrument set as a group is exogenous. Difference-in-Hansen Test for exogeneity of instrument subset (here of private 
credit) is performed. Under the null the instrument excluded is exogenous. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 
1% levels, respectively.
otes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the country level in parentheses. Estimates are one-step
difference GMM. In all the columns L2-L4.(Net debt outflows to GDP) are used as instruments for the (differenced)
lagged dependent variable. In columns (4) and (5) the (differenced) capital account openness is instrumented with
L1-L3 of its level. The table shows the Arellano-Bond test for first- and second-order autocorrelation of the first-
differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is no autocorrelation. A heteroskedasticity-robust test of overidentifying
restrictions (Hansen-J test) is performed. The null hypothesis is that the instrument set as a group is exogenous.
A Difference-in-Hansen test for exogeneity of the instrument subset (here of private credit) is performed. Under
the null the instrument excluded is exogenous. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
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which is expected by construction. The test cannot, however, reject the null
hypothesis of the absences of AR(2) in the first-differenced residuals. It
indicates that my lagged levels of the dependent variable are valid instru-
ments. Further, the p-value of the Hansen-J test ranges between 0.34 and
0.88. Therefore, the null hypothesis of exogeneity of the instrument set as a
whole cannot be rejected. This indicates that endogeneity is not driving my
results. I performed further a Difference-in-Hansen test for the exogeneity
of private credit. The test statistic is χ2(1) distributed. The p-value ranges
from 0.14 to 0.92 and indicates that the null hypothesis of exogeneity of my
financial development measure cannot be rejected.
Looking at column (1) of Table 2.2, private credit has a positive and at the
5% level statistically significant impact on FDI outflows as a share of GDP.
This suggests that in line with the theory countries with a better developed
financial system export FDI on net. Throughout all 5 specifications the coef-
ficient almost does not change quantitatively and remains significant. In the
next three columns (2) to (4) I include the other explanatory variables one
by one. Column (5) uses all the regressors together.56 Since the estimated
coefficients remain unchanged I interpret only column (5). The estimated
coefficient on GDP per capita is negative and shows that poor countries
observe more FDI outflows (or fewer FDI inflows). However, it is not sta-
tistically significant. Further, trade openness has a negative impact on FDI
outflows, which is significant at the 5% level. This result is either consistent
with the vertical integration motive for FDIs where multinational firms look
for cheap production locations or it may be explained by the “export plat-
forms” suggestion by Hanson et al. (2001) where multinationals establish
large distribution networks in order to serve foreign markets better. Finally,
as expected, capital account restrictions impede net FDI inflows. The coef-
56In columns (4) and (5) the capital account openness index is instrumented with ap-
propriate lags because the Difference-in-Hansen test for this variable indicated endogeneity
problems. As a consequence there are four instead of only two overidentifying restrictions.
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ficient is negative though only marginally significant at the 11% level.
A natural question to ask is what is the economic significance of the im-
pact of financial development? To quantify the effect I compare a country at
the 75th percentile of the distribution of private credit, like Australia, with
a country at the 25th percentile, like Turkey.57 The latter has an approxi-
mately 50 percentage points lower level of private credit as a percentage of
GDP. The coefficient of 0.033 suggests that Australia will have 1.65 percent-
age points higher net FDI outflows as a percentage of GDP. However, since I
have a dynamic model, the coefficient represents only the contemporaneous
effect. The long-run impact is given by β/(1− α). Given the estimate for α
of 0.09, the long-run effect amounts to about 1.65/(1− 0.09) = 1.8 percent-
age points. Moreover, let’s compare this value with the observed difference
between the 75th and the 25th percentiles of the distribution of net FDI out-
flows to GDP, which is around 2.7 percentage points.58 Therefore, the effect
of financial development would “explain” about two-thirds of this difference.
In contrast, the same exercise for the other statistically significant variable,
trade openness, leads to a lower long-run effect of 1.1 percentage points,
which makes up around 41% of the interquartile range of the distribution of
net FDI outflows to GDP.59 In summary, financial system development has
not only a statistically but also an economically significant impact on net
FDI flows.
Table 2.3 presents the results for net debt outflows. Since the estimated
coefficients differ only slightly across specifications I interpret the estimates
in column (5) only. Private credit has a negative impact on net debt out-
flows as a share of GDP. Further, the estimated coefficient is significant at
57In 1994 private credit in Turkey was around 16% of GDP whereas it was around 66%
for Australia.
58This represents the interquartile range of the distribution.
59The difference between a country at the 75th percentile of trade openness distribution
and a country at the 25th percentile is 0.48. The long-run impact is therefore 0.48 ∗
0.021/(1− 0.09) = 0.011
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the 5% level. Therefore, as postulated by the theory, financially less devel-
oped countries export portfolio debt capital on net. The economic effect of
financial development is sizable for net debt flows as well. Improving the
availability of private credit in Turkey to the level in Australia leads to a
0.5 ∗ 0.05/(1 − 0.091) = 2.75 percentage points increase in net debt inflows
as a percentage of GDP over the long run. Furthermore, the interquartile
range of net debt outflows amounts to around 6.5% of GDP. As a result the
effect of financial system development makes up around 42% of this range.
Therefore, the quality of the financial system has an economically significant
effect on net portfolio debt flows. Further, the coefficient on the variable
GDP per capita is negative; however, it is only marginally significant at
the 11.4% level. This is against the prediction of purely neoclassical mod-
els because it indicates that high-income countries import capital on net.60
However, this estimate is consistent with the “paradox” of capital flows from
poor to rich countries, because empirically in the period 1984-2004 portfolio
debt investments were directed on net to rich countries. Finally, the last
two explanatory variables, trade and capital account openness, do not have
a significant impact on net debt flows. Nevertheless, the positive coefficient
on financial openness is consistent with the fact that the patterns of debt
flowing from developing to more advanced countries started in the mid 1980s
after the beginning of the global capital account liberalization process.
2.4.3 Robustness
In this part of the paper I perform different robustness checks in order to
show that the estimated effect of financial development on capital flows is not
driven by the choice of country sample. More importantly, I further confirm
60As suggested before GDP per capita may capture the impact of human capital abun-
dance of countries. As shown by Lucas (1990), a better-educated workforce in advanced
economies increases the rate of return on physical capital and therefore the attractiveness
of investments there. Hence, capital flows would not flow to poor, capital-scarce countries.
44
Financial Development and Capital Flows
that the estimated impact is independent of the effect of the quality of other
institutions highlighted by theoretical models as well as previous empirical
studies.
As a first step I address the sample robustness in Tables 2.4 and 2.5.61 I
construct 3 different samples and compare them with the basic sample. The
first one excludes 12 offshore financial centers. These countries are Bahrain,
Costa Rica, Cyprus, Hong Kong, Israel, Malta, Mauritius, the Netherlands,
Panama, the Philippines, Singapore and Uruguay.62 Typically, offshore finan-
cial centers are “de facto pure intermediaries”63 characterized by extraordi-
nary high gross capital in- and outflows. Even though the net flows are not
necessarily large these countries may have a different composition of their
net flows compared with other countries. The second robustness check drops
16 oil exporters from the main sample. The oil-producing countries are Al-
geria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Congo, Ecuador, Gabon, Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria,
Norway, Oman, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, the Syrian Arab Re-
public, Turkmenistan and Venezuela.64 These economies are typically large
creditors. Since fluctuations in the oil prices may lead to a large accumulation
of assets, it is interesting to see whether the exclusion of this group changes
the results qualitatively. Finally, the third sample focuses on developing and
emerging market economies in order to see whether the higher level of fi-
nancial development in developed countries drives my results. It therefore
excludes 19 advanced economies. The advanced countries are Australia, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the
United Kingdom and the United States.65
61Table 2.4 presents the results for net FDI outflows whereas Table 2.5 shows those for
net debt outflows.
62The definition of those countries follows Mauro and Faria (2009).
63See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), p. 231.
64The definition of these countries comes from International Monetary Fund (2007),
chapter 1, p. 16, figure 1.13.
65The definition of these countries comes from Prasad et al. (2003).
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Table 2.4: FDI outflows and financial development: sample robustness
Dependent Variable:
Sample excluding:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L1.(Net FDI outflows to GDP) 0.091* 0.11** 0.084* 0.092** 0.087* 0.094**
(0.049) (0.050) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
Private credit to GDP 0.031* 0.030* 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.028* 0.026*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015)
Log of real GDP per capita in PPP -0.020* -0.017 -0.012
(0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Trade openness -0.020** -0.023** -0.022**
(0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0083)
Capital account openness -0.0094 -0.00056 -0.0083**
(0.0059) (0.0057) (0.0041)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1840 1840 1798 1798 1676 1676
Number of country clusters 110 110 106 106 103 103
Number of instruments 25 30 25 30 25 30
F statistic 3.89 5.68 3.91 5.94 4.68 9.36
F-Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(1) Test -6.34 -6.48 -6.38 -6.43 -6.22 -6.32
AR(1) Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) Test -0.21 -0.15 0.28 0.44 0.096 0.14
AR(2) Test (p-value) 0.83 0.88 0.78 0.66 0.92 0.89
Hansen-J statistic 2.95 4.08 3.35 4.23 0.89 1.97
Hansen-J (degrees of freedom) 2 4 2 4 2 4
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.23 0.39 0.19 0.38 0.64 0.74
Diff-in-Hansen statistic for private credit 0.10 0.21 2.76 0.00 0.20 0.55
Diff-in-Hansen (p-value) 0.75 0.65 0.10 0.97 0.65 0.46
advanced economies
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on country-level in parentheses. Estimates are one-step Difference-GMM. In all columns L2-L4.(Net 
FDI outflows to GDP) are used as instruments for the (differenced) lagged dependent variable. In columns (2), (4) and (6) the (differenced) capital account 
openness is instrumented with L1-L3 of it's level. The table shows the Arellano-Bond-Test for first and second order autocorrelation of the first-differenced 
residuals. The null hypothesis is no autocorrelation. Heteroskedasticity robust test of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen-J-Test) is performed. The null 
hypothesis is that the instrument set as a group is exogenous. Difference-in-Hansen Test for exogeneity of instrument subset (here of private credit) is 
performed. Under the null the instrument excluded is exogenous. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Net FDI outflows to GDP
offshore financial centers oil producers
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the country level in parentheses. Estimates are one-step difference
GMM. In all the columns L2-L4.(Net FDI outflows to GDP) are used as instruments for the (differenced) lagged dependent
variable. In columns (2), (4) and (6) the (differenced) capital account openness is instrumented with L1-L3 of its level.
The t ble shows the Arellano-Bond test for first- nd second-order autocorrelation of the first-differenced residuals. The
null ypothesis is no autocorrelation. A heteroskedasticity-robust est of ov ridentifying restrictions (Hansen-J test) is
p rmed. The l hypothesis is that the i strument set as a roup is exogenous. A Differenc -in-Hansen test for
exogeneity of the instrument subset (here of private credit) is performed. Under the null the instrument excluded is
exogenous. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 2.5: Debt outflows and financial development: sample robustness
Dependent Variable:
Sample excluding:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L1.(Net debt outflows to GDP) 0.10** 0.098** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.068* 0.065*
(0.041) (0.041) (0.035) (0.035) (0.038) (0.039)
Private credit to GDP -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.049** -0.046** -0.073** -0.073**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.022) (0.034) (0.034)
Log of real GDP per capita in PPP -0.037 -0.078* -0.067
(0.038) (0.046) (0.044)
Trade openness 0.0055 -0.012 -0.0045
(0.031) (0.036) (0.031)
Capital account openness 0.0035 0.015 -0.0011
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 1839 1839 1797 1797 1675 1675
Number of country clusters 110 110 106 106 103 103
Number of instruments 25 30 25 30 25 30
F statistic 10.6 9.68 11.2 11.2 13.4 12.7
F-Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(1) Test -7.13 -7.18 -7.09 -7.19 -6.86 -6.92
AR(1) Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) Test 0.64 0.60 1.49 1.43 -0.30 -0.29
AR(2) Test (p-value) 0.52 0.55 0.14 0.15 0.77 0.77
Hansen-J statistic 0.70 1.26 3.47 6.78 0.13 1.79
Hansen-J (degrees of freedom) 2 4 2 4 2 4
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.70 0.87 0.18 0.15 0.94 0.78
Diff-in-Hansen statistic for private credit 0.70 0.07 3.46 1.75 0.03 0.01
Diff-in-Hansen (p-value) 0.40 0.79 0.06 0.19 0.87 0.98
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on country-level in parentheses. Estimates are one-step Difference-GMM. In all columns L2-L4.(Net 
debt outflows to GDP) are used as instruments for the (differenced) lagged dependent variable. In columns (2), (4) and (6) the (differenced) capital account 
openness is instrumented with L1-L3 of it's level. The table shows the Arellano-Bond-Test for first and second order autocorrelation of the first-
differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is no autocorrelation. Heteroskedasticity robust test of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen-J-Test) is performed. 
The null hypothesis is that the instrument set as a group is exogenous. Difference-in-Hansen Test for exogeneity of instrument subset (here of private 
credit) is performed. Under the null the instrument excluded is exogenous. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
offshore financial centers oil producers
Net debt outflows to GDP
advanced economies
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the country level in parentheses. Estimates are one-step difference
GMM. In all the columns L2-L4.(Net debt outflows to GDP) are used as instruments for the (differenced) lagged dependent
variable. In columns (2), (4) and (6) the (differenced) capital account openness is instrumented with L1-L3 of its level.
The table shows the Arellano-Bond test for first- and second-order autocorrelation of the first-differenced residuals. The
null hypothesis is no autocorrelation. A heteroskedasticity-robust test of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen-J test) is
performed. The null hypothesis is that the instrument set as a group is exogenous. A Difference-in-Hansen test for
exogeneity of the instrument subset (here of private credit) is performed. Under the null the instrument excluded is
exogenous. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Comparing column (2) in both Tables 2.4 and 2.5 with the baseline re-
sults we see that the coefficients on private credit change only marginally
and remain statistically significant. Therefore, the presence of offshore fi-
nancial centers in the basic sample does not have a qualitative impact on
the results.66 Column (4) in both tables presents the results when I drop
oil producers. Again the estimates of the coefficient on my financial de-
velopment measure do not seem to be qualitatively different. Actually, the
statistical significance is now stronger. Further, in column (4) of Table 2.5
GDP per capita now has a significant impact on net debt outflows at the
10% level. This supports the evidence that poor economies are net exporters
of portfolio debt capital. Finally, let’s consider the developing and emerging
sample in column (6) of both tables. Table 2.4 shows that the exclusion of
advanced countries does not change the results qualitatively. The only small
difference is that now capital account openness has a significant negative im-
pact on net FDI outflows at the 10% level. Finally, column (6) of Table 2.5
shows that within emerging and developing countries private credit is still
strongly and negatively associated with net debt outflows. In summary, the
baseline estimation results are independent from the choice of the country
sample. Financial system development is a key determinant of the direction
and composition of capital flows.
In the final step I check whether the inclusion of the quality of institutions
other than financial ones has an impact on my baseline results. I use an
index of institutions constructed with data from Kaufmann et al. (2006)
described in section 2.3. Data on institutions are available only for the period
from 1996 to 2004; therefore, all the estimates apply to this sample period.67
66The only apparent difference in column (2) of Table 2.4 is that now GDP per capita is
significant at the 10% level, which indicates that rich countries observe fewer FDI outflows.
Even though this is not consistent with the general evidence, GDP per capita may capture
the positive impact of human capital abundance in attracting FDI inflows.
67Nevertheless, the results show that the choice of the sample period does not have a
qualitative impact on the estimated effect of financial development.
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Table 2.6: Capital outflows and institutional quality during the period 1996-
2004
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lagged dependent variable 0.073 0.070 0.014 0.010
(0.067) (0.068) (0.062) (0.061)
Private credit to GDP 0.045* 0.046* -0.046** -0.042**
(0.024) (0.025) (0.020) (0.020)
Log of real GDP per capita in PPP 0.0062 0.013 -0.068 -0.046
(0.023) (0.024) (0.054) (0.051)
Trade openness -0.029** -0.031*** 0.027 0.022
(0.011) (0.011) (0.024) (0.023)
Capital account openness -0.010 -0.0099 0.0044 0.0042
(0.0077) (0.0081) (0.018) (0.018)
Institutions -0.026** -0.036*
(0.013) (0.021)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 831 831 830 830
Number of country clusters 117 117 117 117
Number of instruments 19 20 19 20
F statistic 4.61 4.89 7.68 8.68
F-Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(1) Test -6.28 -6.26 -5.34 -6.36
AR(1) Test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR(2) Test 0.46 0.43 -1.24 0.55
AR(2) Test (p-value) 0.65 0.67 0.21 0.58
Hansen-J statistic 4.19 3.94 5.90 5.20
Hansen-J (degrees of freedom) 6 6 6 6
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.65 0.69 0.43 0.52
Diff-in-Hansen statistic for private credit 0.00 0.09 2.35 2.19
Diff-in-Hansen for private credit (p-value) 0.97 0.76 0.13 0.14
Diff-in-Hansen statistic for institutions 0.29 1.62
Diff-in-Hansen for institutions (p-value) 0.59 0.20
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on country-level in parentheses. Estimates are one-step Difference-GMM. In 
columns (3) and (4) a forward orthogonal deviations transformation is used instead of first differences. In all columns L2-
L4.(dependent variable) are used as instruments for the transformed lagged dependent variable and capital account openness is 
instrumented with L2-L6 of it's level. The table shows the Arellano-Bond-Test for first and second order autocorrelation of the first-
differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is no autocorrelation. Heteroskedasticity robust test of overidentifying restrictions (Hansen-
J-Test) is performed. The null hypothesis is that the instrument set as a group is exogenous. Difference-in-Hansen Test for exogeneity 
of instrument subset (here of private credit or institutions) is performed. Under the null the instrument excluded is exogenous. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Net FDI outflows to GDP Net debt outflows to GDP
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the country level in parentheses. Estimates are one-
step difference GMM. In columns (3) and (4) a forward orthogonal deviations transformation is used instead of
first differences. In all the columns L2-L4.(dependent variable) are used as instruments for the (transformed)
lagged dependent variable and capital account openness is instrumented with L2-L6 of its level. The table
shows the Arellano-Bond test for first- and second-order autocorrelation of the first-differenced residuals.
The null hypothesis is no autocorrelation. A heteroskedasticity-robust test of overidentifying restrictions
(Hansen-J test) is performed. The null hypothesis is that the instrument set as a group is exogenous. A
Difference-in-Hansen test for exogeneity of the instrument subset (here of private credit or institutions) is
performed. Under the null the instrument excluded is exogenous. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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This institutional index is a proxy for “property rights institutions” from the
model of Ju and Wei (2007) with higher values indicating better developed
institutions. Table 2.6 presents the estimation results. Columns (1) and (2)
use net FDI outflows as a dependent variable whereas columns (3) and (4) use
net debt outflows. Due to data availability 117 of the 122 countries from the
basic sample are used in this estimation. Throughout all the specifications
the overall Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions as well as the individual
tests for both private credit and institutions cannot reject the null hypothesis
of exogeneity of the explanatory variables. Unfortunately, the estimated
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is not statistically significant.68
Therefore, I interpret only contemporaneous effects.
As previously stated the theory predicts that countries with better prop-
erty rights institutions should experience fewer net FDI outflows as well as
fewer net debt outflows. Therefore, the coefficient for the effect of the quality
of institutions on net FDI (debt) outflows should be negative. Columns (2)
and (4) of Table 2.6 show that the estimated coefficients indeed have a nega-
tive sign and are statistically significant at the 5% or 10% levels, respectively.
Furthermore, the economic effect of the institutional quality index is sizable.
The difference in this variable between a country at the 75th percentile of
institutions like Lithuania and a country at the 25th percentile like the Kyr-
gyz Republic is 1.363. The impact of institutional quality on FDI outflows
is therefore about 1.363 ∗ 0.026 = 3.54 percentage points, which represents
81% of the interquartile range of net FDI flows to GDP.69 Now let’s compare
this effect with the impact of private credit. Given the estimate of 0.046
the impact of financial development accounts for 64.5% of the observed in-
terquartile range of net FDI flows to GDP. Accordingly, it is a little lower
68Even though the lagged dependent variable has no significant impact, which may
indicate a static model, I still rely on GMM as the correct estimation technique because
I have to use instruments for the potentially endogenous capital account openness.
69This range is around 4.37 percentage points.
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than the effect of the institutional index.70 For debt outflows in column (4) a
similar picture emerges. Improving the quality of institutions in the Kyrgyz
Republic to the level in Lithuania leads to a 4.9 percentage points increase
in net debt inflows.71 This represents around 71.4% of the 6.86 percentage
points interquartile range of net debt outflows as a percentage of GDP. In
contrast, the effect of financial system development is smaller and amounts to
0.614∗0.042 = 2.58 percentage points, which make up 37.6% of the observed
interquartile range.
In summary, the quality of institutions has a positive, statistically and
economically significant impact on both net FDI and portfolio debt inflows.
The effect of the quality of the financial system in this respect is smaller,
but still economically significant and more importantly independent from it.
Therefore, as suggested by the model of Ju and Wei (2007), both financial
and property rights institutions are key determinants of the direction and
composition of international capital flows.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence that financial development is a key
determinant of recent empirical patterns of worldwide capital flows. Since
the mid 1980s there is evidence that FDIs flow on net to emerging and de-
veloping countries but simultaneously significant net flows of portfolio debt
capital are directed to developed countries. While traditional neoclassical
theory is unable to explain these “paradoxical” developments recent theo-
retical literature emphasizes the role of financial market frictions. In such a
setting differences in financial system development across countries combined
70For this sample the difference in private credit between a country on the 75th
percentile and a country on the 25th percentile is 0.614. The impact is therefore
0.614 ∗ 0.046 = 2.82 percentage points.
71The effect is 1.363 ∗ 0.036 = 4.9 percentage points.
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with an increased international financial integration generate a sort of com-
parative advantage that alters the direction and composition of capital flows.
In particular, using a panel dataset of up to 122 developing, emerging and de-
veloped countries, I show that the degree of financial development influences
different types of capital flows in different ways. As suggested by recent mod-
els, e.g. that of Ju and Wei (2007) among others, good financial institutions
are ceteris paribus associated on net with debt inflows and FDI outflows.
Further, better property rights institutions attract more FDI and more debt
inflows on net. As suggested by theory, the effect of financial institutions
is independent of the impact of the quality of other institutions. Using the
dynamic difference GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991)
I confirm that these results are not driven by endogeneity due to omitted
variables or reverse causality.
The findings in this paper have important economic implications. First,
the increased worldwide financial integration allows domestic savers in devel-
oping countries to “bypass” the inefficient, underdeveloped financial system
and simultaneously enables foreign investors to run profitable investment
projects in those countries, which are not financed through the domestic
financial system. Second, the observed recent patterns of current account
imbalances may be rationalized by cross-country differences in financial de-
velopment in a financially globalized world.72 As shown by Antra`s and Ca-
ballero (2009), policy makers should be cautious in raising trade barriers in
order to reduce these “imbalances”, because these actions may even exacer-
bate them. Finally, the global financial crisis that started in 2008 indicated
that increased cross-border holdings of assets may be dangerous for the sta-
bility of the global financial system. It showed that negative local shocks,
i.e. the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market in the US, are likely to
72See Mendoza et al. (2009). In a different model Caballero et al. (2008) show as well
that such “imbalances” may arise as an equilibrium response to different shocks, whereas
financial system development is a key feature of the model.
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be transmitted quickly and powerfully to foreign countries, which bear the
risk of holding “toxic” US assets and as a result not only the US but also the
global economy is affected. Therefore, although growing capital flows across
countries may be advantageous, they may increase the vulnerability of the
global financial system.
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A Appendix to Chapter 2
Table 2.7: Country description
Country name Country
ISO code
Country name Country
ISO code
Albania* ALB Estonia EST
Algeria DZA Ethiopia ETH
Angola* AGO Fiji FJI
Argentina ARG Finland FIN
Armenia ARM France FRA
Australia AUS Gabon GAB
Austria AUT Georgia GEO
Azerbaijan AZE Germany DEU
Bahrain BHR Ghana GHA
Bangladesh BGD Greece GRC
Belarus* BLR Guatemala GTM
Belgium BEL Guinea GIN
Benin BEN Haiti HTI
Bolivia BOL Honduras HND
Bosnia and Herzegovina BIH Hong Kong, China HKG
Botswana BWA Hungary HUN
Brazil BRA Iceland ISL
Brunei* BRN India IND
Bulgaria* BGR Indonesia IDN
Burkina Faso BFA Iran, Islamic Rep. IRN
Cambodia KHM Ireland IRL
Cameroon CMR Israel ISR
Canada CAN Italy ITA
Chad TCD Jamaica JAM
Chile CHL Japan JPN
China CHN Jordan JOR
Colombia COL Kazakhstan KAZ
Congo, Dem. Rep.* ZAR Kenya KEN
Congo, Rep. COG Korea, Rep. KOR
Costa Rica CRI Kuwait KWT
Cote d’Ivoire CIV Kyrgyz Republic KGZ
Croatia HRV Lao PDR LAO
Cyprus CYP Latvia LVA
Czech Republic CZE Lebanon* LBN
Denmark DNK Libya* LBY
Dominican Republic DOM Lithuania LTU
Ecuador ECU Luxembourg* LUX
Egypt, Arab Rep. EGY Macedonia, FYR MKD
El Salvador SLV Madagascar MDG
Equatorial Guinea GNQ Malawi MWI
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Table 2.7 - Continued
Country name Country
ISO code
Country name Country
ISO code
Malaysia MYS Swaziland SWZ
Mali MLI Sweden SWE
Malta MLT Switzerland* CHE
Mauritius MUS Syrian Arab Republic SYR
Mexico MEX Taiwan* TWN
Moldova MDA Tajikistan* TJK
Morocco MAR Tanzania TZA
Mozambique MOZ Thailand THA
Myanmar* MMR Togo TGO
Namibia NAM Trinidad and Tobago TTO
Nepal NPL Tunisia TUN
Netherlands NLD Turkey TUR
New Zealand NZL Turkmenistan* TKM
Nicaragua* NIC Uganda UGA
Niger NER Ukraine UKR
Nigeria NGA United Arab Emirates* ARE
Norway NOR United Kingdom GBR
Oman OMN United States USA
Pakistan PAK Uruguay URY
Panama PAN Uzbekistan* UZB
Papua New Guinea PNG Venezuela, RB VEN
Paraguay PRY Vietnam* VNM
Peru PER Yemen, Rep.* YEM
Philippines PHL Zambia ZMB
Poland* POL Zimbabwe ZWE
Portugal PRT
Qatar* QAT
Romania ROM
Russian Federation RUS
Rwanda RWA
Saudi Arabia SAU
Senegal SEN
Serbia and Montenegro* YUG
Singapore SGP
Slovak Republic* SVK
Slovenia SVN
South Africa ZAF
Spain ESP
Sri Lanka LKA
Sudan SDN
Notes: Sample of 145 countries from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). 23 countries marked with an asterisk
(*) are excluded from the basic estimation sample.
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Notes: The figure shows the average of trade openness, defined as the sum of exports and imports of goods and
services over GDP, over the period 1990-2004 for three country groups: advanced, emerging and developing
economies.
Figure 2.5: Trade integration over the period 1984-2004
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period 1990-2004 for three country groups: advanced, emerging and developing economies.
Figure 2.6: Financial integration over the period 1984-2004
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Table 2.8: Pairwise correlations of explanatory variables
Private credit
to GDP
Log of real
GDP per
capita in
PPP
Trade
openness
Capital
account
openness
Institutions
Private credit to
GDP
1.00
Log of real GDP
per capita in PPP
0.69 1.00
Trade openness 0.22 0.24 1.00
Capital account
openness
0.48 0.59 0.26 1.00
Institutions 0.71 0.84 0.24 0.61 1.00
Notes: The table shows the pairwise correlations between the main explanatory variables used in section 2.4.2.
Table 2.9: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev. Min Max
Net FDI outflows to GDP 2064 -0.015 0.027 -0.084 0.024
Net debt outflows to GDP 2064 -0.013 0.060 -0.145 0.130
Private credit to GDP 2064 0.454 0.390 0.010 2.492
Log of real GDP per capita in PPP 2064 8.521 1.146 6.185 10.504
Trade openness 2064 0.735 0.484 0.056 4.169
Capital account openness 2064 0.256 1.568 -1.767 2.603
Institutions 831 0.132 0.878 -1.608 1.938
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for the main variables used in section 2.4.2. For institutions the sample
period spans 1996-2004, for all other variables it is 1984-2004.
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Credit Constraints in Europe:
Firm Productivity and Export
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3.1 Introduction
After the fall of the “Iron Curtain” Eastern European countries showed re-
markable performance. The gradual opening to trade and capital flows sur-
rounding the preparation for the enlargement of the European Union allowed
not only Eastern but also Western European countries to gain from larger
markets, technological improvements and an increased number of product
varieties. This process was accompanied by a surge in trade flows across
countries and an improvement in productivity levels, which raised the wel-
fare in all the participating countries. Even though the labor productivity
growth during the period 1999-2004 was stronger in Central and Eastern Eu-
ropean Countries (CEEC), their productivity level is still about half of that
in Western European states.1
It is the consensus in the literature on economic growth to emphasize
the importance of property rights and contracting institutions for economic
development.2 As countries develop further and property rights strengthen,
financial institutions gain more attention for explaining differences in eco-
nomic development between emerging and advanced economies. Although
there have been significant improvements in the financial systems of many
emerging economies in the last decade, cross-country differences between
Eastern and Western Europe as well as within the group of Western Euro-
pean countries remain significant. Levine (2005) points out the major role of
financial development as providing improvements in the “(i) production of ex
ante information about possible investments, (ii) monitoring of investments
and implementation of corporate governance, (iii) trading, diversification,
and management of risk, (iv) mobilization and pooling of savings, and (v)
exchange of goods and services”. Thus, by reducing financial frictions, finan-
cial development facilitates economic development.
1See Alam et al. (2008), p. 73, figure 2.7.
2See Acemoglu and Johnson (2005).
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Are financial frictions really important for entrepreneurial activities? The
financial crisis that started in 2008 gave us the correct, affirmative answer.
According to the October 2008 euro area bank lending survey of the Euro-
pean Central Bank (ECB), there has been “a significant increase in the net
tightening of credit standards for loans to enterprises in the third quarter
of 2008.”3 Subsequent surveys show that these tight conditions remained at
high levels. At the same time GDP in the euro area slumped by 3.9% in
2009, while CEEC experienced a 4.3% drop.4 This suggests that financial
conditions are indeed important for economic activity. A further survey on
the access to finance of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) published
by the ECB reports that for the first half of 2009 especially SMEs found it
difficult to access finance compared with large corporations.5 SMEs report
two main reasons why credit conditions have worsened: deterioration of the
economic outlook and an increase in collateral requirements. This suggests
that the availability of assets that can serve as collateral is an important
determinant of the access to external finance for firms. In addition, SMEs
reported reduced availability of internal funds as factors for their external
financing needs.6
The next relevant question is whether financial frictions are important
for international trade flows. In a recent press release the World Trade Or-
ganization (2010) reports that in the financial crisis year of 2009, the global
trade flows fell by 12.2%, the sharpest decline since World War II. The World
3See European Central Bank (2008).
4See International Monetary Fund (2010).
5See European Central Bank (2009). The survey covers 6,000 SMEs as well as large
firms in the euro area. Around 43% of SMEs in the euro area reported a worsening in the
availability of credit. Moreover, the smaller the enterprise, the higher is the percentage of
firms reporting deterioration in the readiness of banks to provide credit. This survey is
interesting insofar as the sample of firms I am using in the empirical analysis consists of
around 95% SMEs (fewer than 250 employees) and even around 99% of all firms do not
have access to stock markets.
6These observations are consistent with how the existing literature measures financial
constraints.
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Trade Report 20097 suggests that one of the main causes is the financial cri-
sis, which led to “a sharp decline in credit to finance imports and exports.”8
There are several theoretical considerations for why exporting firms rely on
external finance. Beyond the domestic financing needs, firms entering export
markets face substantial fixed costs, e.g. for marketing research, advertising,
product development and customization, setting-up of new distribution net-
works abroad etc., which typically have to be paid before export revenues
are generated.9 Since firms typically do not have enough cash flow to finance
them, they rely on external finance. Moreover, Auboin (2007) argues that
more than 90% of trade transactions involve some form of credit, insurance
or guarantee. Hence, banks or other financial institutions play a key role in
enabling firms to export or import at desirable levels.
Using a large panel of firms active in up to 28 Eastern and Western Eu-
ropean countries from 179 three-digit US SIC industries during the period
1995-2004, this paper provides evidence that financial constraints are an im-
portant determinant of firm-level total factor productivity (TFP) as well as
firms’ export participation. My results generally match the predictions of
theoretical models on heterogeneous firms, credit constraints and trade, e.g.
Manova (2006) among others, which show how financial frictions shape trade
patterns and productivity differentials. That is, other things being equal,
firms operating in more financially dependent industries and/or industries
that have less tangible assets are on average more productive and are more
likely to export in countries with a better developed financial system. These
findings are independent of the effects of traditional comparative advantage
as well as the effects of non-financial institutions. One interesting further
7See World Trade Organization (2009).
8Chor and Manova (2009) provide evidence that during the crisis countries with tighter
credit conditions exported less to the US.
9See Manova (2009). These costs can be sunk or per period. In addition to fixed
costs, variable costs for duties and transportation are important and may require external
finance.
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result states that credit constraints operate through different channels when
one differentiates between manufacturing and services industries. While in-
sufficient cash flow constrains manufacturing firms, the availability of collat-
eral seems to be more important for services. This finding is consistent with
the notion that service activities usually involve transfers of relatively more
intangible assets, which cannot be used as collateral for financing purposes.
Therefore, financial institutions may be more reluctant to provide sufficient
credit to service companies compared with manufacturing enterprises.
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it
provides firm-level evidence that credit constraints are an important deter-
minant of both TFP and export behavior where firm-level studies are rather
scarce. Second, it focuses on a larger and more homogeneous set of countries,
which are mostly members or candidates of the European Union.10 Third,
most previous studies consider in their analysis solely manufacturing indus-
tries. However, it is interesting to study services for two reasons. The share
of services in total value added and employment has grown over time and
is significantly bigger than the rest of the economy for both Western and
Eastern European countries.11 For CEEC the share in value added rose sig-
nificantly from 40% in 1999 to 60% in 2005.12 Moreover, the expansion of
services relative to agriculture and manufacturing boosted the aggregate la-
bor productivity level during the period 1999-2004.13 Therefore, ignoring the
important role of services does not allow us to understand fully significant
developments in the economy. Finally, previous firm-level studies using trade
data do not effectively account for the endogeneity of firm-level measures of fi-
nancial health with respect to the export decision. Using exogenous measures
of financial vulnerability and applying a difference-in-difference methodology
10In contrast, firm-level studies like Gatti and Love (2008) or Greenaway et al. (2007)
focus on individual countries only.
11See Alam et al. (2008), p. 72.
12See Alam et al. (2008), p. 14.
13See Alam et al. (2008), p. 15.
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I am able to establish a causal relationship from credit constraints to a firm’s
export participation.14
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a review
of the related theoretical and empirical literature. The subsequent section
3.3 provides a brief look at the dataset and the definitions and measurement
of the key explanatory variables. Section 3.4 describes how firm-level total
factor productivity is estimated. In sections 3.5 and 3.6 I present the empir-
ical models and estimation results for how credit constraints affect TFP and
the export status of the firm, respectively. These sections provide additional
robustness checks, too. Finally, section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related literature and theoretical predic-
tions of heterogeneous firms models with
credit constraints
This paper provides evidence on the effects of financial constraints on firms’
TFP as well as their export activities. It can be related to two broad areas
of research: the first one is the more traditional literature on finance and
growth and the second one is the newly established but growing literature
on finance and trade.
The finance and growth literature emphasizes the role of the availabil-
ity of external funds and the efficiency of the financial system for facilitating
economic growth.15 The industry-level analysis of Rajan and Zingales (1998)
among others provides strong evidence that firms from financially dependent
industries have higher growth rates of value added in countries with better
developed financial systems. The firm-level studies on that topic are rather
14A recent exception is Manova et al. (2009).
15For a comprehensive survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on finance and
growth see Levine (2005).
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scarce. Beck et al. (2004) use survey data from 54 countries and demon-
strate that financing obstacles negatively impact on the growth of firms’
sales. While these papers look at the link between the growth rate of value
added and financial constraints, I focus instead on how the level of total
factor productivity by individual firms is affected for the following reasons.
First, Easterly and Levine (2001) provide evidence that TFP accounts for
most of the cross-country differences in the level and growth of GDP per
capita.16 Second, firm-level studies on the link between the level of TFP
and financial constraints are rather scarce. One example is Gatti and Love
(2008), who find that Bulgarian firms that have better access to credit fea-
ture higher TFPs. The potential problem of simultaneity is present in their
study because for example whether the firm has a credit line depends clearly
on its overall performance (productivity). Even though the authors use two-
stage least-squares estimation to address this problem, one can doubt the
results. Their instrument “positive past sales growth” clearly does not meet
the exclusion restriction because it influences directly the contemporaneous
level of TFP.
The studies above have nothing to say about the link between finance and
export patterns. Here comes the role of the literature on finance and trade.
The seminal theoretical work is by Kletzer and Bardhan (1987), who use a
two-country, two-sector, two-factor Heckscher-Ohlin framework to study the
link between credit markets and international trade patterns. This model
shows that financial development can generate a comparative advantage even
in the absence of technological and endowment differences or economies of
scale. The studies of Beck (2002, 2003) among others17 give empirical sup-
port and show that countries with better developed financial systems have
16Rioja and Valev (2004) give the more differentiated view that finance accelerates
primarily TFP growth for advanced countries, whereas it boosts capital accumulation in
developing countries.
17Similar studies on the country or country-industry level are Becker and Greenberg
(2005), Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005) and Hur et al. (2006).
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higher export shares, especially in industries that rely more on external fi-
nance. Although these studies give consistent evidence that financial con-
straints affect export behavior, they are not able to provide a more exact,
disaggregated view of what drives the exports in a particular industry and at
the same time they do not generate predictions about TFP differences across
countries and industries. Here comes the role of heterogeneous firms models,
which depart from the assumption that all the firms in an industry are iden-
tical. Chaney (2005) introduces liquidity constraints in a Melitz (2003)-type
model where firms differ in their productivity levels. Manova (2006) uses
the Melitz framework as well but in addition to Chaney explicitly models fi-
nancial contracts and sectoral dependence on finance, which generates richer
predictions about trade patterns. In both models financial frictions (the lack
of liquidity or external financing) prevent less efficient potential exporters
from entering export markets.
Let me focus on the theoretical predictions of the richer model of Manova
(2006), which is a multi-country, multi-sector partial equilibrium model. The
key assumption is that firms face substantial fixed costs of exporting, e.g. for
marketing, advertising, distribution etc., which are typically paid up-front be-
fore entering the export market. Since export revenues are not realized yet,
some parts of these fixed costs should be financed externally.18 Conditional
on a country’s level of economic development, which captures the fact that
the productivity distribution may differ on average across countries, opening
to trade induces the following two effects. First, in financially constrained
sectors firms are more likely to enter export markets if they are settled in
the financially developed country.19 Second, Manova’s model has a partial
18In the original Melitz (2003) model firms pay the fixed exporting cost using solely
their internal funds.
19This is a consequence of the result that the “export productivity cut-off” is lower
in countries with a better developed financial system. Manova (2006, 2008) provides
strong cross-country-industry level evidence that credit constraints indeed impact on trade
patterns using the variation in the country’s development of the financial system as well
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equilibrium framework and it does not show the differential effect of credit
constraints on the average productivity across industries but only how ex-
port activity is affected. Extending it to a general equilibrium as long as
there is selection into exporting, the following additional effect on average
productivity arises: there will be more intensive entry of firms into export
markets in the better financially developed countries, which will lead to a
stronger competition for purely domestic firms in those countries.20 On the
labor market this will drive up the wage rate more strongly, thus leading to
a higher increase in costs. This lowers the ex-post profits of non-exporters,
since they do not face the foreign demand in addition to their domestic one.
Therefore, firm selection will be stronger in the financially developed country.
As a consequence the least efficient firms will exit the domestic market, which
means that on average more productive companies survive in this industry.
This effect is then stronger in the financially developed country. However,
if one extends the model by assuming in addition that the fixed entry costs
should be financed by external funds, the predictions of the model would be
different. Now firms are still more likely to be exporters in the financially
developed country, but also purely domestic firms are more likely to enter
the market, because access to external finance is easier.21 The survival of less
efficient firms would lower the average productivity.22 Hence, the effect of
financial constraints on the average productivity is theoretically ambiguous,
which is the starting point for my empirical analysis.
as shocks to the availability of finance due to equity market liberalizations.
20The “zero-profit productivity cut-off” will be higher in countries with a better devel-
oped financial system.
21Which means that the “zero-profit productivity cut-off” would be lower in the finan-
cially advanced country.
22Recent literature on trade liberalization argues that beside between-firm reallocations
there can be significant within-firm productivity improvements (Melitz and Costantini
(2008)). In the empirical analysis I am not going to answer the question of whether within-
or between-firm productivity gains drive the average productivity. Alam et al. (2008)
find for CEEC that among industries dominated by SMEs (fewer than 250 employees),
reallocation plays a more important role than within-firm productivity improvements for
aggregate productivity growth (Alam et al. (2008), p. 120).
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The last related theoretical paper is by Bernard et al. (2007b), who in-
troduce differences in the relative abundance of human capital into a Melitz
(2003) model. Even though this paper does not explain the link between
finance, TFP and trade patterns, it shows that traditional sources of compar-
ative advantage can simultaneously influence firm productivity and exports.
The authors demonstrate that trade liberalization induces reallocations of re-
sources not only across but also within industries. In general equilibrium the
probability of exporting is shown to be higher in the comparative advantage
sector relative to the comparative disadvantage sector because export oppor-
tunities are greater in this sector. Further, this generates higher competition
in comparative advantage sectors, which leads to a stronger exit of unproduc-
tive domestic firms. As a result the average productivity in this sector rises
by more. These results suggest that along with financial constraints tradi-
tional comparative advantage can drive both observed productivity levels and
export participation, which should be accounted for in empirical studies.23
While there are several empirical studies on credit constraints and trade
that use aggregated data, firm-level studies on that topic are rather scarce.
Greenaway et al. (2007) use a sample of UK manufacturing firms and show
that exporters have better financial health (high liquidity and low leverage)
than non-exporters, whereas interestingly there is no evidence of a selection
effect of ex-ante more financially healthy firms into exporting. Even the
opposite is found to be true. In contrast, Muuˆls (2008) and Berman and
He´ricourt (2008) provide evidence that firms are more likely to become ex-
porters if they are initially more productive and if they are less financially
23It is worth emphasizing that overall heterogeneous firm models predict that the level
of TFP and not the growth rate of TFP should be a function of country and industry
characteristics. This is the reason why I depart from the finance and growth literature.
Moreover, as already noted, Alam et al. (2008) estimate that even though the labor
productivity growth during the period 1999-2004 was stronger in CEEC, the productivity
level was more than twice as low as in Western EU member states. Therefore, looking at
the cross-country differences in productivity levels seem to be more interesting.
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constrained.24 However, all three studies use firm-level balance sheet mea-
sures of credit constraints or the company’s credit ratings, which are likely to
be endogenous to the decision of the firm to export. Therefore, their results
should be viewed with caution. Recently, Manova et al. (2009) provided evi-
dence on the link between exports and financial frictions using Chinese firm-
level data. Unlike the previous studies, they use industry-specific measures
of financial vulnerability that are exogenous to the firm’s export decision.25
To summarize, the existing firm-level empirical literature on the link be-
tween credit constraints and firm productivity or a firm’s export participation
finds it difficult to establish causality. In the next section I present the data
that are used in the empirical analysis and show how I deal with the potential
endogeneity of firm-level measures of financial constraints.
3.3 Data and summary statistics
3.3.1 Firm-level data
In order to perform a comprehensive empirical analysis I use different data
sources. The AMADEUS database (2005) from Bureau van Dijk Electronic
Publishing (BvDEP) serves as the main source of information.26 It provides
comprehensive data on different balance sheet and income statement items
for a large number of firms in all European countries, except Albania and
24Muuˆls (2008) focuses on a sample of Belgian manufacturing firms whereas Berman
and He´ricourt (2008) use Investment Climate Surveys data from the Worldbank on 5000
firms from 9 developing and emerging economies (China, India, Bangladesh, Indonesia,
the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Morocco and South Africa).
25This is also the way I proceed. While I focus on the participation decision (extensive
margin) they use firm-level data by export destinations and are able to explore the intensive
margin of exports.
26This database is widely used in empirical studies on European firms. For example,
Helpman et al. (2004) use this data to estimate productivity distributions while Klapper
et al. (2006) use data on market entry rates in different industries.
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the former CIS. In the 2005 edition 40 European countries are covered.27 I
use the medium-size database, which focuses on the top 1.5 million compa-
nies. AMADEUS uses the following criteria for the inclusion of firms in this
database: for the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Ukraine and the Rus-
sian Federation companies must satisfy at least 1 of the following 3 criteria:
1. operating revenue equal to at least 1.5 million euro;
2. total assets equal to at least 3 million euro;
3. number of employees equal to at least 20.
For all other countries these criteria are:
1. operating revenue equal to at least 1 million euro;
2. total assets equal to at least 2 million euro;
3. number of employees equal to at least 15.
From the 1.5 million firms I sample only unconsolidated accounts, namely
I exclude consolidated statements of parent firms and their subsidiaries,
which are included in the database. This prevents double counting of firms.
Firms are selected further so as to have non-missing data on value added,
sales, total revenues, fixed assets, total assets, number of employees and
material cost. These data are required to estimate total factor productivi-
ties (TFP) at the firm level. In order to use a more homogeneous sample I
focus on countries that are currently members of the European Union (plus
27The countries are: Austria (AT), Belarus (BY), Bulgaria (BG), Belgium (BE), Bosnia
and Herzegovina (BA), Croatia (HR), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK),
Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU),
Iceland (IS), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Liechtenstein (LI), Lithuania (LT),
Luxembourg (LU), Macedonia (MK), Malta (MT), Moldova (MD), Monaco (MC), the
Netherlands (NL), Norway (NO), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Romania (RO), the Russian
Federation (RU), Serbia and Montenegro (CS), the Slovak Republic (SK), Slovenia (SI),
Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), Switzerland (CH), Ukraine (UA) and the United Kingdom (GB).
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Switzerland and Norway) or are EU candidates. After applying the above se-
lection criteria I end up with 28 countries, of which 16 are Western European
and 12 belong to the group of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Table 3.12
in Appendix B provides a list of the country coverage. The available sample
period spans the years 1995 and 2004. The panel of companies is unbalanced
with an average of 5 to 6 yearly observations per firm. With respect to the
industry coverage the following sample selection was performed. Primary sec-
tors are not included in the sample, because their existence highly depends
on countries’ abundance of natural resources.28 Finance, real estate and in-
surance industries (SIC codes 600-699) were also dropped because financial
and profitability measures are hardly comparable with those of other firms.
As a result the final sample consists of up to 539,015 firms active in 179 three-
digit US SIC industries.29 Table 3.1 shows the distribution of firms across
broad industry divisions. Most of the companies come from manufacturing
and wholesale trade, whereas firms from transportation, communication etc.
services represent the minority group in the dataset. As a whole secondary
industries cover around 42% of the firms while 58% are tertiary industries.
Table 3.1: Industry coverage in the sample
Industry Division SIC
codes
Percentage
Construction 152-179 12.7
Manufacturing 201-399 29.6
Transportation, Communication, etc. Services 401-495 7.3
Wholesale Trade 501-519 24.8
Retail Trade 523-599 11.5
Other Services 701-874 14.1
Notes: The table shows by industry division the total number of active firms during the sample period
of 1995-2004.
28Gold and silver ores are the only exception. Leaving out this industry does not alter
all the results presented in the paper.
29Table 3.14 in Appendix B provides a full description of all 179 industries.
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Analyzing the role of credit constraints for export activity in section
3.6 requires firm-level data on export turnover reported in the AMADEUS
database. Unfortunately, this information is relatively scarce. From the 28
countries sampled before only 6 countries collect and report this data. After
applying some sample selection criteria I am left with the countries France,
the United Kingdom, Sweden and Croatia. Section 3.6 provides summary
statistics on the export sample.
3.3.2 Industry-level data
In the empirical analysis I use different measures of industry characteris-
tics. The most important data are on financial constraints. The primary
data source is the Worldscope Database (2008) by Thomson Financial. This
database provides detailed balance sheets and income statements of 8915
listed US companies over the period 1995-2004. This database is used to
calculate measures of financial vulnerability following the methodology de-
veloped by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Braun (2003).30
Rajan and Zingales (1998) identify a particular channel through which
credit affects economic activity, i.e. via the dependence on external finance.
They argue that not every firm (industry) benefits from a better supply of
credit. Only those who are “naturally” more dependent on external finance
will be able to gain. However, there is a typical identification problem in cap-
turing empirically the (natural) demand for credit because only equilibrium
quantities are actually observed. Therefore, country-specific firm-level mea-
sures of the credit usage may constitute poor measures of financing needs.
For example, in economies with poor credit supply firms are likely to re-
spond endogenously with less external financing. The economic effects of an
30These measures have been extensively used by many researchers, e.g. Manova (2006)
for export activity, Klapper et al. (2006) or Aghion et al. (2007) for the market entry of
new firms, Kroszner et al. (2007) or Dell’Ariccia et al. (2005) for the effect of banking crises
on growth of industry value added, etc., when looking at the effects of credit constraints.
79
Credit Constraints in Europe
increased credit supply would therefore be underestimated. A solution to
this problem arises only if the supply of credit is nearly perfectly elastic, so
that the demand for credit determines the actually observed amount. Rajan
and Zingales argue that publicly listed US companies are good candidates
because they face such conditions for two reasons. First, among all countries
the US has one of the most developed financial systems. Second, within the
US publicly quoted companies face the least barriers to external funding.
In order to use this measure for all other countries the assumption made
by Rajan and Zingales is that the natural demand for credit of a company
within an industry depends mainly on the technological characteristics of the
production process of that particular industry.31 This assumption does not
mean that the financial dependence of industries does not vary across coun-
tries. It requires only that the relative ranking of industries with respect to
this measure does not change across countries.
The second alternative measure of tight credit constraints is introduced
by Braun (2003). He argues that in the presence of incomplete contract-
ing (captured by the level of financial development) higher asset tangibility
serves as collateral (protection) to banks (outside investors). Only those
firms that have (naturally) more tangible assets that can serve as collateral
will be able to access credit markets and gain from a higher credit supply.
The same problem of identification arises when one uses country-specific
firm-level measures. In economies with poor credit supply companies are
likely to compensate endogenously for this country’s disadvantage by hold-
ing more tangible assets on their balance sheets. This would underestimate
the economic effects of the availability of credit. To overcome this problem
31For Western European countries this is clearly a good assumption. I argue that this
is mainly the case for Eastern European countries as well for the following reasons. After
the fall of the “iron curtain” the old production technologies were replaced with new ones
because firms were not competitive compared with the Western European imported goods.
Moreover, the transition process to a market economy in Eastern European countries
was guided by technology transfer from Western Europe through inward FDI. This was
particularly important after 1995, which is the start of my sample period.
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again publicly listed US companies are good candidates for “estimating” the
natural financial “vulnerability” of a particular sector.
Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Braun (2003) calculate the variables only
for the manufacturing sector, which incorporates up to 36 three-digit indus-
tries. Moreover, these measures are based on data for the period before my
starting year of 1995. Since I am considering up to 179 manufacturing and
non-manufacturing industries and the financial conditions in the 1995-2004
period are likely to be different from those in previous periods, I construct
these two measures with new data.32 Rajan and Zingales’s measure is called
external financial dependence of industry j (FinDepj). It represents the
fraction of a firm’s investment (capital expenditures, CapExp) that is not
financed by the internal net cash flow (CashF low) from operations. The
financial dependence of industry j is calculated by the following formula:
FinDepj = Medianj

∑
t
(CapExpijt − CashF lowijt)∑
t
CapExpijt

First, I obtain a firm-specific, time-invariant ratio of the capital expendi-
tures not covered by internal cash flow as a ratio of total capital expenditure.
This is achieved by summing for each firm i the use of external finance over
time and dividing it by the sum of CapExp over the same period. This
strategy reduces the effects of the business cycle on these flow variables. In
order to obtain an industry-specific measure, Rajan and Zingales consider
the median value of the distribution of all i firm-specific measures within an
industry j. The median has an advantage over the sample mean because it is
not sensitive to the presence of big outliers in the data. The higher FinDep
is, the more credit is demanded by the firm/industry.
32Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Braun (2003) use the Compustat database of Stan-
dard and Poors for variable calculation. However, as reported by Ulbricht and Weiner
(2005), after the year 1998 Worldscope’s firm coverage is significantly higher than that of
Compustat, which leads to better representativity.
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The measure of asset tangibility (“asset hardness”) is calculated following
Braun (2003):
Tangj = Medianj
{
1
t
∑
t
(Net Property, P lant and Equipment)ijt
Total Assetsijt
}
Again, for each firm i an asset tangibility measure is constructed by di-
viding the “Net Property, Plant and Equipment” balance sheet item, which
represents the tangible assets of the firm, by the total assets and averaging it
over the sample period. The industry tangibility measure is the median value
of the firm-specific ratios. The higher this measure is, the more collateral can
be pledged to outside investors (banks) and the more likely it is that credit
can be granted.
The second and third columns of Table 3.15 in Appendix B include the
calculated measures of credit constraints. For example, a highly financially
dependent industry is engines and turbines (SIC 351), while the cigarettes
industry (SIC 211) is less dependent on external finance. Further, the mis-
cellaneous personal services industry (SIC 729) has a relatively low level of
asset tangibility, while hotels and motels (SIC 701) have a very high ratio of
tangible to total assets.
The AMADEUS database is used to compute other variables. For ro-
bustness and comparability checks I construct two firm-level asset tangibility
measures. Again, whereas the industry-specific US measure is exogenous, the
firm-specific one is likely to be endogenous. The first one, Tang1, is defined
as the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets averaged over time. The
second one, Tang2, is the ratio of tangible and financial fixed assets to to-
tal assets again averaged over the years 1995-2004. Unfortunately, I cannot
build a firm-level financial dependence measure since AMADEUS does not
report capital expenditure figures.
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For robustness checks I construct two industry-specific asset tangibility
measures using UK data as a benchmark from AMADEUS. The reason lies
in the fact that the United Kingdom is considered to have one of the most
developed financial systems in Europe, which is comparable to that of the
US. Hence, the Rajan and Zingales’s (1998) and Braun’s (2003) assumption
of nearly perfectly elastic credit supply is likely to hold for the UK. The first
measure is the ratio of tangible fixed assets to total assets averaged over time
for the median UK firm. The second one is the median value of the ratio
of tangible and financial fixed assets to total assets for UK enterprises. The
correlation of the US and UK asset tangibility measures is high at around
0.67, which indicates that indeed technological characteristics of the partic-
ular industry common across countries determine the measures.
Table 3.2: Firm- vs. industry-level asset tangibility measures
Measure Eastern Europe Western Europe
Tang (US) 0.26 0.24
Tang1 (UK) 0.23 0.22
Tang2 (UK) 0.27 0.25
Tang1 (firm-level) 0.37 0.20
Tang2 (firm-level) 0.39 0.24
Observations 130,726 1,410,871
Notes: The table shows by country group the means of the variables using the estimation sample from
section 3.5.
In Table 3.2 I compare the firm-level asset tangibility measures with the
exogenous industry-specific measures using the US or the UK as reference
countries. The expectation is that in countries with unsound financial condi-
tions like the Eastern European countries enterprises will endogenously react
to these conditions by holding more collateralizable assets than are needed
for technological reasons. Obviously, the measures for Western European
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countries are very similar. Tang (US), Tang2 (UK) and Tang2 (firm-level)
are almost identical and equal to around 0.24. However, for Eastern Europe
the firm-level tangibility measures are much higher than the “estimated”
ones. Tang (US) and Tang2 (UK) are on average equal to 0.26 compared
with 0.39 for Tang2 (firm-level).33 Therefore, this evidence indeed supports
the argument that firm-level financial constraint measures are not suitable
for consistent estimation of their effects on TFP or export participation.
In the next step two industry-level measures of human capital inten-
sity (HumInt) and physical capital intensity (CapInt) are calculated using
AMADEUS data on UK firms as a benchmark. These measures are used
in the empirical analysis in order to make sure that the estimated effects of
financial constraints do not capture other sources of comparative advantage.
Following Braun (2003), Hur et al. (2006) and Manova (2006) among others,
human capital intensity is proxied by the average wage (in million USD per
employee) of the median firm in each UK industry. The intuition is that
since high-skilled workers are more productive than low-skilled ones then the
relative wage compensation for skilled employees will be higher. Physical
capital intensity (otherwise called the capital to labor ratio) is defined as the
value of fixed assets (in millions USD) per employee for the median UK firm.
These measures are, like the others, time-invariant and industry-specific. The
United Kingdom is used as a reference country because it has one of the most
liberalized (flexible) labor markets in Europe. Since firms face nearly per-
fectly elastic factor supply, the relative factor prices (wages) would therefore
capture the true “technological” demand for skilled and unskilled labor and
physical capital.34 Again, like for the financial constraint measures, even
33A further comparison of the industry-level measures across Eastern and Western
Europe suggests that in the sample there are on average more tangible industries selected
in Eastern Europe. This can be explained by the survival of more financially healthy
industries in countries with unsound financial conditions. This hypothesis is in addition
supported by the observation that in the same sample Eastern European industries are
also less financially dependent than Western European ones (0.004 vs. 0.05 on average).
34Literature on relative wages and trade, e.g. Davis (1998), shows that the combination
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though these two quantities are not required to be exact across countries,
the assumption needed is that the ranking of industries remains unchanged
across the European countries in the sample.35 The last two columns of Table
3.15 present the calculated measures of physical and human capital intensi-
ties. For example, a low-skill-intensive industry is knitting mills (SIC 225),
while firms from the communications equipment (SIC 366) industry employ
more skilled workers. Further, personnel supply services (SIC 736) have a
relatively low physical capital intensity, while air transportation (SIC 451)
companies have a very high physical capital to labor ratio.
Table 3.16 in Appendix B calculates the pairwise correlation between the
four industry-specific variables. Interestingly, asset tangibility is only slightly
negatively correlated with financial dependence, which is not significantly dif-
ferent from zero. This suggests that they capture two different characteristics
of financial constraints, which can be jointly exploited as potential determi-
nants in a regression framework. The physical and human capital intensities
are not significantly correlated with each other, either.
Finally, the World Integrated Trade Solution (2009) database is used to
obtain tariff rates, which are shown to be important determinants of trade
patterns and productivity differences. It combines several data sources in
an integrated solution. The tariff data come originally from the UNCTAD
TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information System) database. For each re-
porter country and in each three-digit manufacturing and construction in-
dustry within this country I obtain a simple average or a weighted average of
the import tariffs. Tariffs are effectively applied tariff rates (the lowest avail-
able). The partner countries (exporting countries) for which these tariffs are
calculated are all other countries (the rest of the world). These tariffs then
of exposure to international trade and rigid wages for unskilled labor would artificially drive
the demand for skilled labor and its relative wage. Hence, countries with regulated labor
markets are not suitable for “estimating” the “natural” factor intensity of an industry.
35For robustness checks I recalculate the HumInt measure using French, Spanish and
German data. The pairwise correlation with the UK lies between 0.57 and 0.70.
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capture the intensity of import competition in each of the country-industry
pairs.
3.3.3 Country-level data
The country-level variables used in the paper are taken from three different
sources. Table 3.13 in Appendix B provides summary statistics on the key
country variables.
The most important data source is Beck et al. (2000). They provide
a database on financial development indicators for a large group of coun-
tries. I use two measures of the availability of funds in an economy. These
are private credit by deposit money banks as a share of GDP and a more
broader definition, i.e. private credit by deposit money banks and other fi-
nancial institutions as a share of GDP. These credit availability measures are
widely used in the finance and growth literature, e.g. Rajan and Zingales
(1998) and Kroszner et al. (2007) among others, as well as in the trade
and finance literature, e.g. Beck (2002, 2003) and Manova (2006) among
others. Other measures that describe the development of the stock markets
(e.g. stock market capitalization to GDP or private bond market capitaliza-
tion to GDP) are less suitable indicators of the availability of funds for the
following reasons. First, the AMADEUS sample consists primarily of small
and medium-sized enterprises, which heavily use loans instead of debt secu-
rities issuance or equity issuance. Second, the European financial system is
bank-based as opposed to the market-based US. Finally, Eastern European
countries have only very small, illiquid and underdeveloped stock markets
during the sample period.36
36Another alternative to quantity-based financial indicators are price-based ones like
interest rates. I argue that these indicators can perform poorly or they can even be mis-
leading. For example during the current financial crisis starting in 2008 central banks set
very low interest rates to fight back bad liquidity conditions on money markets. Never-
theless, credit conditions remained very restrictive. So, using interest rates will be not
suitable for such situations.
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The World Development Indicators (2006) database reports country-level
aggregate variables. These are not considered alone as controls, since I am not
interested in those effects, but they are used to compute interaction effects
with industry characteristics. The first variable I obtain from the database is
real GDP per capita in PPP, which is used to proxy for the capital abundance
of a country. Clearly it captures other differences but reliable estimates of
the physical capital stocks for all Western and Eastern European countries
are hardly available. The second variable is the tertiary school enrollment as
a percentage of gross school enrollment for each country. It is used to proxy
for a country’s human capital abundance.37 Third, the wholesale price index
for each country is used to convert nominal variables into real ones. Finally,
a PPP conversion factor is used to compare TFP levels across countries.
The last set of country-level variables is obtained from Kaufmann et al.
(2006). The authors provide 6 measures of governance quality: voice and
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government effec-
tiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. They
capture the stance of the institutional environment in a particular country
beside that of the financial system, which can facilitate economic activity.
The indicators are indexes that are computed using hundreds of different
variables. Each index of governance is normalized to take values between
−2.5 and 2.5 with higher values indicating better quality. I construct an
average governance index (“Institutions”) which is the simple average of all
6.38
37Barro and Lee (2001) argue that there are three possible proxies for human capital
that are based on educational attainment: school enrollment ratios, literacy rates and
average years of schooling. They provide these measures but they are available only for
the years 1995 and 2000. Tertiary school enrollment is widely used in the literature, e.g.
Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) among others. Other studies, e.g. Manova (2006), use
average years of schooling to proxy for human capital abundance. But again since this
variable is not available in a panel I stick to using the school enrollment ratio. Another
disadvantage of using average years of schooling is that it is an estimate and hence can be
plagued by estimation error.
38Indexes are available for the years 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2003 and 2004 only. For
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3.4 TFP estimation
The analysis of how financial constraints influence firm-level TFP is per-
formed in two stages. In the first stage it is required to estimate consistently
firm’s productivity level. After this has been achieved I proceed to the sec-
ond stage where I investigate how financial factors influence the TFP levels
across firms, industries and countries.
Total factor productivity is measured as the residual from a production
function estimation, i.e. after netting out the contribution of observed pro-
duction input factors. This in turn requires consistent estimates of the input
elasticities, which are performed in this section.
There is a large amount of literature on how to obtain consistent esti-
mates of these elasticities. The TFP literature starts by using the standard
assumption that a firm i uses a Cobb-Douglas production function of the
form:
Yit = e
ψitKβkit L
βl
it (3.1)
where Yit represents the firm’s value added generated at time t, Lit is
the labor input and Kit is the capital input. The parameters βk and βl are
the elasticities of output with respect to capital and labor, respectively. ψit
represents a firm-specific time-varying technology parameter.
Taking natural logs from both sites of equation (3.1) and denoting natural
logs with small letters I have:
yit = βkkit + βllit + ψit (3.2)
I am interested in the unobserved (log of) total factor productivity ψit,
which can be calculated as the “residual” of equation (3.2):
the missing years I linearly interpolate the data.
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ψit = yit − βkkit − βllit (3.3)
Following Ackerberg et al. (2006) I assume that the TFP term can be
split into two components:
ψit = ωit + ξit (3.4)
where both ξit and ωit cannot be observed by econometricians. The cru-
cial difference is that whereas ξit is an i.i.d. shock unobserved by the firm,
ωit is known (or predicted) by the firm at the time it chooses the inputs.
39
This generates the well-known simultaneity problem, because ωit and hence
the TFP term are correlated with the labor and/or capital inputs. A simple
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation that ignores this potential correla-
tion will lead to inconsistent estimates of the labor and capital elasticities
and as a result an inconsistent estimate of the firm’s TFP.
If one assumes that the productivity shock ωit is constant over time, i.e.
ωit = ωi,t−1 = ωi, I can consistently estimate the parameters of the pro-
duction function using the fixed-effects (FE) estimator. It eliminates the
constant ωi term and hence the correlation between the TFP and the in-
put factors. However, this assumption may often fail in practice and as a
consequence the FE estimator will not provide consistent TFP estimates.
Another possibility for dealing with the endogeneity problem is to use
instrumental variable estimators. The dynamic panel generalized method
of moments (GMM) estimator of Blundell and Bond (2000) uses the idea
of substantial adjustment costs, which makes the input and output choice
persistent, e.g. this period choice depends highly on the last period’s de-
cision. Given that assumption lagged levels of inputs can serve as valid
39For example one can think of ωit representing some production process improvement,
which is known by the management of the firm.
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instruments in an estimation in first differences, the method can deal with
problems arising from the presence of firm fixed effects as well as first-order
serial correlated TFP shocks. The Blundell and Bond (2000) approach fol-
lows the literature on dynamic panel estimation, Arellano and Bond (1991),
and more closely Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).
Arellano and Bond’s (1991) difference-GMM estimator is found to perform
poorly if the input and output series are highly persistent. The reason is that
in this case lagged levels are only weakly correlated with subsequent differ-
ences, which in turn leads to the well-known “weak instruments” problem.
Therefore, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) improve
this estimation technique by considering in addition to instrument the levels
with lagged differences. This is usually referred to as the system-GMM es-
timator. Unfortunately, as pointed out by Roodman (2009), this estimation
procedure is only valid under a much stronger and non-trivial assumption
of initial stationarity of the series. In the sample period of 1995-2004 the
fall of the “iron curtain” and the subsequent process of Eastern enlargement
represent substantial, persistent shocks to the market activity of European
firms. Therefore, it is very likely that the data series are initially far from
their steady states, making the Blundell and Bond estimator inappropriate
for this dataset.
The last set of techniques is semiparametric estimators proposed by Ol-
ley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). Their approach is
more structural in nature, because they suggest “making” the unobserved
productivity shock ωit observable. Concretely, they use the firm’s invest-
ment decision and intermediate input choice, respectively, to proxy for the
unobserved productivity.40 Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) argue that the in-
termediate inputs proxy has two advantages over the investment proxy. On
40Recently, Wooldridge (2005) and Ackerberg et al. (2006) proposed different improved
estimation procedures based on this idea.
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the one hand in many datasets firms report zero investment.41 However, the
estimation procedure relies only on non-zero observations. Therefore, using
investment as a proxy requires dropping many of the firm observations, which
in some datasets can be severe. By contrast, firms almost always report pos-
itive intermediate inputs, like electricity or materials. On the other hand,
in the presence of adjustment costs intermediate inputs may respond more
fully to productivity shocks than investment does. This makes the Olley and
Pakes (OP) procedure problematic, because some correlation between the
error term and the regressors still remains.42
Given these advantages I present the Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) ap-
proach. Let’s start again with equation (3.2) rewritten in the extended form:
yit = βkkit + βllit + ωit + ξit (3.5)
Levinsohn and Petrin assume that the demand for the intermediate input
mit (e.g. materials or energy) depends on the state variables kit and ωit:
mit = mt(ωit, kit) (3.6)
where the function mt(.) must be strictly monotonically increasing in ωit.
Given that assumption one can invert-out the productivity term ωit:
ωit = m
−1
t (mit, kit) = ωt(mit, kit) (3.7)
The unobserved ωit is now an unknown function of observables. Putting
equation (3.7) in equation (3.5) leads to the following estimable equation:
yit = βkkit + βllit + ωt(mit, kit) + ξit (3.8)
41Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) find in their panel dataset on Chilean plants that fewer
than 50% of the observations have non-zero investments, whereas more than 99% report
material use (intermediate inputs).
42See Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), p. 321.
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Estimation is performed in two stages, where the function ωt(.) is treated
non-parametrically. In the first stage only βl, but not βk, is identified, because
the first kit term is collinear with the non-parametric term ωt(mit, kit). This
is achieved by using the following equation:
yit = βllit + φt(mit, kit) + ξit (3.9)
with
φt(mit, kit) = βkkit + ωt(mit, kit) (3.10)
representing a joint term.
Following Petrin et al. (2004) I approximate the function ωt(mit, kit) by
a third-order polynomial.43 Again using equation (3.9) I can estimate βl.
The second stage uses those estimates to identify βk. As a first step I can
compute the estimated value of φt(mit, kit) as
φ̂t = ŷit − βˆllit (3.11)
Therefore, using equation (3.10) the predicted value of the productivity
term ωt becomes:
ω̂t = φ̂t − βkkit (3.12)
Until now the only unknown term in equation (3.12) is ω̂t. In a next step
I use the assumption of Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) that the productivity shock ωt follows a first-order Markov process.
One can thus approximate the unknown ω̂t by running the regression:
ωt = γ0 + γ1ωt−1 + γ2ω2t−1 + γ2ω
3
t−1 + υit (3.13)
43For a complete and extensive formal exposition and implementation in Stata see
Petrin et al. (2004), pp. 115-120.
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and computing the predicted value of ωt. After completing this step, βk
can now be identified from equation (3.12), which completes the second stage
of the LP procedure.
Beside the simultaneity problems when estimating input elasticities, there
is the issue of the so-called “selection bias”. It arises mainly in balanced
panels of firms. Theoretical models such as Melitz (2003) show that firm
selection, e.g. firm entry and exit, is important and a consequence of between-
firm productivity differences. For example, firms having higher capital stock
are likely to survive after being hit by a negative productivity shock. Hence,
considering only a balanced panel will leave only those surviving firms. This
will further lead to a correlation between the unobserved productivity and
the capital input, which in turn makes estimates of βl and βk inconsistent.
Olley and Pakes (1996) deal with this problem in their estimation procedure.
However, as they show, allowing for an unbalanced panel as in my case
reduces the problem considerably.44
I consider using 3 different estimators in my analysis: OLS, fixed-effects
(FE) and Levinsohn-Petrin (LP) semiparametric estimators.45 The decision
to use these estimators is mainly driven by data availability46 and the existing
discussion in the literature about different production function estimators.47
44Probably this is why Levinsohn and Petrin do not incorporate a selection bias correc-
tion into their estimation procedure. Following these findings I use an unbalanced panel
of firms and do not explicitly address the potential “selection bias” issue.
45The Levinsohn-Petrin estimator is implemented using the levpet routine in Stata
provided by Petrin et al. (2004).
46The alternative estimation procedure by Olley and Pakes (1996) cannot be performed
here because OP relies on information about (positive) investments, which is missing in
AMADEUS.
47Ackerberg et al. (2006) argue that the LP (as well as OP) technique may be prob-
lematic for collinearity reasons. This estimator relies on the assumption that only the
material choice but not the labor choice depends on productivity (and capital), which is
criticized by Ackerberg et al. If one relaxes this assumption, there is no possibility to
identify the labor elasticity in their first-stage regression. As a solution Ackerberg et al.
propose a different estimator, which extends the semi-parametric techniques of OP and
LP, but the “success” of this estimator in applied work still depends crucially on the data
quality. Therefore, I stick to using the OLS, FE and LP in the following section and report
the results separately in order to ensure that the results of interest are not driven by the
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Compared with OLS or FE the LP estimation is performed for a smaller sub-
set of countries because 5 countries, i.e. Cyprus, Denmark, the UK, Ireland
and Iceland, do not report data on material costs, which are required for this
estimation technique.48 The dependent variable is firm value added.49 The
two input variables are labor, which is measured by the number of employees,
and capital, defined as the value of fixed assets. All the variables are deflated
using country-specific wholesale price indexes.50 Estimation is performed for
each of the 179 three-digit US SIC industries separately by pooling the data
over all the countries. This strategy is also followed by Corcos et al. (2007).
The main assumption requires that the factor intensity of the particular in-
dustry is the same across countries. In contrast, total factor productivity is
allowed to vary across countries. In a sense technological progress is assumed
to be Hicks-neutral, which is a good assumption supported by the evidence
provided by Trefler (1995). This idea is implemented by including country
and year dummies in the production function equation in order to capture
differences of TFP levels across countries and time.51
Table 3.17 in Appendix B shows the estimated coefficients on the in-
put factors, capital and labor, using a value-added Cobb-Douglas production
function. In general one can observe differences in the estimated elasticities
choice of estimator.
48Croatia has to be dropped from the sample because AMADEUS does not report
value added. Therefore, I effectively use 27 countries. I reestimate the TFPs using my
own measure of value added, which is the difference of firm sales and material costs. The
estimated TFP measures are highly correlated with those using AMADEUS’s own value
added. For section 3.6, where Croatia is included in the sample of exporting firms, I rely
on the TFP measure using value added defined as firm sales minus material costs.
49Ackerberg et al. (2006) and Bond and So¨derbom (2005) argue that the alternative
gross output estimation has a disadvantage because it can be hard to identify coefficients
when both labor and intermediate inputs (materials) are perfectly variable (and not per-
sistent) inputs.
50Firm-level TFP estimation requires firm-level price deflators. Unfortunately, these
are typically not available, as in my case. Alternatively, one can use industry-specific
deflators, which in my case are again not available for all the countries, industries and
years.
51An alternative way is to use country-year-specific dummies instead to capture these
differences. I confirm that this strategy delivers very similar estimates of TFP.
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that are consistent with the findings in the literature. The following overall
picture emerges:52 the estimated elasticities on capital and labor are smaller
than one, suggesting that there are positive but decreasing marginal produc-
tivities. Comparing LP with OLS the coefficients on labor as well as those
on capital are clearly upward biased. This observation is fully consistent
with the results of Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). On the other hand, the
fixed-effects (within) estimator indicates that the labor elasticity is upward
biased, but the capital elasticity is downward biased. This result is also con-
sistent with the findings of Olley and Pakes (1996). Despite these differences
all three TFP measures are highly correlated. Table 3.18 in Appendix B
shows that the pairwise correlation between those measures is higher than
0.86. Therefore, it will be less likely that the choice of estimator will drive
the results presented next.
After obtaining consistent estimates for the firm-level TFP I proceed to
the second stage in Section 3.5 where I show how productivity is related to
financial constraints, controlling for other factors.
3.5 TFP and financial constraints
3.5.1 Baseline results
Before I start with a multivariate regression analysis let’s take a look at the
following graphs, which compare the TFP level of a financially developed
country like the United Kingdom with that of the financially weak country
Bulgaria. In line with the theoretical predictions I focus on the difference
in levels across industries in both countries.53 Figures 3.1 and 3.2 depict
52Here I pick for example one industry from construction (SIC 152), manufacturing
(SIC 239), transportation (SIC 478), wholesale trade (SIC 501), retail trade (SIC 541)
and services (SIC 735), respectively.
53From the individual TFP levels I calculate industry averages. These are converted
into PPP levels to make the country comparison reasonable.
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the differences in TFPs for industries that differ in their asset tangibility
and financial dependence, respectively. Both figures include a linear fit in
order to capture the average tendency of the data. Obviously and consistent
with the expectations the productivity of the average firm in UK industries
is higher than the average productivity of Bulgarian firms. This can be
attributed to the difference in the overall economic development of both
countries. However, the productivity advantage is uneven across industries.
Looking at the regression lines the TFP advantage of UK firms is more
pronounced in industries that are at lower levels of asset tangibility. The
same picture emerges if I rank the same industries according to their financial
dependence, shown in Figure 3.2. Again on average UK firms are more
productive than Bulgarian companies, especially in industries that rely more
on external finance.
In order to make the overall picture more clearer and in order to ex-
plain how the empirical strategy applied below works I pick only two sectors.
Their productivity differences across the UK and Bulgaria are presented in
figures 3.3 and 3.4. They compare the difference in TFP for highly finan-
cially constrained firms with those of less credit-constrained firms. As one
can see again the TFP advantage of companies located in the UK is stronger
in the more financially vulnerable sector dyeing and finishing textiles (SIC
226) than in the less financially vulnerable sector for bakery products (SIC
205).54 The empirical model presented below will intuitively compare those
two differences. The effect of financial development is estimated by sub-
tracting the productivity advantage in industries that rely less on external
finance from the productivity advantage in more financially vulnerable sec-
tors. This strategy will net out differences across countries that may influence
the observed productivity advantage but are not related to financial system
development. Intuitively, such differences are obvious for sectors that do not
54Financially vulnerable sectors are those with high FinDep and/or low Tang.
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Figure 3.1: TFP and asset tangibility by US SIC industry in Bulgaria com-
pared with the United Kingdom
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Figure 3.2: TFP and financial dependence by US SIC industry in Bulgaria
compared with the United Kingdom
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Figure 3.3: TFP and asset tangibility by US SIC industry in Bulgaria com-
pared with the United Kingdom
benefit directly from a better credit supply, like the bakery sector in this
example.
Building on the theoretical predictions of heterogeneous firms models pre-
sented in section 3.2 and consistent with the graphical representation above
I assume that the firm’s TFP is given by the following empirical model:
ln(TFPijct) = α1FinDevct ∗ FinDepj + α2FinDevct ∗ Tangj +
+xijctκ1 + zjctκ2 + µct + ηj + ijct (3.14)
where FinDevct is the measure of financial development in country c at
year t and FinDepj and Tangj are the industry-specific measures of ex-
ternal financial dependence and asset tangibility, respectively. Along the
first two interaction terms capturing the effect of credit constraints I con-
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Figure 3.4: TFP and financial dependence by US SIC industry in Bulgaria
compared with the United Kingdom
dition on a vector of other firm-specific (xijct) variables like firm size and
industry-country-specific (zjct) covariates like comparative advantage or im-
port competition exposure (tariffs). These variables are likely to influence the
productivity of firms and may be correlated with the two interaction terms.
Omitting these determinants might lead to biased estimates. In addition, a
full set of country-year dummies (µct) and industry dummies (ηj) capture dif-
ferences in economic development or policies across countries over time and
technological differences of industries common to all countries, respectively.55
55These dummies subsume the separate effects of FinDev, FinDep and Tang on TFP.
Using country-year dummies controls for more than only pure time effects common to all
countries and pure state effects common to one country over the time period. This is a
better strategy for two reasons. First, they capture for example country-specific policies
or changes in laws in a particular year that influence directly the economic performance of
enterprises. Second, they control for various external and internal shocks to countries, e.g.
the banking crisis in Bulgaria in 1996-1997 or the Kosovo war in 1998-1999, which affected
countries from the Balkan region, or even the Russian crisis that is likely to have affected
the economies of the Baltic states. Therefore, this strategy ensures that such events do
not drive my results.
100
Credit Constraints in Europe
Finally, ijct represents the error term, which may include a firm-specific but
time-invariant component along with a well-behaved random term.
The coefficients of interest are those on the interaction terms and I expect
that α1 > 0 and α2 < 0. They indicate that a higher level of financial devel-
opment will have greater effects on the productivity for firms that are more
dependent on external finance and/or that have less tangible assets. This
difference-in-difference (DiD)56 methodology reduces omitted variable bias
due to the presence of reverse causality, i.e. more productive firms demand
more credit, which raises the aggregate measure of FinDev in a country, and
due to omitted variables, i.e. other factors like non-financial institutions
(e.g. rule of law), could spur the productivity of firms and simultaneously
the further development of the financial system. An alternative solution to
the DiD methodology would be to apply an instrumental variable estimation
technique. However, this has its own problems. First, researchers should
find an exogenous and not weak instrument. Second, one should make the
most important and non-testable assumption that the instrument itself is not
directly influencing the TFP level, i.e. the so called “exclusion restriction”.
In order for DiD to fail in practice there should be both endogeneity driving
financial development as well as endogeneity driving the financial dependence
of industries. Even though financial development is potentially endogenous,
using the US as a reference country I obtain a reasonable exogenous financial
dependence measure.57
Table 3.3 shows estimates using the preferable LP productivity measure
56This method relates to the literature on policy evaluation. The (continuous) treat-
ment is given here by the availability of credit in a country; the treatment group includes
the firms with higher financial dependence or fewer tangible assets, whereas the control
group is the other firms. The coefficients of interest on the interaction terms α1 and α2
capture the difference of the treatment effect on the treatment group minus the effect on
the control group.
57This means in the DiD context that the assignment of firms to the treatment and
control groups is exogenous and not related to treatment itself. On the contrary, when
country-specific firm-level financial measures are used this assignment is clearly endoge-
nous.
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Table 3.3: Productivity and financial constraints
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FinDev*FinDep 0.011 0.0094 0.029***
(0.0094) (0.0091) (0.0094)
FinDev*Tang -0.17** -0.17** -0.37***
(0.073) (0.072) (0.078)
(Y/L)*CapInt -0.51
(1.44)
(H/L)*HumInt -0.38***
(0.064)
Firm size 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25***
(0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061)
Country*year dummies yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 1290959 1290959 1290959 1290959
Number of firms 386145 386145 386145 386145
Number of clusters 3011 3011 3011 3011
R-squared 0.345 0.345 0.345 0.346
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
TFP_LP
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on country-industry pairs in
parentheses. The table shows fixed-effects within estimates. Country-year dummies
and a constant ar suppressed. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels, respectively.
as the dependent variable. Tables 3.21 and 3.22 in Appendix B present
comparable estimates using the OLS and FE productivity estimates instead.
Since the results are qualitatively similar I interpret only those using the LP
TFP measure.58 The regressions use the whole sample of firms for the pe-
riod 1999-2003.59 There are two reasons why I choose this period. First, the
proxy variable for a country’s human capital abundance is available only for
this period. Second, the representativity of the sample increases around the
58In unreported regressions I further confirm that all of the results hold when I use
labor productivity, defined as value added per worker, instead of TFP. The correlation
with the TFP measures ranges between 0.60 for FE and around 0.81 to 0.83 for LP and
OLS, respectively.
59Table 3.19 in Appendix B provides descriptive statistics of all variables used in section
3.5.
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years 1999-2000. When there is a shift in the industry or country structure
of the sample this can influence my results.60 I further perform a fixed-effects
within estimation. Even though unobserved time-invariant firm character-
istics can be correlated with countries’ financial development they are not
likely to affect the FinDep or Tang measures since these are exogenous to
the firm. Nevertheless, if for some reasons firms with highly skilled managers
or employees are sampled in the financially constrained sectors of financially
developed countries then estimates can be inconsistent. I thus use fixed firm-
level effects. Further, standard errors are clustered by country-industry pair
to account for the possible correlation of residuals within clusters, which is
not controlled for by firm-level covariates. This strategy is important for the
following reason. The potential problems of cluster sampling were largely ig-
nored by applied econometricians until recently. The best-known example is
Moulton (1990), who illustrates how regressing firm-level outcomes on aggre-
gate/grouped (i.e. on a higher aggregation level) explanatory variables and
ignoring the correlation of the disturbances may lead to seriously downward-
biased estimates of the standard errors. The result is an incorrect interpre-
tation of economic impacts, which in reality are not present. How important
this problem is in applied work is shown by Bertrand et al. (2004). They
surveyed 92 papers published in 6 leading journals (e.g. American Economic
Review) in the period 1990-2000 that use a difference-in-difference method-
ology. The authors found that most of those papers had potential problems
with grouped error terms and very few of them dealt with this appropriately.
Finally and most importantly, Moulton (1990) shows that the bias can be
large even if the within-group correlation of the residuals is small. The bias
becomes larger when the cluster size rises and when the explanatory variable
is highly correlated within clusters. This is the case in my sample where I
60I further confirm that using the sample period of 2000-2003 instead does not change
the results qualitatively.
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have many firms within industry-country clusters and the interaction term is
highly positively correlated within these clusters. Following Bertrand et al.
(2004) and Wooldridge (2006) I use a cluster-robust correction of the stan-
dard errors with an industry-country pair representing the cluster unit. The
asymptotic validity of this correction depends on the number of industry-
country clusters. Since I have more than 3000 clusters, this cluster-robust
correction is appropriate for my sample.
Column (1) of Table 3.3 reveals the well-known observation that bigger
firms are on average more productive. The coefficient on firm size is positive
and significant at the 1% level. Even though the coefficient on the interaction
of financial development with financial dependence has the correct positive
sign it seems to be initially not statistically significant. Further, columns
(2) and (3) show that consistent with the expectations the estimated effects
of asset tangibility are negative and significant at the 5% level. Compared
with the first three columns, following Bernard et al. (2007b), the last spec-
ification (4) uses two traditional sources of comparative advantage, i.e. the
country’s abundance of physical and human capital, which influence the en-
try and exit of firms and hence the observed firm productivity. Now the
estimated coefficients α1 and α2 have the right sign and are statistically sig-
nificant at the 1% level. These two effects are separate and show that firms
in industries that are either more dependent on external finance or have
less tangible assets have higher productivities in financially more developed
countries. The estimated coefficients on the interaction terms capturing tra-
ditional comparative advantage are both negative whereas only human capi-
tal seems to have a statistically significant impact on TFP. These results are
against the expectation that firms from human-capital-intensive industries
will have higher productivity in countries abundant in human capital.61 Ac-
61The counterintuitive negative coefficients on the interaction terms of physical and hu-
man capital are also present in some specifications in Braun (2003), Becker and Greenberg
(2005) and Manova (2006).
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cording to Table 3.20 in Appendix B, the simple correlation between TFP
measures and the interaction of human capital abundance and human capital
intensity is positive. This is exactly what one expects. However, it seems
that after controlling for country-specific, industry-specific and other factors
in the regression framework the sign changes. This negative sign remains
even when financial constraints are excluded from the regression. The last
observation concerns the increase in absolute value of the estimated effects
of financial constraints after comparative advantage is included. This can
be explained technically by the negative correlation between (H/L)*HumInt
and FinDev*Tang as well as the positive correlation between (H/L)*HumInt
and FinDev*FinDep in the sample. Omitting the effect of human capital on
TFP therefore leads to a bias in αˆ1 as well as αˆ2 towards zero. Overall the
differences in the estimated coefficients on financial constraints in columns
(3) and (4) suggest that traditional comparative advantage always has to be
included in the empirical analysis in order to reduce the econometric problem
due to omitted variables.
After presenting the qualitative results a last and natural question is
whether credit constraints have an economically significant impact on firms’
productivity. One natural interpretation of the results is to ask what would
happen with TFP when a financially dependent sector “sanitary services”
(SIC 495, 75th percentile) relative to the financially less-dependent sector
“cleaning preparations” (SIC 284, 25th percentile) was located in the fi-
nancially developed Austria (75th percentile) instead of the financially less-
developed Hungary (25th percentile). Then the estimate of 0.029 means
that the productivity of sanitary services would rise by αˆ1 ∗ ∆FinDev ∗
∆FinDep = 0.029 ∗ 0.7 ∗ 1.1 = 2.2% more than the productivity of cleaning
preparations. Similarly, if a low tangibility sector “legal services” (SIC 811,
25th percentile) relative to the high tangibility sector “shipping containers”
(SIC 341, 75th percentile) was relocated from the financially less-developed
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Hungary to the financially more-developed Austria, then its productivity
would rise by αˆ2 ∗∆FinDev ∗∆Tang = 0.37 ∗ 0.7 ∗ 0.25 = 6.5% more than
the productivity of shipping containers.
3.5.2 Robustness
In this subsection I perform several robustness checks in order to show that
the estimated impact of financial constraints on firms’ TFP is not driven by
the choice of the sample or the choice of financial measures.
The first five columns of Table 3.4 use different measures of asset tangi-
bility.62 If we compare column (1), which uses the US benchmark measure,
with the alternative two UK-based measures in columns (2) and (3), the esti-
mates of α1 and α2 remain with the correct signs and statistical significance.
Therefore, using the US as a benchmark economy represents a good approx-
imation of the true financing needs of European firms. The next columns
(4) and (5) use firm-level asset tangibility measures instead of the exogenous
industry-specific measures. As previously stated I expect an endogenous re-
sponse of firms located especially in financially underdeveloped countries.
Specifically, they will keep on average more collateralizable assets on their
balance sheets in order to be more likely to receive sufficient credit. This
endogenous reaction will lead to a bias in α2 towards zero. Let’s compare
columns (2) and (4), which have the same variable definition. It is evident
that the coefficient on the firm-level measure is smaller in size than the exoge-
nous industry measures. A decrease in Tang1 (UK) from its value on the 75th
to its value on the 25th percentile comparing Austria with Hungary results
in an effect of 0.47 ∗ 0.7 ∗ 0.25 = 8.2%. In contrast, the same exercise using
Tang1 (firm-level) would yield an impact of 0.21 ∗ 0.7 ∗ 0.25 = 3.7%. There-
fore, the downward bias amounts to about 55% (= (0.082 − 0.037)/0.082),
62Tables 3.23 and 3.24 in Appendix B show comparable results using the OLS and FE
productivity estimates.
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which is a big number. This result suggests that firm-level measures of fi-
nancial vulnerability are not suitable for consistent estimation of the effects
of credit constraints on firm productivity. In the next step I make sure that
my estimates do not capture the effects of other non-financial institutions
that may influence the TFP. These other factors are only problematic here
when for some reasons industries relying heavily on external finance are for
example simultaneously more dependent on the legal enforcement of con-
tracts or on property rights protection.63 I use in column (6) an institutional
index that measures the quality of governance in each country. In column (7)
the GDP per capita serves as a proxy for the overall quality of institutions.
These country-specific variables are then interacted with the industry mea-
sures of financial vulnerability and included in the estimation as additional
explanatory variables. In both cases my baseline results remain robust. The
coefficients almost do not change in column (6), whereas in column (7) the
estimated α2 even increases in size. These results suggest that the effect
of financial constraints on firm productivity are separate from the effects
of other non-financial institutions. Finally, column (8) uses an alternative
measure of financial development. It represents a broader measure of credit
supply and captures the private credit provided by banks and other financial
institutions. This variable reflects more comprehensively all the available
funding opportunities, especially in better developed economies. Using this
definition of financial development the estimates of interest remain with the
correct sign and are statistically significant. To summarize, the results pre-
sented above indicate that the baseline results are not driven by the choice
of financial measures and are robust to the inclusion of other non-financial
institutions that potentially affect the economic efficiency of firms.
The second set of robustness tests concerns the selected European coun-
63For example young innovative firms simultaneously need more external finance and
demand more protection for their intellectual property. Therefore, they are likely to ex-
pand more if they operate in a country with a better financial as well as legal system.
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tries. Table 3.5 shows estimates using different country samples.64 In columns
(2) and (3) I split the sample into firms from Eastern and Western Europe.
The estimates for the Western European sample do not differ qualitatively
from the whole sample. Unfortunately, within Eastern Europe financial con-
straints lose their significant impact on firm productivity.65 The coefficient
on the interaction term of financial development and financial dependence is
positive and even higher in size than the baseline estimate. However, stan-
dard errors are much higher, which leads to an insignificant coefficient. The
coefficient on FinDev*Tang has the reverse positive sign and is statistically
not significant. One possible explanation for this result is the lack of cross-
country variation in financial development across Eastern European states.
This explains the very large standard errors, which are more than seven times
larger than those in the Western European sample.
Finally, columns (4) to (8) check whether the exclusion of some countries
renders the baseline results. “Sample1” and “Sample2” exclude countries
with relatively small numbers of firms. On the other hand, the last three
columns of the table exclude countries with a relatively large number of active
firms. Overall, these changes in the sample do not have a qualitative impact
on the estimated coefficients. Therefore, the main results are not sensitive
to the inclusion of countries that have either bigger or smaller weights in the
estimation sample.
The last set of robustness checks looks at the different impacts of credit
constraints across industry groups. In order to carry this out I split the sam-
ple into two groups. The first includes manufacturing and construction firms
with SIC codes from 150 to 399. The remaining firms from industries with
SIC codes 400-599 and 700-874 are grouped into the services sample. Table
3.6 shows estimates using firms from the manufacturing and construction
64Tables 3.25 and 3.26 in Appendix B show comparable results using the OLS and FE
productivity estimates.
65The results do not change when I drop countries one by one from this sample.
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Table 3.6: Productivity and financial constraints in manufacturing and con-
struction industries
Industry Sample:
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FinDev*FinDep 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.032***
(0.0096) (0.0096) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0089) (0.0089)
FinDev*Tang -0.046 -0.011 -0.071 -0.028 0.022 0.065
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13)
(Y/L)*CapInt 2.80 2.97 0.30 0.45 3.76 3.95
(4.36) (4.33) (4.05) (4.02) (4.50) (4.45)
(H/L)*HumInt -0.33*** -0.32*** 0.043 0.053 -0.20* -0.20*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11)
Firm size 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.085*** 0.085*** 0.21*** 0.21***
(0.0081) (0.0081) (0.012) (0.012) (0.0083) (0.0083)
Tariff rate (simple average) 0.0025 0.0040 0.0023
(0.0021) (0.0029) (0.0024)
Tariff rate (weighted average) 0.0052 0.0063 0.0062
(0.0034) (0.0046) (0.0045)
Country*year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 463963 463963 463963 463963 399980 399980
Number of firms 134918 134918 134918 134918 116134 116134
Number of clusters 1866 1866 1866 1866 1628 1628
R-squared 0.204 0.204 0.121 0.121 0.288 0.288
TFP_LP
Manufacturing + Construction
TFP_OLS TFP_FE
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on country-industry pairs in parentheses. The table shows
fixed-effects within estimates. Country-year dummies and a constant are suppressed. *, ** and *** indicate signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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industries. Compared with the baseline specification this regression includes
additionally the average tariff rate for each industry, which is a measure of
import competition. This strategy is justified by the large literature on trade
liberalization and its impact on firm productivity.66 In the standard Melitz
(2003) model falling tariff rates have a positive impact on firm productivity
because they lead to increased foreign competition, which forces less efficient
firms to exit. This leads to an increase in the average productivity in an
industry. Therefore, I expect a negative sign on the tariff rate measure. Un-
fortunately, Table 3.6 does not confirm this prediction. The estimated coeffi-
cients have a positive sign and are not statistically significant. One possible
explanation is that manufacturing industries across and within countries do
not differ much in their import competition exposure and tariff rates have
low time variation. The mean tariff rate is small at around 3% whereby the
standard deviation across time is only 0.93, which may be problematic for
the fixed-effects within estimator. Compared with the baseline results asset
tangibility does not seem to play a significant role in the manufacturing sam-
ple. In the first 4 columns α2 is negative but insignificant, whereas in the case
with the TFP LP measure as the dependent variable the sign is even positive
though again not significant. This result may be explained by the notion
that firms from secondary sectors are typically better endowed with assets
that can be used to secure debt financing. Hence, collateral requirements are
probably more easily met by such companies. Therefore, better credit supply
does not have an impact on TFP through this particular channel. It seems
that manufacturing firms are only significantly affected when they rely more
on external finance.
Table 3.7 shows estimates using the sample of service firms. Compared
66For example, Pavcnik (2002) finds evidence that trade liberalization led to produc-
tivity improvements of Chilean manufacturing firms. These are mainly attributed to the
reshuﬄing of resources to more efficient firms. Further, Amiti and Konings (2007) show
with Indonesian data that productivity improvements can additionally arise because trade
liberalization lowers the prices of imported intermediate inputs used in the production.
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Table 3.7: Productivity and financial constraints in services industries
Industry Sample:
Dependent Variable: TFP_OLS TFP_FE TFP_LP
(1) (2) (3)
FinDev*FinDep 0.017** 0.0068 0.014
(0.0083) (0.010) (0.014)
FinDev*Tang -0.15** -0.30*** -0.27***
(0.068) (0.083) (0.087)
(Y/L)*CapInt -0.63 -1.99 -0.98
(1.15) (1.33) (1.21)
(H/L)*HumInt -0.13* -0.069 -0.30***
(0.071) (0.070) (0.083)
Firm size 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.26***
(0.0086) (0.012) (0.010)
Country*year dummies yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes
Observations 864748 864748 702818
Number of firms 265470 265470 216076
Number of clusters 1371 1371 1132
R-squared 0.232 0.202 0.339
Services
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on country-industry pairs in parenthe-
ses. The table shows fixed-effects within estimates. Country-year dummies and a constant are
suppressed. The services sample includes transportation and communication services, wholesale
trade, retail trade and other services. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
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with the manufacturing sample financial development improves firm produc-
tivity mainly via the availability of hard assets rather than the dependence
on external finance. The estimated α2 is for all TFP measures negative and
statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level. However, the estimate of α1
though positive is significant only for the regression with the OLS TFP mea-
sure as the dependent variable. This finding is generally in line with the
notion that service activities include more intangible assets that cannot be
used as collateral when firms apply for credit. Hence, those service indus-
tries that are naturally more equipped with such assets are likely to be less
credit constrained. Therefore, improvements in the financial development
will mainly have an impact on the productivity of service firms when there
is a lack of sufficient collateral.
To summarize, there is evidence in Europe that financial constraints op-
erate for manufacturing industries through the “financial dependence” chan-
nel, while for service sectors they act through the “collateral requirements”
channel.
3.6 Export status and financial constraints
Until now I have shown how credit constraints influence the total factor pro-
ductivity of firms. In this part of the empirical analysis I test the predictions
of heterogeneous firms models presented in section 3.2 regarding how export
behavior is affected by financial frictions.
From the previous dataset described in Table 3.12 the 2005 edition of
the AMADEUS database reports information on export turnover only for 6
European countries: France, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Croatia, Hungary
and Switzerland. The following sample selection is performed. Since Hungary
and Switzerland have too few export observations I decided to exclude these
countries from the analysis. In order to have comparable results only those
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firms remain in the sample that have data on productivity and financial
constraints. After applying these restrictions I am left with 765,617 yearly
observations of more than 174,000 firms in 4 countries (France, the United
Kingdom, Sweden and Croatia) and 179 industries (703 country-industry
clusters). Around 36 % of the firms report positive exports during the sample
period 1995-2004, whereby 47.59% are never-exporters and 19.22% always
export.
Before I proceed to the regression analysis let’s look at the following fig-
ures and tables, which capture systematic differences between exporters and
purely domestic firms, i.e. non-exporters. The trade literature on exports
and productivity makes the general observation that exporters are bigger and
they are more efficient than non-exporters.67 However, there is less agreement
regarding the question of the causal link between export status and produc-
tivity, i.e. whether the observed productivity differences are evident before
or after enterprises enter export markets. Most of the studies support the
“selection into exporting” hypothesis, e.g. Bernard and Jensen (1999) for US
companies, while the minority find evidence of the “learning by exporting”
hypothesis, e.g. De Loecker (2007) for Slovenian firms.
Table 3.8 compares the mean characteristics of exporters versus non-
exporters in my sample. Consistent with the literature exporters are big-
ger than purely domestic firms, i.e. they have on average a higher value
of total assets and they have a higher number of employees. The size ad-
vantage in terms of total assets is about 75%68 while the employment of
exporters is about 38% higher than those of non-exporters. Figure 3.5 com-
pares the whole distribution of firm size measured by the total assets across
67See for example Bernard and Jensen (1999) and Bernard et al. (2007a) for the US,
Mayer and Ottaviano (2007) for European countries as well as Wagner (2007) for a survey
of studies from countries all over the world.
68= (e8.46 − e7.9)/e7.9
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Table 3.8: Exporters vs. non-exporters mean comparison
Exporters Non-exporters
Firm size 8.46 7.90
Log of TFP (OLS) 3.43 3.32
Log of TFP (FE) 3.90 3.68
Publicly quoted (in %) 1.84 0.64
Employees 160 116
Debt ratio 0.88 0.92
Asset tangibility 1 (firm-level) 0.16 0.21
Asset tangibility 2 (firm-level) 0.20 0.25
Observations 278,120 487,497
Notes: The table shows the sample mean by variable for the exporter and non-exporter samples. Firm
size is measured by the logarithm of real total assets. For all the variables a simple unpaired t-test rejects
the null hypothesis that the sample mean for exporters is equal to the sample mean for non-exporters
at the 1% significance level.
both groups. Clearly, the shapes of the distributions are very similar, with
those for exporters shifted to the right. The next observation refers to firms’
productivity. Using two measures of TFP the mean productivity advantage
of exporting enterprises ranges between 11% and 22%. However, inspecting
carefully Figure 3.6, which compares the two distributions of productivities,
it seems that the productivity leadership of exporters is not so obvious as it
is for the size measure. Nevertheless, these observations generally match the
evidence of previous literature.69 The last observation concerns the financial
health of exporters evident from the lower part of Table 3.8. On the one
hand, exporters exhibit a lower debt to assets ratio than non-exporters, in-
dicating that they are less financially constrained. On the other hand, they
have lower asset tangibility ratios, which suggest that they may be more fi-
nancially vulnerable. Again, using these firm-level measures to capture the
true financing needs of firms is likely to be misleading because there are po-
tential endogeneity problems. For example, since exporters have access to
foreign markets they may generate enough revenues to cover their capital
69See for example Mayer and Ottaviano (2007), p. 19, Table 5 for French firms.
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Figure 3.5: Size distribution of exporters vs. non-exporters
expenditures. Therefore, they may not need to raise additional debt, which
may explain the lower debt ratio. Further, exporters may face lower collateral
requirements by banks because they generate higher revenues and are more
likely to repay their credit. Thus, the observable lower level of asset tangibil-
ity that is chosen by the firm does not indicate higher financial vulnerability
but rather the opposite is true. In summary, firm-level financial measures are
not appropriate for capturing the causal link from lower credit constraints to
higher export probability because the export status itself affects the financial
health of the firm.
In the next step I present the empirical strategy in order to identify the
effects of credit constraints on export participation. It uses the variation
in export status across countries at different levels of financial development
and between industries that differ in their financial vulnerability. Table 3.9
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compares the export probabilities across two sectors (SIC 226 and 205) and
two countries, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is
more financially developed than Sweden,70 whereas the dyeing and finishing
textile sector (SIC 226) is more financially vulnerable, i.e. it is more exter-
nally financially dependent and it has less tangible assets than the sector
of bakery products (SIC 205). Again, as in the previous section, in order
to determine the differential effect of financial development, one can build a
double difference of the export probabilities. This difference-in-difference of
18.62 = (41.78− 22.72)− (21.43− 20.99) indicates that companies from the
textile industry compared with bakery products firms are about 19 percent-
age points more likely to become exporters if they are settled in the more
financially developed United Kingdom relative to Sweden.71
Table 3.9: Export probability comparison across sectors and countries
Sweden United Kingdom
Bakery products (SIC 205) 20.99 22.72
Dyeing and finishing textiles (SIC 226) 21.43 41.78
All industries 16.24 27.41
Notes: The table shows the exporting probability as a percentage.
The empirical model presented below builds on the theoretical predictions
of a Melitz (2003)-type model with credit constraints by Manova (2006). As
70Both countries have relatively similar levels of GDP per capita. Therefore, differential
effects of financial development in both countries are not likely to be driven by factors
capturing the overall economic development.
71Another reasonable check is to compare the dyeing and finishing textile sector with
the “average” industry. In the UK it has about a 41.78− 27.41 = 14.4 percentage points
higher probability, whereas in Sweden only around a 21.43−16.24 = 5.2 percentage points
higher probability than the average. The differential impact is then about 9.2 percentage
points.
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already mentioned in section 3.2, this model predicts that in the presence
of imperfect capital markets firms are more likely to become exporters when
they operate in a country with a sound financial system.72 An identifica-
tion problem might arise when along with credit constraints other sources
of comparative advantage drive the decision of firms to enter export mar-
kets. Empirically this could result in the well-known omitted variable bias.
Bernard et al. (2007b) support this issue and show that firms from compara-
tive advantage industries are more likely to become exporters than firms from
comparative disadvantage industries. Following their theoretical predictions
I control for two sources of comparative advantage, namely the physical and
human capital abundance of a country.
Building on theoretical predictions of heterogeneous firms models the
probability of exporting is given by the following equation:
P (ExpDijct = 1) = G(δ1FinDevct ∗ FinDepj + δ2FinDevct ∗ Tangj +
+xijctκ1 + zjctκ2 + µct + ηj + ijct) (3.15)
where ExpDijct is a binary choice variable, equal to 1 if a firm i from in-
dustry j in country c exports in year t and 0 otherwise. G(.) is a cumula-
tive distribution function. Along the first two interaction terms capturing
the effect of credit constraints I condition on a vector of other firm-specific
(xijct) variables like firm size and industry-country-specific (zjct) covariates
like comparative advantage or import competition exposure (tariffs). A full
set of country-year dummies (µct) and industry dummies (ηj) captures dif-
72Manova’s model generates much richer predictions than only about the export status
of the firm. For example, assuming that a part of the variable costs of exporting have to be
financed externally, the model generates a prediction about the level of firm exports. Even
though I have data on firm-specific export turnover, the volume of exports depends strongly
on the demand conditions in export destinations. Since data on export destinations are
not available I cannot explore this particular question and stick to explaining the extensive
margin of firm exports.
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ferences in economic development or policies across countries over time and
technological differences of industries common to all countries, respectively.
Finally, ijct is a well-behaved random error term. I do not further include
firm fixed effects like in the previous section, because most of the firms do
not change their export status over time and therefore identification would
be problematic. I still use firm-level variables like firm size and productivity
to capture firm-level effects. By conditioning on the firm-specific TFP level
I am able to isolate the “direct” effect of credit constraints on export partic-
ipation, because I have previously shown that financial factors affect directly
the productivity of firms.73 For the model in equation (3.15) I expect that
δ1 > 0 and δ2 < 0, namely that in financially vulnerable sectors the export
probability will be higher in the more financially developed country.
Suitable econometric models of a firm’s probability of exporting given
by equation (3.15) are usually the probit and logit models, where G(.) is the
standard normal or the logistic cumulative distribution function, respectively.
However, a crucial problem exists in interpreting coefficients on interaction
and higher-order (e.g. quadratic) terms in non-linear models like probit and
logit. Ai and Norton (2003) reviewed 72 articles published in 13 economic
journals in the period 1980-1999 that use interaction effects in non-linear
models. They found that none of these articles interpreted those coefficients
correctly. Compared with the linear models the authors point out the fol-
lowing serious issues. First, the marginal effect of changing two explanatory
variables (i.e. the cross derivative) is not the same as the marginal effects of
the change in the interaction term of both variables. Second, there may be
a significant interaction effect even if the coefficient on the interaction term
is equal to zero. Third, statistical significance cannot be tested with a t-test
73This strategy is followed by Bernard and Jensen (1999) too. The main reason lies
in the heterogeneous firms theory, which predicts that only firms that are sufficiently
productive enter export markets. Since productivity captures different factors like the
management ability unobservable to the econometrician, which in turn drive the export
decision, including it in the estimation may be advantageous.
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on the estimated coefficient of the interaction term. Finally, the sign of the
coefficient on the interaction term is not necessarily the same as that of the
interaction effect. Given these severe problems of non-linear models I decide
to use a linear probability model, which is estimated by OLS. Even though
OLS estimates are sensitive to outliers, having a large sample of more than
765,000 observations makes this problem negligible. Second, the problem of
heteroskedastic errors in the case of linear probability models can be easily
handled using a cluster-robust variance-covariance matrix. Finally, the lin-
ear model typically generates a good approximation of the probability for
observations around the means of the covariates.74
Table 3.10 shows the main estimation results using the whole sample of
firms. Additionally Table 3.27 in Appendix B provides summary statistics
on the variables used in the estimation. Standard errors are corrected to
account for a possible serial correlation within country-industry pairs and
heteroskedasticity across these pairs. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.10 re-
veal that firms from financially more dependent sectors or sectors with lower
asset tangibility are more likely to become exporters when they are settled
in a financially more developed country. The estimated coefficients δ1 and
δ2 have the expected sign and are significant at the 1% and 5% levels, re-
spectively. Column (3) of the table confirms the previous results by jointly
74See Wooldridge (2002), pp. 454-457. To check the appropriateness of OLS estimation
I perform a probit estimation of the model and compute the marginal effects on the means.
The estimated effects of the non-interacted variables size, TFP, publicly quoted do not
differ in terms of sign and significance from those of OLS and differ quantitatively only
slightly. I consider further using the inteff routine for Stata of Norton et al. (2004). This
routine computes the interaction effects using the correct formulas. Nevertheless, there
is a fundamental problem in applying this routine to the model given in equation (3.15).
Consider for example the interaction effect of a country’s financial development and an
industry’s financial dependence. The formula for the interaction effect requires estimating
the effects of both variables separately. However, these variables are not identified in
the model since they are collinear to the full set of country-year and industry controls,
respectively. Even though I could drop some of these dummies to estimate the coefficients
on both variables, these estimates are arbitrary, depending on which controls are dropped.
This is why I cannot compute the correct interaction effects for non-linear probit or logit
and hence stick to the OLS estimates.
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Table 3.10: Export participation and financial constraints
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
FinDev*FinDep 0.032*** 0.028** 0.030*** 0.027** 0.027** 0.025**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
FinDev*Tang -0.30** -0.27* -0.25* -0.26* -0.28**
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14)
Tang1 (firm-level) 0.044
(0.064)
FinDev*Tang1 (firm-level) -0.19***
(0.067)
TFP_OLS 0.039*** 0.015*** 0.027***
(0.0060) (0.0053) (0.0047)
Firm size 0.054*** 0.053***
(0.0028) (0.0029)
Publicly quoted 0.11*** 0.11***
(0.019) (0.020)
(Y/L)*CapInt -0.87*
(0.48)
(H/L)*HumInt -0.19**
(0.094)
Country*year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 765617 765617 765617 765594 765617 765565 475729
Number of clusters 703 703 703 703 703 703 703
R-squared 0.226 0.226 0.227 0.228 0.229 0.251 0.263
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Exporter Dummy
OLS
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on country-industry pairs in parentheses. Constant, country-
year dummies and industry dummies are suppressed. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
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estimating both effects. Thereby, the effects are slightly smaller but they are
still statistically significant at the 10% level. Column (4) compares the effect
of the firm-level asset tangibility measure of credit constraints with that of
the arguably exogenous measure at the industry level in column (3). Pre-
vious firm-level studies on the link between financial constraints and export
behavior find it hard to establish causality, because firm-level measures of
financial health are likely to be endogenous for two reasons. First, as shown
by Greenaway et al. (2007), exporters seem to be financially more healthy
after entering export markets. Therefore, reverse causality is at play. Sec-
ond, other unobserved firm-specific factors like product innovation can drive
both the financial situation of the firm and its export decision. A comparison
of the estimated coefficients on the interaction of financial development with
asset tangibility reveals that those using the firm-level measure are smaller
in absolute value. This indicates a bias towards zero. To be more precise
the effect of a 1 standard deviation decrease in Tang (US) comparing the
UK and Sweden returns a differential effect of 0.16 ∗ 0.27 ∗ 0.65 = 0.028, i.e.
a 2.8 percentage points higher probability, whereas a 1 standard deviation
decrease in the firm-level measure returns a 0.19 ∗ 0.19 ∗ 0.65 = 2.3 percent-
age points rise in export likelihood. Thus, the bias amounts to around 18
(= (2.8 − 2.3)/2.8) percent. In column (5) I include the total factor pro-
ductivity of the firm as a further explanatory variable. Consistent with the
empirical literature more efficient companies are more likely to be exporters
whereby the effect is significant at the 1% level.75 In the next step, column (7)
includes in addition to productivity other firm-level covariates. Consistent
with the expectations bigger firms and firms having access to stock markets
75Here arises again the problem of the causal relationship between export status and
productivity. Since I am not interested in this link I do not rely on instrumental variable
estimation techniques. Researchers usually use lagged explanatory variables to account
for simultaneity issues, but this strategy is less likely to be successful, because most of the
firms do not change their export status over the sample period.
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are more likely to export.76 In the final specification in column (7) I control
for comparative advantage effects. The interaction terms of human (physical)
capital intensity with human capital (physical) abundance are statistically
significant at the 5% (10%) level, but they have obviously the wrong nega-
tive sign. Even though this result is against the theoretical predictions, other
studies like Becker and Greenberg (2005) and Manova (2006) find similar re-
sults.77 Nevertheless, the estimates of the coefficients δ1 and δ2 change only
marginally and remain statistically significant on the 5% level. Therefore,
the results are robust to the inclusion of traditional comparative advantage
as a determinant of export participation.
Although the interaction effects in Table 3.10 have a statistically signif-
icant impact on export probability a natural question is to ask what their
economic significance is. Let’s compare the financially more developed United
Kingdom with the less financially developed Sweden. Then the estimate of
0.025 from column (7) means that the probability of exporting in the fi-
nancially more dependent sector sanitary services (SIC 495, 75th percentile)
would rise by δˆ1 ∗∆FinDev ∗∆FinDep = 0.025 ∗ 0.65 ∗ 1.1 = 1.8 percent-
age points more than the export probability of the less financially dependent
sector cleaning preparations (SIC 284, 25th percentile), when firms relocate
their business from Sweden to the UK. Similarly, if a low tangibility sector
legal services (SIC 811, 25th percentile) relative to the high tangibility sec-
tor shipping containers (SIC 341, 75th percentile) is located in the financially
developed United Kingdom instead of the financially less developed Sweden,
76Again, due to the endogeneity interpretation based on the causal link is problematic.
However, using detailed French data Eaton et al. (2008) argue in favor of this “selection
into exporting” hypothesis. They find evidence that companies’ size in the domestic
market, measured by total sales, is strongly related to firms’ export market penetration.
This means that only large and productive firms that are domestic “champions” are able
to enter more export markets.
77Becker and Greenberg (2005) find a negative sign on the interaction of human or
physical capital with a measure of fixed costs of an industry with respect to bilateral
exports. Manova (2006) also finds a negative sign on physical capital per capita interacted
with capital intensity.
125
Credit Constraints in Europe
then firms there would be δˆ2 ∗∆FinDev ∗∆Tang = 0.28 ∗ 0.65 ∗ 0.25 = 4.6
percentage points more likely to become exporters than companies from ship-
ping containers. Given that UK firms are on average around 11 percentage
points more likely to export than Swedish enterprises, the credit constraint
effects of 1.8 and 4.6 percentage points increases in export probability are
indeed economically significant.
In the next and final step I perform an additional robustness analy-
sis where I split the data into two samples, one using manufacturing and
construction firms and the other including only service firms. Table 3.11
presents the estimation results. Qualitatively the results for services in col-
umn (2) match the estimates for the whole sample. However, in this case
the magnitude of the impact of financial constraints on export probabil-
ity is higher. More precisely, comparing again the interquartile range of
the distribution of both financial vulnerability measures for service indus-
tries across the more financially developed United Kingdom and the less
financially developed Sweden, the following results apply: the differential
effect using financial dependence is equal to δˆ1 ∗ ∆FinDev ∗ ∆FinDep =
0.039 ∗ 0.65 ∗ 0.98 = 2.48%, whereas the differential effect regarding asset
tangibility is δˆ2 ∗∆FinDev ∗∆Tang = 0.44 ∗ 0.65 ∗ 0.36 = 10.3%. These are
much larger than the benchmark effects of a 1.8 and 4.6 percentage points
higher export probability, respectively. This finding suggests that financial
factors are more important for the export participation of services enterprises.
Columns (3) to (6) of Table 3.11 show the estimates for the manufactur-
ing and construction industries only. The following results emerge. First,
for this sample I additionally use tariff rates to capture the impact of trade
liberalization on the extensive margin of exports. Following Melitz (2003),
tariff rate reductions lower the trade costs and lead to increased entry of firms
into export markets. Thus, sectors that are more liberalized will exhibit a
higher share of exporting firms. I use the simple or the weighted average of
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Table 3.11: Export participation and financial constraints: industry robust-
ness
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
Sample:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FinDev*FinDep 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.024** 0.023** 0.027** 0.026**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.0096) (0.0096) (0.011) (0.011)
FinDev*Tang -0.39** -0.44*** -0.18 -0.18 -0.15 -0.15
(0.17) (0.15) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
TFP_OLS 0.032*** 0.044*** -0.0068 -0.0068 -0.00062 -0.00061
(0.0066) (0.0061) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0056) (0.0056)
Firm size 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.070*** 0.070***
(0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0044)
Publicly quoted 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 0.050** 0.050**
(0.034) (0.035) (0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.022)
(Y/L)*CapInt -0.97* -0.61 -0.72
(0.56) (1.01) (1.02)
(H/L)*HumInt -0.26*** 0.12 0.11
(0.092) (0.20) (0.20)
Tariff rate (simple average) -0.0062** -0.0068**
(0.0028) (0.0031)
Tariff rate (weighted average) -0.0038** -0.0023
(0.0018) (0.0021)
Country*year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 457125 285676 217557 217557 131865 131865
Number of clusters 270 270 382 382 381 381
R-squared 0.202 0.215 0.218 0.218 0.239 0.239
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Exporter Dummy
OLS
Services Manufacturing + Construction
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on country-industry pairs in parentheses. Constant, country-
year dummies and industry dummies are suppressed. The service sample includes transportation and communication
services, wholesale trade, retail trade and other services. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
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the import tariff rate for each industry-country pair to capture this effect.
Consistent with the theory, lower tariff rates increase the export probability
of firms. Focusing on the full specifications in columns (5) and (6), the co-
efficient on the simple average tariff rate is negative and significant at the
5% level, though that on the weighted average tariff measure is negative but
not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the economic significance of tariff
reductions is rather small. The reason is due to the fact that the difference
in the tariff rates for two industries at the 25th and the 75th percentile of
the distribution is about 1.54 percentage points. This implies that the dif-
ferential effect on export probability amounts only to 0.01 percentage points
which is much lower than the impact of financial constraints. The second
observation refers to the effects of credit constraints. The estimated δ1 and
δ2 have the expected signs, though δˆ2 is not statistically significant. This
implies that asset tangibility considerations do not have a significant impact
on the export probability of firms from secondary industries. This result
is consistent with the notion that manufacturing (construction) companies
have relatively more tangible assets than services firms such that collateral
requirements by banks do not represent an obstacle to their external financ-
ing. Financial constraints impact on the export probability of manufacturing
firms only through the external financial dependence. The differential im-
pact on the export likelihood for the specification in column (5) is around
δˆ1 ∗ ∆FinDev ∗ ∆FinDep = 0.027 ∗ 0.65 ∗ 0.90 = 1.6 percentage points,
which is close to the effect for the whole sample. The final interesting result
concerns the role of productivity differences. The estimated coefficient on
the TFP measure is no more statistically significant and even has the wrong
negative sign. One reasonable explanation for this result is that systematic
productivity differences between exporters and non-exporters are captured
solely by observable factors like firm size, financial constraints, comparative
advantage and tariff rates. Therefore, productivity has no further economic
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impact on the export participation of firms.
3.7 Conclusion
This paper provides empirical evidence that financial constraints are an im-
portant determinant of firm-level total factor productivity as well as of firms’
export participation. Using a large panel of Eastern and Western European
companies during the period 1995-2004 I found the following patterns in the
data. First, firms in industries that are either more dependent on external
finance or possess less tangible assets have on average higher productivities
and are more likely to export in countries with a better developed financial
system. Second, this finding is robust to the inclusion of traditional compar-
ative advantage, to the effects of other non-financial institutions as well as to
the effects of trade liberalization. Finally, the empirical results are consistent
with newly established theoretical literature on heterogeneous firms, credit
constraints and international trade, e.g. Manova (2006).
This paper contributes to the existing empirical literature in the following
ways. First, it provides firm-level evidence on the role of credit constraints
where micro-level studies are rather scarce. Second, unlike most of the pre-
vious firm-level studies, which fail to establish a causal link from financial
constraints to export activity, this paper delivers consistent results by em-
ploying a difference-in-difference methodology and using exogenous measures
of financial vulnerability. Finally, unlike the existing literature, this paper
does not focus exclusively on manufacturing industries. Service sectors are
becoming increasingly important for the overall performance in European
economies. The results suggest that financial conditions influence the pro-
ductivity and export participation of service enterprises mainly through the
availability of hard, tangible assets that serve as collateral when companies
apply for credit.
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The findings in this paper have important economic implications. The
severe financial crisis of 2008-2009 showed that sound financial conditions
are important drivers of entrepreneurial activity as well as worldwide trade
flows. The results in this paper suggest that the financial crisis will harm
more heavily industries relying strongly on outside finance or having less
tangible assets. Moreover, these effects are likely to be exacerbated by a lower
valuation of firms’ tangible assets and lower cash flow during the financial
meltdown.
There is scope for further research. Probably the current financial crisis
will provide us with a good “natural experiment”, where one can study the
effects of credit constraints on firm activities. However, from an econometric
point of view it may be difficult to identify credit-constraint effects along
with strong policy interventions of European governments during that period.
Nevertheless, exploring how important financial frictions are for economic
activity plays a key role in designing and implementing appropriate economic
policies that will strengthen the financial systems of the countries.
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B Appendix to Chapter 3
Table 3.12: Countries in the sample
Country Country
ISO code
Frequency Percent Cum.
Austria AT 752 0.14 0.14
Belgium BE 12,184 2.26 2.40
Bulgaria BG 11,532 2.14 4.54
Switzerland CH 202 0.04 4.58
Cyprus CY 33 0.01 4.58
Czech Republic CZ 10,548 1.96 6.54
Germany DE 3,734 0.69 7.23
Denmark DK 8,522 1.58 8.81
Estland EE 5,014 0.93 9.74
Spain ES 97,764 18.14 27.88
Finland FI 13,394 2.48 30.37
France FR 107,373 19.92 50.29
United Kingdom GB 42,358 7.86 58.14
Croatia HR 5,901 1.09 59.24
Hungary HU 902 0.17 59.41
Ireland IE 35 0.01 59.41
Island IS 52 0.01 59.42
Italy IT 102,744 19.06 78.48
Luxembourg LU 126 0.02 78.51
Latvia LV 98 0.02 78.53
Macedonia MK 71 0.01 78.54
Netherland NL 7,908 1.47 80.01
Norway NO 24,809 4.60 84.61
Poland PL 11,836 2.20 86.81
Portugal PT 4,009 0.74 87.55
Romania RO 28,967 5.37 92.92
Sweden SE 36,609 6.79 99.71
Slovak Republic SK 1,538 0.29 100.00
Total 539,015 100.00
Notes: The table shows by country the total number of active firms during the sample period
1995-2004.
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Table 3.13: Country characteristics
Country
ISO
code
Private credit
by deposit money
banks (% of GDP)
Private credit by
banks and other fi-
nancial institutions
(% of GDP)
Y/L H/L Institutions
AT 0.98 0.98 10.23 52.68 1.56
BE 0.74 0.74 10.18 58.23 1.28
BG 0.20 0.20 8.71 42.64 0.02
CH 1.60 1.60 10.31 40.30 1.85
CY 0.97 1.32 9.85 23.85 0.92
CZ 0.50 0.50 9.65 31.61 0.72
DE 1.11 1.11 10.12 49.28 1.52
DK 0.82 0.82 10.23 60.57 1.75
EE 0.22 0.22 9.16 58.88 0.81
ES 0.89 0.89 9.95 59.47 1.19
FI 0.56 0.56 10.10 84.25 1.85
FR 0.84 0.84 10.13 53.41 1.22
GB 1.24 1.24 10.16 60.51 1.62
HR 0.38 0.38 9.14 33.82 0.07
HU 0.28 0.28 9.45 41.35 0.83
IE 0.90 0.92 10.23 50.14 1.54
IS 0.81 0.81 10.21 49.70 1.67
IT 0.67 0.67 10.11 52.40 0.83
LU 0.98 0.98 10.83 10.83 1.75
LV 0.17 0.17 8.96 61.58 0.42
MK 0.22 0.22 8.65 24.58 -0.41
NL 1.64 2.02 10.22 54.77 1.79
NO 0.65 0.90 10.41 72.26 1.68
PL 0.23 0.23 9.21 53.05 0.62
PT 1.07 1.07 9.75 50.43 1.23
RO 0.09 0.09 8.77 28.48 -0.15
SE 0.59 0.95 10.12 71.84 1.72
SK 0.42 0.42 9.33 30.29 0.44
Average 0.71 0.75 9.79 48.61 1.08
p10 0.20 0.20 8.77 24.58 0.02
p25 0.28 0.28 9.33 40.30 0.72
p75 0.98 0.98 10.22 59.47 1.68
p90 1.24 1.32 10.31 71.84 1.79
Notes: The table shows by country the cross-sectional mean of each variable during the period 1995-2004. Y/L denotes
the log of real GDP per capita in PPP, H/L is a human capital abundance measure. Institutions is an index of the
quality of governance in a country, with higher values indicating better quality. p10, p25, p75 and p90 indicate the
10th, 25th, 75th and 90th percentile of the distribution, respectively.
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Table 3.14: US SIC industry description
SIC code Industry Description
104 Gold and Silver Ores
152 General Building Contractors-residential
161 Highway and Street Construction
162 Heavy Construction, Except Highway And Street
171 Plumbing, Heating and Air-Conditioning
173 Electrical Work
174 Masonry, Stonework, Tile Setting, and Plastering
175 Carpentry and Floor Work
176 Roofing, Siding and Sheet Metal Work
178 Water Well Drilling
179 Miscellaneous Special Trade Contractors
201 Meat Products
202 Dairy Products
203 Canned, Frozen, and Preserved Fruits, Vegetables, etc.
204 Grain Mill Products
205 Bakery Products
206 Sugar and Confectionery Products
207 Fats and Oils
208 Beverages
209 Miscellaneous Foods and Kindred Products
211 Cigarettes
221 Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Cotton
222 Broadwoven Fabric Mills, Manmade Fiber and Silk
225 Knitting Mills
226 Dyeing and Finishing Textiles, Except Wool Fabrics
227 Carpets and Rugs
228 Yarn and Thread Mills
229 Miscellaneous Textile Goods
232 Men’s and Boys’ Furnishings
238 Miscellaneous Apparel and Accessories
239 Miscellaneous Fabricated Textile Products
242 Sawmills and Planing Mills
243 Millwork, Veneer, Plywood, and Structural Wood
245 Wood Buildings and Mobile Homes
249 Miscellaneous Wood Products
251 Household Furniture
252 Office Furniture
261 Pulp Mills
262 Paper Mills
265 Paperboard Containers and Boxes
267 Miscellaneous Converted Paper and Paperboard Products
271 Newspapers: Publishing, or Publishing and Printing
272 Periodicals: Publishing, or Publishing and Printing
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Table 3.14 - Continued
SIC code Industry Description
273 Books
274 Miscellaneous Publishing
275 Commercial Printing
278 Blankbooks, Looseleaf Binders, and Bookbinding
281 Industrial Inorganic Chemicals
282 Plastics Materials and Synthetic Resins
283 Drugs
284 Soap, Detergents, and Cleaning Preparations; Perfumes, etc.
285 Paints, Varnishes, Lacquers, Enamels, and Allied
286 Industrial Organic Chemicals
287 Agricultural Chemicals
289 Miscellaneous Chemical Products
299 Miscellaneous Products of Petroleum and Coal
301 Tires and Inner Tubes
302 Rubber and Plastic Footwear
306 Fabricated Rubber Products, Not Elsewhere Classified
308 Miscellaneous Plastics Products
321 Flat Glass
322 Glass and Glassware, Pressed or Blown
323 Products of Purchased Glass
324 Cement, Hydraulic
325 Structural Clay Products
326 Pottery and Related Products
327 Concrete, Gypsum and Plaster Products
328 Cut Stone and Stone Products
329 Abrasive, Asbestos, and Miscellaneous
331 Steel Works, Blast Furnaces, and Rolling and Finishing Mills
332 Iron and Steel Foundries
333 Primary Smelting and Refining Of Nonferrous
334 Secondary Smelting and Refining Of Nonferrous
336 Nonferrous Foundries (Castings)
341 Metal Cans and Shipping Containers
342 Cutlery, Handtools, and General Hardware
343 Heating Equipment, Except Electric And Warm Air
344 Fabricated Structural Metal Products
345 Screw Machine Products, Bolts, etc.
346 Metal Forgings and Stampings
348 Ordnance and Accessories, Except Vehicles and Guided Missiles
349 Miscellaneous Fabricated Metal Products
351 Engines and Turbines
352 Farm and Garden Machinery and Equipment
353 Construction, Mining, and Materials Handling
354 Metalworking Machinery and Equipment
355 Special Industry Machinery, Except Metalworking
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Table 3.14 - Continued
SIC code Industry Description
356 General Industrial Machinery and Equipment
357 Computer and Office Equipment
362 Electrical Industrial Apparatus
363 Household Appliances
364 Electric Lighting and Wiring Equipment
365 Household Audio and Video Equipment
366 Communications Equipment
367 Electronic Components and Accessories
369 Miscellaneous Electrical Machinery, Equipment, and Supplies
371 Motor Vehicles and Equipment
372 Aircraft and Parts
373 Ship and Boat Building and Repairing
374 Railroad Equipment
375 Motorcycles, Bicycles and Parts
379 Miscellaneous Transportation Equipment
381 Search, Detection, Navigation, etc. and Equipment
382 Measuring and Controlling Instruments
384 Surgical, Medical, and Dental Instruments and Supplies
387 Watches, Clocks, Clockwork Operated Devices, and Parts
391 Jewelry, Silverware and Plated Ware
393 Musical Instruments
394 Dolls, Toys, Games and Sporting and Athletic
399 Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries
401 Railroads
411 Local and Suburban Passenger Transportation
421 Trucking and Courier Services, Except Air
441 Deep Sea Foreign Transportation of Freight
444 Water Transportation of Freight, Not Elsewhere Classified
449 Services Incidental to Water Transportation
451 Air Transportation, Scheduled, and Air Courier
452 Air Transportation, Nonscheduled
458 Airports, Flying Fields, and Airport Terminal
461 Pipelines, Except Natural Gas
472 Arrangement Of Passenger Transportation
474 Rental of Railroad Cars
478 Miscellaneous Services Incidental To Transportation
489 Communications Services, Not Elsewhere Classified
495 Sanitary Services
501 Motor Vehicles, Parts and Supplies
502 Furniture and Home Furnishing
503 Lumber and Other Construction Materials
504 Professional and Commercial Equipment and Supplies
505 Metals and Minerals, Except Petroleum
506 Electrical Goods
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Table 3.14 - Continued
SIC code Industry Description
507 Hardware, Plumbing and Heating Equipment
508 Machinery, Equipment and Supplies
509 Miscellaneous Durable Goods
512 Drugs, Drug Proprietaries, and Druggists’ Sundries
513 Apparel, Piece Goods and Notions
514 Groceries and Related Products
515 Farm-product Raw Materials
516 Chemicals and Allied Products
518 Beer, Wine, and Distilled Alcoholic Beverages
519 Miscellaneous Non-durable Goods
523 Paint, Glass and Wallpaper Stores
531 Department Stores
541 Grocery Stores
543 Fruit and Vegetable Markets
544 Candy, Nut and Confectionery Stores
549 Miscellaneous Food Stores
554 Gasoline Service Stations
565 Family Clothing Stores
566 Shoe Stores
571 Home Furniture and Furnishings Stores
572 Household Appliance Stores
581 Eating and Drinking Places
591 Drug Stores and Proprietary Stores
593 Used Merchandise Stores
594 Miscellaneous Shopping Goods Stores
596 Nonstore Retailers
599 Retail Stores, Not Elsewhere Classified
701 Hotels and Motels
702 Rooming and Boarding Houses
703 Camps and Recreational Vehicle Parks
722 Photographic Studios, Portrait
729 Miscellaneous Personal Services
731 Advertising
733 Mailing, Reproduction, Stenographic Services
734 Services to Dwellings and Other Buildings
735 Miscellaneous Equipment Rental and Leasing
736 Personnel Supply Services
737 Computer Programming, Data Processing, etc. Services
738 Miscellaneous Business Services
751 Automotive Rental and Leasing, Without Drivers
753 Automobile Repair Shops
762 Electrical Repair Shops
769 Miscellaneous Repair Shops and Related Services
811 Legal Services
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Table 3.14 - Continued
SIC code Industry Description
871 Engineering, Architectural, and Surveying
872 Accounting, Auditing, and Bookkeeping Services
873 Research, Development, and Testing Services
874 Management and Public Relations Services
Source: United States Department of Labor; www.osha.gov
Table 3.15: Industry measures
SIC
code
Asset
Tangibil-
ity (US)
External
Finance De-
pendence
(US)
Physical
Capital
Intensity
(UK)
Human
Capital
Intensity
(UK)
104 0.345 1.993 0.0347 0.0325
152 0.019 1.318 0.0137 0.0335
161 0.344 -0.130 0.0205 0.0383
162 0.230 -0.123 0.0124 0.0357
171 0.041 -1.758 0.0073 0.0353
173 0.251 0.329 0.0062 0.0380
174 0.136 0.875 0.0101 0.0345
175 0.379 -0.134 0.0148 0.0323
176 0.087 -2.946 0.0079 0.0332
178 0.335 1.490 0.0152 0.0405
179 0.257 -0.697 0.0210 0.0360
201 0.419 -0.326 0.0292 0.0255
202 0.330 -0.447 0.0473 0.0288
203 0.285 -1.028 0.0378 0.0277
204 0.437 -0.467 0.0592 0.0331
205 0.492 -0.356 0.0225 0.0200
206 0.361 -0.763 0.0463 0.0247
207 0.360 0.106 0.0698 0.0356
208 0.333 -0.333 0.1170 0.0321
209 0.319 -0.199 0.0328 0.0259
211 0.125 -3.438 0.1541 0.0431
221 0.634 -0.105 0.0362 0.0252
222 0.374 -0.574 0.2263 0.0083
225 0.162 -0.084 0.0126 0.0204
226 0.051 1.883 0.0309 0.0261
227 0.317 -0.618 0.0229 0.0270
228 0.510 -0.403 0.0288 0.0251
229 0.392 -0.048 0.0285 0.0266
232 0.193 -0.892 0.0126 0.0236
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Table 3.15 - Continued
SIC code Asset
Tangibil-
ity
External
Financial
Depen-
dence
Physical
Capital
Intensity
Human
Capital
Intensity
238 0.113 0.258 0.0142 0.0251
239 0.307 0.790 0.0146 0.0227
242 0.107 1.008 0.0315 0.0260
243 0.429 -0.506 0.0178 0.0277
245 0.189 -1.890 0.0268 0.0281
249 0.214 -1.214 0.0262 0.0264
251 0.285 -1.055 0.0162 0.0275
252 0.355 -1.407 0.0189 0.0321
261 0.636 -0.210 0.2391 0.0385
262 0.574 -0.557 0.0725 0.0385
265 0.470 -0.774 0.0446 0.0304
267 0.513 -0.776 0.0401 0.0306
271 0.230 -2.067 0.0476 0.0295
272 0.094 -1.273 0.0231 0.0440
273 0.133 -0.834 0.0197 0.0375
274 0.120 -1.140 0.0269 0.0405
275 0.332 -0.732 0.0459 0.0360
278 0.287 -2.180 0.0356 0.0328
281 0.371 -0.277 0.0972 0.0442
282 0.421 -0.202 0.0516 0.0340
283 0.124 9.304 0.0678 0.0452
284 0.170 -0.728 0.0332 0.0308
285 0.385 -1.319 0.0398 0.0361
286 0.342 0.280 0.1267 0.0453
287 0.270 -0.821 0.1056 0.0361
289 0.224 -0.223 0.0580 0.0387
299 0.147 -1.140 0.0584 0.0396
301 0.375 0.060 0.0387 0.0312
302 0.123 -1.299 0.0139 0.0250
306 0.329 -0.363 0.0288 0.0316
308 0.344 -0.151 0.0336 0.0296
321 0.416 -0.403 0.0329 0.0277
322 0.365 -1.037 0.0380 0.0326
323 0.306 1.072 0.0495 0.0312
324 0.510 -0.803 0.1134 0.0401
325 0.386 -0.222 0.0699 0.0334
326 0.084 -7.519 0.0267 0.0272
327 0.436 -0.152 0.0505 0.0342
328 0.382 -0.106 0.0215 0.0265
329 0.148 3.985 0.0557 0.0326
331 0.459 -0.105 0.0405 0.0328
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Table 3.15 - Continued
SIC code Asset
Tangibil-
ity
External
Financial
Depen-
dence
Physical
Capital
Intensity
Human
Capital
Intensity
332 0.465 -0.687 0.0273 0.0321
333 0.410 0.647 0.0342 0.0333
334 0.377 -0.115 0.0281 0.0319
336 0.226 -3.981 0.0289 0.0323
341 0.390 -0.709 0.0291 0.0324
342 0.169 -2.041 0.0266 0.0312
343 0.236 1.566 0.0307 0.0359
344 0.317 -0.429 0.0199 0.0339
345 0.399 -2.277 0.0308 0.0287
346 0.420 0.020 0.0310 0.0310
348 0.181 -0.404 0.0477 0.0417
349 0.228 -0.706 0.0250 0.0323
351 0.188 6.268 0.0378 0.0358
352 0.135 -1.177 0.0263 0.0307
353 0.248 -0.341 0.0216 0.0366
354 0.213 -0.740 0.0314 0.0358
355 0.169 0.289 0.0278 0.0381
356 0.222 -0.478 0.0248 0.0376
357 0.107 0.186 0.0209 0.0404
362 0.170 0.018 0.0221 0.0358
363 0.128 -0.769 0.0247 0.0286
364 0.230 -0.230 0.0207 0.0320
365 0.144 0.398 0.0245 0.0362
366 0.124 1.525 0.0206 0.0406
367 0.177 0.198 0.0240 0.0312
369 0.179 2.043 0.0203 0.0328
371 0.273 -0.149 0.0329 0.0340
372 0.152 -1.124 0.0307 0.0400
373 0.282 -0.271 0.0240 0.0347
374 0.270 0.151 0.0175 0.0395
375 0.216 0.910 0.0154 0.0250
379 0.241 -0.452 0.0186 0.0306
381 0.146 -0.934 0.0223 0.0380
382 0.128 0.384 0.0171 0.0392
384 0.122 3.311 0.0317 0.0388
387 0.127 -1.060 0.0155 0.0408
391 0.025 1.523 0.0164 0.0246
393 0.305 -0.627 0.0444 0.0356
394 0.124 0.427 0.0236 0.0292
399 0.247 -0.255 0.0264 0.0300
401 0.698 -0.307 0.0212 0.0423
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Table 3.15 - Continued
SIC code Asset
Tangibil-
ity
External
Financial
Depen-
dence
Physical
Capital
Intensity
Human
Capital
Intensity
411 0.148 0.526 0.0400 0.0247
421 0.480 0.175 0.0318 0.0316
441 0.742 0.332 0.1566 0.0364
444 0.603 -0.579 0.1107 0.0365
449 0.576 0.457 0.0228 0.0369
451 0.581 0.111 0.0786 0.0399
452 0.535 0.213 0.0533 0.0448
458 0.390 -0.182 0.0463 0.0373
461 0.801 -0.896 1.8359 0.0325
472 0.065 0.568 0.0102 0.0274
474 0.657 0.160 0.5089 0.0369
478 0.606 1.249 0.0143 0.0330
489 0.271 2.184 0.0386 0.0511
495 0.388 0.371 0.0530 0.0300
501 0.175 -0.312 0.0304 0.0276
502 0.040 0.435 0.0210 0.0286
503 0.195 0.521 0.0254 0.0268
504 0.081 0.743 0.0162 0.0419
505 0.276 0.480 0.0348 0.0331
506 0.063 -0.009 0.0168 0.0325
507 0.148 -0.470 0.0158 0.0272
508 0.185 -0.258 0.0194 0.0318
509 0.139 -0.157 0.0584 0.0258
512 0.091 -1.519 0.0210 0.0321
513 0.060 -1.047 0.0190 0.0283
514 0.246 -0.064 0.0233 0.0275
515 0.191 -0.550 0.0346 0.0305
516 0.287 -1.020 0.0203 0.0343
518 0.356 1.085 0.0283 0.0294
519 0.107 -0.469 0.0222 0.0340
523 0.186 -2.755 0.0220 0.0196
531 0.435 0.070 0.0201 0.0181
541 0.494 -0.235 0.0261 0.0130
543 0.280 -0.561 0.0058 0.0116
544 0.476 -0.148 0.0139 0.0148
549 0.451 4.362 0.0222 0.0172
554 0.573 0.000 0.0799 0.0152
565 0.304 -0.897 0.0165 0.0186
566 0.288 -0.359 0.0118 0.0161
571 0.289 -0.208 0.0332 0.0241
572 0.253 0.258 0.0181 0.0243
150
Credit Constraints in Europe
Table 3.15 - Continued
SIC code Asset
Tangibil-
ity
External
Financial
Depen-
dence
Physical
Capital
Intensity
Human
Capital
Intensity
581 0.581 -0.018 0.0301 0.0157
591 0.130 0.497 0.0377 0.0166
593 0.142 -0.378 0.0264 0.0261
594 0.221 -0.105 0.0114 0.0211
596 0.105 1.150 0.0164 0.0273
599 0.116 0.768 0.0214 0.0214
701 0.662 0.189 0.0959 0.0171
702 0.830 0.641 0.0723 0.0170
703 0.819 -0.561 0.1505 0.0172
722 0.433 -0.351 0.0172 0.0337
729 0.091 -1.319 0.0332 0.0205
731 0.058 -0.204 0.0117 0.0457
733 0.090 1.377 0.0266 0.0632
734 0.097 -2.121 0.0010 0.0110
735 0.492 0.232 0.0925 0.0340
736 0.089 -0.753 0.0037 0.0401
737 0.097 3.019 0.0130 0.0568
738 0.100 1.271 0.0172 0.0383
751 0.607 0.513 0.3036 0.0269
753 0.479 0.508 0.0290 0.0290
762 0.200 1.433 0.0065 0.0284
769 0.254 6.203 0.0086 0.0343
811 0.141 -2.196 0.0049 0.0378
871 0.166 -0.177 0.0064 0.0454
872 0.070 -0.672 0.0118 0.0404
873 0.130 8.764 0.0374 0.0473
874 0.091 -0.516 0.0121 0.0495
Average 0.287 -0.035 0.050 0.032
p10 0.091 -1.299 0.0124 0.0204
p25 0.141 -0.728 0.0186 0.0270
p75 0.390 0.371 0.0398 0.0366
p90 0.535 1.377 0.0786 0.0406
Notes: The table shows by sector the calculated measures for asset tangibility (Tang), external financial
dependence (FinDep), physical capital intensity (CapInt) and human capital intensity (HumInt) using the
methodology described in the main text. p10, p25, p75 and p90 indicate the 10th, 25th, 75th and 90th
percentile of the distribution, respectively.
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Table 3.16: Pairwise correlations of industry measures
Tang FinDep CapInt HumInt
Tang 1.00
FinDep -0.03 1.00
(0.71)
CapInt 0.37 -0.03 1.00
(0.00) (0.64)
HumInt -0.20 0.18 0.02 1.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.83)
Notes: The table shows the pairwise correlations between the industry measures: asset tangibility
(Tang), external financial dependence (FinDep), physical capital intensity (CapInt) and human capital
intensity (HumInt). P-values of the t-test with the null hypothesis of no correlation in parentheses.
Table 3.17: Estimated coefficients by industry and esti-
mation method
OLS FE LP
SIC
code
capital labor obs. capital labor obs. capital labor obs.
104 0.28 0.57 411 0.21 0.35 411 0.20 0.78 251
152 0.29 0.62 143533 0.41 0.44 143533 0.18 0.49 122559
161 0.36 0.58 11496 0.60 0.34 11496 0.31 0.41 10801
162 0.23 0.71 24027 0.37 0.52 24027 0.16 0.60 18802
171 0.25 0.72 27591 0.44 0.43 27591 0.17 0.50 25260
173 0.21 0.76 36867 0.33 0.46 36867 0.11 0.60 33195
174 0.21 0.68 12960 0.29 0.48 12960 0.10 0.61 11722
175 0.16 0.71 11843 0.21 0.49 11843 0.11 0.56 10572
176 0.17 0.70 8922 0.17 0.61 8922 0.10 0.59 8151
178 0.32 0.64 1114 0.46 0.37 1114 0.25 0.53 1052
179 0.22 0.69 23522 0.23 0.45 23522 0.15 0.58 20957
201 0.38 0.55 23647 0.60 0.20 23647 0.38 0.39 21931
202 0.42 0.57 10614 0.63 0.22 10614 0.32 0.45 9867
203 0.38 0.54 9098 0.53 0.26 9098 0.31 0.37 7654
204 0.47 0.51 12757 0.71 0.18 12757 0.43 0.37 11564
205 0.58 0.37 18230 0.82 0.13 18230 0.55 0.21 16829
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Table 3.17 - Continued
OLS FE LP
SIC
code
capital labor obs. capital labor obs. capital labor obs.
206 0.45 0.56 4434 0.62 0.22 4434 0.36 0.41 3971
207 0.44 0.60 2881 0.59 0.21 2881 0.32 0.42 2681
208 0.41 0.60 16255 0.59 0.25 16255 0.35 0.42 14531
209 0.35 0.59 14139 0.41 0.36 14139 0.27 0.46 12247
211 0.45 0.52 746 0.31 0.42 746 0.44 0.41 564
221 0.37 0.53 3034 0.53 0.28 3034 0.31 0.45 2915
222 0.29 0.61 1700 0.50 0.46 1700 0.19 0.55 1671
225 0.38 0.54 10172 0.56 0.21 10172 0.24 0.50 9585
226 0.23 0.63 5769 0.20 0.38 5769 0.11 0.57 5371
227 0.31 0.63 1394 0.42 0.44 1394 0.34 0.58 964
228 0.33 0.56 5864 0.47 0.40 5864 0.23 0.51 4891
229 0.35 0.60 6234 0.50 0.33 6234 0.24 0.50 5597
232 0.46 0.46 19796 0.64 0.13 19796 0.35 0.48 18365
238 0.41 0.47 6146 0.59 0.14 6146 0.31 0.46 5603
239 0.38 0.49 5886 0.62 0.25 5886 0.34 0.43 5227
242 0.50 0.39 12874 0.76 0.09 12874 0.49 0.28 11565
243 0.32 0.63 6303 0.49 0.26 6303 0.20 0.45 5929
245 0.35 0.56 12530 0.58 0.25 12530 0.31 0.40 11505
249 0.36 0.52 5830 0.56 0.21 5830 0.29 0.44 5035
251 0.44 0.50 21666 0.68 0.16 21666 0.38 0.34 19481
252 0.36 0.51 6032 0.56 0.16 6032 0.32 0.34 5276
261 0.36 0.60 417 0.54 0.25 417 0.21 0.30 380
262 0.36 0.59 4447 0.39 0.35 4447 0.19 0.52 3697
265 0.33 0.62 14346 0.39 0.37 14346 0.20 0.47 12218
267 0.36 0.56 10905 0.50 0.20 10905 0.27 0.43 9502
271 0.38 0.55 6058 0.46 0.31 6058 0.28 0.45 4563
272 0.19 0.74 5871 0.12 0.42 5871 0.07 0.61 4107
273 0.27 0.63 6467 0.26 0.28 6467 0.13 0.49 4840
274 0.26 0.59 2639 0.25 0.35 2639 0.18 0.47 1641
275 0.33 0.57 23454 0.47 0.27 23454 0.24 0.38 18596
278 0.30 0.53 1791 0.27 0.20 1791 0.20 0.49 1639
281 0.35 0.59 5114 0.44 0.34 5114 0.38 0.42 3561
282 0.35 0.58 5735 0.37 0.37 5735 0.20 0.48 4415
283 0.28 0.70 8651 0.38 0.35 8651 0.23 0.48 7061
284 0.33 0.63 7647 0.39 0.31 7647 0.21 0.47 6689
285 0.34 0.60 6601 0.53 0.29 6601 0.31 0.37 5860
286 0.34 0.64 1967 0.28 0.41 1967 0.26 0.51 1704
287 0.26 0.72 2576 0.37 0.41 2576 0.22 0.58 2244
289 0.26 0.69 8673 0.32 0.40 8673 0.24 0.52 6958
299 0.44 0.53 2488 0.40 0.25 2488 0.26 0.46 2017
301 0.44 0.51 637 0.75 0.18 637 0.46 0.28 511
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Table 3.17 - Continued
OLS FE LP
SIC
code
capital labor obs. capital labor obs. capital labor obs.
302 0.38 0.54 15168 0.59 0.26 15168 0.27 0.49 14797
306 0.31 0.63 5857 0.44 0.41 5857 0.18 0.52 5054
308 0.32 0.60 29550 0.45 0.33 29550 0.24 0.44 24971
321 0.38 0.59 4162 0.51 0.29 4162 0.28 0.47 3708
322 0.45 0.51 2627 0.57 0.19 2627 0.29 0.38 2348
323 0.51 0.38 355 0.73 0.47 355 0.58 0.40 280
324 0.46 0.53 1561 0.32 0.33 1561 0.19 0.37 1366
325 0.33 0.66 8246 0.48 0.39 8246 0.24 0.51 7755
326 0.41 0.55 3194 0.62 0.23 3194 0.37 0.43 2748
327 0.31 0.61 20702 0.39 0.37 20702 0.18 0.49 19771
328 0.27 0.63 7029 0.40 0.36 7029 0.17 0.54 6923
329 0.36 0.55 3510 0.44 0.30 3510 0.38 0.46 3037
331 0.30 0.65 9244 0.39 0.41 9244 0.20 0.51 7921
332 0.34 0.59 3622 0.53 0.23 3622 0.25 0.43 3145
333 0.34 0.62 4423 0.36 0.45 4423 0.18 0.50 3309
334 0.26 0.64 1749 0.36 0.27 1749 0.21 0.56 1551
336 0.42 0.48 1799 0.62 0.23 1799 0.25 0.38 1669
341 0.33 0.60 5064 0.50 0.33 5064 0.27 0.45 4685
342 0.26 0.64 7436 0.36 0.32 7436 0.14 0.55 6554
343 0.20 0.74 7731 0.25 0.42 7731 0.11 0.64 7389
344 0.32 0.61 37018 0.53 0.31 37018 0.24 0.50 34060
345 0.35 0.56 4145 0.54 0.22 4145 0.23 0.43 3678
346 0.29 0.63 14167 0.36 0.38 14167 0.20 0.55 13576
348 0.24 0.69 793 0.26 0.38 793 0.33 0.47 681
349 0.24 0.67 59193 0.29 0.40 59193 0.14 0.58 49069
351 0.29 0.64 1522 0.57 0.28 1522 0.28 0.48 1281
352 0.30 0.63 6596 0.44 0.35 6596 0.22 0.49 5981
353 0.24 0.69 14676 0.34 0.40 14676 0.14 0.55 12820
354 0.24 0.67 11718 0.38 0.34 11718 0.14 0.53 10813
355 0.23 0.68 21235 0.29 0.41 21235 0.13 0.56 19122
356 0.21 0.71 32050 0.24 0.39 32050 0.16 0.58 28379
357 0.31 0.63 4884 0.41 0.31 4884 0.22 0.55 3347
362 0.27 0.66 12134 0.42 0.39 12134 0.24 0.51 10915
363 0.31 0.62 4165 0.42 0.28 4165 0.19 0.47 3559
364 0.28 0.64 9192 0.36 0.40 9192 0.22 0.50 8144
365 0.28 0.64 2539 0.34 0.42 2539 0.22 0.42 1936
366 0.28 0.67 4704 0.28 0.45 4704 0.16 0.58 4036
367 0.24 0.66 7324 0.27 0.46 7324 0.25 0.53 6024
369 0.23 0.69 12462 0.22 0.37 12462 0.15 0.55 9542
371 0.31 0.64 19808 0.44 0.44 19808 0.21 0.50 17299
372 0.28 0.69 2308 0.41 0.47 2308 0.41 0.53 1623
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Table 3.17 - Continued
OLS FE LP
SIC
code
capital labor obs. capital labor obs. capital labor obs.
373 0.24 0.71 6500 0.40 0.39 6500 0.13 0.64 5628
374 0.34 0.57 2553 0.51 0.34 2553 0.24 0.44 2435
375 0.17 0.77 1329 0.19 0.49 1329 0.17 0.65 1199
379 0.14 0.76 801 0.08 0.37 801 0.06 0.52 553
381 0.22 0.72 8422 0.26 0.45 8422 0.13 0.59 6375
382 0.25 0.67 6165 0.42 0.37 6165 0.19 0.53 5655
384 0.27 0.64 7025 0.22 0.41 7025 0.17 0.50 5992
387 0.23 0.61 526 0.22 0.65 526 -0.02 0.59 477
391 0.23 0.62 5337 0.22 0.34 5337 0.13 0.58 4991
393 0.42 0.37 465 0.45 -0.04 465 0.54 0.32 412
394 0.29 0.61 3555 0.35 0.35 3555 0.22 0.48 3064
399 0.26 0.65 10966 0.29 0.43 10966 0.20 0.52 5685
401 0.23 0.69 1469 0.26 0.40 1469 0.43 0.48 761
411 0.24 0.68 16845 0.24 0.32 16845 0.14 0.66 14501
421 0.32 0.62 67320 0.48 0.37 67320 0.23 0.52 47829
441 0.32 0.53 4820 0.26 0.37 4820 0.22 0.48 2414
444 0.36 0.51 913 0.50 0.33 913 0.35 0.43 594
449 0.23 0.66 10292 0.34 0.32 10292 0.16 0.65 7605
451 0.24 0.75 1229 0.16 0.55 1229 0.10 0.73 552
452 0.21 0.80 1136 0.20 0.65 1136 0.20 0.66 680
458 0.22 0.70 1658 0.22 0.47 1658 0.06 0.69 1012
461 0.46 0.28 195 0.82 0.01 195 0.01 0.15 136
472 0.17 0.78 15526 0.20 0.46 15526 0.09 0.66 9216
474 0.45 0.42 1492 0.43 0.32 1492 0.23 0.36 986
478 0.21 0.66 26512 0.23 0.39 26512 0.15 0.63 16651
489 0.35 0.61 6580 0.49 0.34 6580 0.28 0.50 4277
495 0.42 0.48 8327 0.64 0.22 8327 0.33 0.42 7553
501 0.23 0.69 120382 0.28 0.37 120382 0.16 0.48 102545
502 0.23 0.63 45999 0.28 0.35 45999 0.16 0.50 41780
503 0.25 0.60 56546 0.31 0.29 56546 0.16 0.44 51873
504 0.21 0.74 21024 0.24 0.48 21024 0.10 0.63 18608
505 0.27 0.61 31997 0.31 0.32 31997 0.15 0.53 28298
506 0.20 0.72 45595 0.21 0.43 45595 0.12 0.55 41112
507 0.20 0.68 21771 0.20 0.35 21771 0.13 0.48 20101
508 0.22 0.66 104134 0.24 0.37 104134 0.14 0.50 85685
509 0.28 0.56 4892 0.25 0.31 4892 0.17 0.50 4301
512 0.24 0.68 25969 0.29 0.30 25969 0.16 0.50 23209
513 0.20 0.62 32632 0.21 0.42 32632 0.13 0.48 27756
514 0.29 0.54 92195 0.39 0.20 92195 0.22 0.41 83521
515 0.25 0.62 22172 0.31 0.30 22172 0.17 0.53 20642
516 0.21 0.65 26830 0.22 0.35 26830 0.11 0.55 23887
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Table 3.17 - Continued
OLS FE LP
SIC
code
capital labor obs. capital labor obs. capital labor obs.
518 0.29 0.52 17264 0.41 0.13 17264 0.24 0.35 15581
519 0.28 0.59 14888 0.38 0.25 14888 0.16 0.50 12354
523 0.21 0.65 19971 0.33 0.27 19971 0.16 0.40 19050
531 0.46 0.41 8021 0.69 0.12 8021 0.38 0.22 6380
541 0.39 0.53 61205 0.60 0.16 61205 0.37 0.21 55402
543 0.29 0.55 1220 0.42 0.24 1220 0.24 0.48 1168
544 0.40 0.55 1695 0.61 0.34 1695 0.24 0.46 1597
549 0.31 0.60 3598 0.42 0.42 3598 0.20 0.40 3392
554 0.28 0.66 20872 0.47 0.20 20872 0.21 0.48 19775
565 0.21 0.68 21849 0.26 0.45 21849 0.15 0.42 19650
566 0.25 0.62 5502 0.30 0.33 5502 0.20 0.33 4993
571 0.21 0.67 19533 0.29 0.40 19533 0.16 0.39 18254
572 0.23 0.69 12001 0.41 0.33 12001 0.18 0.44 11017
581 0.27 0.65 36996 0.41 0.31 36996 0.24 0.36 33329
591 0.34 0.52 9218 0.57 0.19 9218 0.26 0.26 8306
593 0.31 0.45 1048 0.41 0.18 1048 0.21 0.46 691
594 0.36 0.52 5244 0.59 0.23 5244 0.24 0.35 4777
596 0.24 0.65 6265 0.25 0.38 6265 0.22 0.52 5420
599 0.24 0.61 39878 0.34 0.33 39878 0.17 0.50 36546
701 0.30 0.62 36129 0.42 0.32 36129 0.22 0.41 30850
702 0.30 0.52 2669 0.43 0.30 2669 0.27 0.38 2192
703 0.34 0.55 2120 0.27 0.19 2120 0.10 0.43 1588
722 0.32 0.51 2002 0.57 0.14 2002 0.27 0.43 1604
729 0.34 0.55 1912 0.28 0.50 1912 0.27 0.46 1543
731 0.22 0.68 22145 0.18 0.48 22145 0.10 0.62 14606
733 0.21 0.67 2371 0.12 0.55 2371 0.16 0.69 1651
734 0.20 0.70 19282 0.18 0.44 19282 0.09 0.64 17193
735 0.39 0.52 12321 0.43 0.51 12321 0.22 0.47 9207
736 0.26 0.55 9008 0.23 0.34 9008 0.16 0.51 2034
737 0.21 0.73 52506 0.20 0.51 52506 0.11 0.71 34004
738 0.24 0.62 40861 0.20 0.46 40861 0.13 0.63 19956
751 0.54 0.39 4373 0.51 0.42 4373 0.31 0.31 2656
753 0.27 0.66 24172 0.44 0.37 24172 0.20 0.60 22155
762 0.27 0.65 1084 0.53 0.36 1084 0.19 0.63 1017
769 0.18 0.72 2019 0.14 0.51 2019 0.09 0.70 1923
811 0.21 0.68 2959 0.12 0.49 2959 0.17 0.59 1050
871 0.23 0.70 36894 0.28 0.53 36894 0.13 0.67 24012
872 0.24 0.67 12121 0.18 0.45 12121 0.15 0.65 5394
873 0.25 0.68 10086 0.50 0.46 10086 0.20 0.62 7008
874 0.23 0.64 27174 0.19 0.41 27174 0.13 0.62 13416
Notes: The table shows estimated coefficients on capital and labor and the number of observations from a
Cobb-Douglas production function. Three methods are used: ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects within
(FE) and Levinsohn and Petrin (LP) estimation.
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Table 3.18: Pairwise correlations of firms’ TFP measures
TFP OLS TFP FE TFP LP
TFP OLS 1.00
TFP FE 0.89 1.00
(0.00)
TFP LP 0.92 0.86 1.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Notes: The table shows the pairwise correlations between the three measures of TFP using OLS, FE
and LP estimation, described in the main text. P-values of the t-test with the null hypothesis of no
correlation in parentheses.
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Table 3.19: Descriptive statistics
Variable description Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log of TFP (OLS) TFP_OLS 1 541 597 3.10 0.90 -7.08 11.15
Log of TFP (FE) TFP_FE 1 541 597 3.43 1.16 -6.55 11.63
Log of TFP (LP) TFP_LP 1 290 959 3.93 0.94 -5.89 12.24
Private credit by deposit money banks as a share 
of GDP FinDev 1 541 597 0.82 0.29 0.06 1.65
Private credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions as a share of GDP 1 541 597 0.84 0.28 0.06 1.65
External financial dependence (US industry 
median) FinDep 1 541 597 0.04 1.28 -7.52 9.30
Asset tangibility (US industry median) Tang 1 541 597 0.24 0.16 0.02 0.83
Asset tangibility (tangible fixed assets to total 
assets, UK industry median) Tang1 (UK) 1 541 597 0.22 0.16 0.05 0.85
Asset tangibility (tangible plus financial fixed 
assets to total assets, UK industry median) Tang2 (UK) 1 541 597 0.25 0.16 0.06 0.88
Firm-level asset tangibility (tangible fixed assets 
as a share of total assets)
Tang1 (firm-
level) 1 541 498 0.21 0.20 0 0.999
Firm-level asset tangibility (tangible plus 
financial fixed assets as a share of total assets)
Tang2 (firm-
level) 1 541 501 0.25 0.21 0 0.999
Log of real GDP per capita in PPP Y/L 1 541 597 10.04 0.34 8.61 11.03
Physical capital intensity (UK industry median) CapInt 1 541 597 0.03 0.03 0.00 1.84
Tertiary school enrollment (% of gross) H/L 1 541 597 57.47 10.80 9.50 86.90
Human capital intensity (UK industry median) HumInt 1 541 597 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.06
Average governance index Institutions 1 541 597 1.17 0.44 -0.47 1.94
Publicly quoted firm (Dummy variable) 1 541 597 0.01 0.08 0 1
Number of employees 1 541 597 88.70 435.97 1 19729
Log of Sales (in Tsd USD) 1 349 270 8.20 1.39 0 17.66
Log of material costs (in Tsd USD) 1 290 959 7.29 1.79 0 18.04
Log of real value added (in Tsd real USD) 1 541 597 6.81 1.52 -0.71 16.32
Log of real fixed assets (in Tsd real USD) 1 541 597 6.09 2.00 -0.71 17.73
Log of real total assets (in Tsd real USD) Firm size 1 541 597 7.80 1.58 -0.04 18.32
Debt to total assets ratio Debt ratio 1 491 922 0.92 0.12 0 0.999
Effectively applied import tariff rate in % 
(simple industry average) 464 192 2.31 4.70 0 189
Effectively applied import tariff rate in % 
(weighted industry average) 464 192 2.93 4.38 0 189
Notes: Summary statistics only for the estimation sample period of 1999-2003.
158
Credit Constraints in Europe
T
ab
le
3.
20
:
P
ai
rw
is
e
co
rr
el
at
io
n
s
of
va
ri
ab
le
s
T
F
P
O
L
S
T
F
P
F
E
T
F
P
L
P
F
in
D
ev
*F
in
D
ep
F
in
D
ev
*T
an
g
(Y
/L
)*
C
ap
In
t
(H
/L
)*
H
u
m
In
t
F
ir
m
si
ze
T
F
P
O
L
S
1.
00
T
F
P
F
E
0.
89
1.
00
T
F
P
L
P
0.
92
0.
86
1.
00
F
in
D
ev
*F
in
D
ep
0.
06
0.
04
0.
01
1.
00
F
in
D
ev
*T
an
g
-0
.0
4
-0
.1
1
0.
05
-0
.0
9
1.
00
(Y
/L
)*
C
ap
In
t
-0
.1
3
-0
.1
5
-0
.0
2
0.
01
0.
39
1.
00
(H
/L
)*
H
u
m
In
t
0.
37
0.
35
0.
30
0.
26
-0
.1
4
-0
.1
0
1.
00
F
ir
m
si
ze
0.
31
0.
35
0.
55
0.
05
0.
16
0.
12
0.
14
1.
00
N
o
te
s
:
T
h
e
ta
b
le
sh
o
w
s
th
e
p
a
ir
w
is
e
co
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
s
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
m
a
in
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
u
se
d
in
se
ct
io
n
3
.5
.
159
Credit Constraints in Europe
Table 3.21: Productivity (OLS) and financial constraints
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FinDev*FinDep 0.017** 0.016** 0.029***
(0.0068) (0.0066) (0.0074)
FinDev*Tang -0.14** -0.13** -0.24***
(0.056) (0.055) (0.067)
(Y/L)*CapInt -0.91
(1.30)
(H/L)*HumInt -0.23***
(0.055)
Firm size 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13***
(0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055)
Country*year dummies yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 1541597 1541597 1541597 1541597
Number of firms 461454 461454 461454 461454
Number of clusters 3527 3527 3527 3527
R-squared 0.240 0.240 0.240 0.240
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TFP_OLS
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on country-industry pairs in parentheses.
The table shows fixed-effects within estimates. Country-year dummies and a constant are sup-
pressed. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.22: Productivity (FE) and financial constraints
Dependent Variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FinDev*FinDep 0.015* 0.014 0.022**
(0.0087) (0.0083) (0.0094)
FinDev*Tang -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.31***
(0.075) (0.074) (0.085)
(Y/L)*CapInt -1.58
(1.51)
(H/L)*HumInt -0.16***
(0.061)
Firm size 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15***
(0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0082)
Country*year dummies yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 1541597 1541597 1541597 1541597
Number of firms 461454 461454 461454 461454
Number of clusters 3527 3527 3527 3527
R-squared 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.181
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
TFP_FE
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on country-industry pairs in parentheses.
The table shows fixed-effects within estimates. Country-year dummies and a constant are sup-
pressed. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.27: Descriptive statistics for export status
Variable description Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log of TFP (OLS) TFP_OLS 765 617 3.36 0.74 -4.84 10.79
External financial dependence (US data) FinDep 765 617 0.05 1.30 -7.52 9.30
Asset tangibility (US data) Tang 765 617 0.25 0.16 0.02 0.83
Firm-level asset tangibility (tangible 
fixed assets as a share of total assets)
Tang1 (firm-
level) 765 594 0.19 0.19 0 0.999
Log of real GDP per capita in PPP Y/L 765 617 10.11 0.21 9.06 10.25
Physical capital intensity (UK industry 
median) CapInt 765 617 0.03 0.03 0.001 1.84
Tertiary school enrollment (% of gross) H/L 475 756 55.79 6.87 30.54 67.39
Human capital intensity (UK industry 
median) HumInt 765 617 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.06
Log of real total assets (in Tsd real USD) Firm size 765 565 8.10 1.60 0.81 19.53
Publicly quoted firm (Dummy variable) 765 617 0.01 0.10 0 1
Effectively applied import tariff rate in 
% (simple industry average) 217 769 1.67 2.06 0 106.97
Effectively applied import tariff rate in 
% (weighted industry average) 217 769 2.36 2.54 0 171.89
Notes: Summary statistics only for the estimation sample.
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Chapter 4
The Empirics of Securitization
by Banks: Determinants and
Incentive Effects1
1This chapter is based on a joint work with Desislava Andreeva.
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4.1 Introduction
Between 2000 and 2007 the market for asset-backed securities was one of the
largest and fastest-growing segments in the fixed-income securities market.
Despite its size and the vibrant issuance activity, it attracted the attention of
policy makers, researchers, and the general public only after the onset of the
current crisis. Figure 4.1 depicts the evolution of the outstanding amount
of asset-backed securities in the US compared with securities issued by non-
financial corporations, commercial banks, and foreign issuers. Between 2000
and 2007 the segment of asset-backed commercial paper was the largest one
in short-term debt markets. With regard to longer-term debt, depicted in the
right panel, the amount of asset-backed securities outstanding experienced
a remarkable growth until mid-2007. By the end of the year it had become
larger than the outstanding amount of non-financial corporate bonds.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent that the observed surge in se-
curitization activity had been accompanied by poor underwriting standards
and the origination of riskier credit. Defaults on those risky financial claims
led to losses accruing to the investors in asset-backed securities and triggered
a global financial crisis. Right now asset-backed securities are still called by
some “toxic waste” assets. Exploring why securitization takes place, partic-
ularly whether it is solely driven by attempts to circumvent capital adequacy
regulation and whether it leads to unsound bank lending and excessive risk
taking, can help us understand better the observed development. Further-
more, it can help in improving the regulation of capital markets to foster the
resilience of the financial system. Therefore, the questions we address in this
paper, focusing on the banking sector, are: why do banks securitize loans
and does securitization affect the incentives of banks for prudent screening
and monitoring of borrowers.
Securitization can be broadly defined as the transformation of illiquid
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Figure 4.1: Evolution of the amount outstanding of securitized assets in the
US during the period 1970-2007
financial claims into tradable securities; see Greenbaum and Thakor (1987).
The central feature of securitization is that it allows assets to be removed from
the balance sheet of the institution that originated them onto the balance
sheet of a special trust company. For these assets the bank is no longer
required to hold regulatory capital. Theory gives us roughly two views on why
banks may choose to securitize assets: on the one hand, for instance, Allen
and Carletti (2006), Allen and Gale (2007), and Cerasi and Rochet (2008) see
securitization as a largely beneficial financial innovation that allows a better
allocation of risk, lowers the distress costs for the issuer, and (see Arping
(2004) or Chiesa (2008)) leads to better incentives for monitoring. On the
other hand, there is a more pessimistic view of securitization as being largely
driven by attempts to circumvent capital regulation and impairing incentives;
see for instance Gorton and Pennacchi (1995) and Fecht and Wagner (2007).
Our empirical results confirm the latter view. Using panel data on large
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US banks we find evidence of the existence of a regulatory arbitrage motive
in securitization. The novel feature of our analysis is the introduction of a
corrected measure for the tier 1 capital to total assets and total regulatory
capital to risk-weighted assets ratios. In most empirical studies regressions
of the issuance activity of banks on their leverage and a set of controls are
performed; see for instance Minton et al. (2004) and Bannier and Ha¨nsel
(2008). Such studies find that the probability of securitizing rather decreases
as leverage ratios increase, implying that banks with a high capital basis
tend to securitize more often than capital-constrained banks. The finding
contradicts the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis, according to which banks
with low capital available to back additional lending benefit the most from
securitization. They can seize new profitable lending opportunities without
having to issue new equity or build it up slowly via retained earnings, thus
one would expect that securitization rather becomes more probable as lever-
age grows. The approach of Minton et al. (2004) is problematic because
the observed leverage ratios are endogenous. If banks use securitization to
circumvent capital regulation, they will structure the transactions so that
the ex-post observable leverage in their balance sheet is lowered.
We propose a different approach: instead of using observable but endoge-
nous capital ratios we construct a proxy for the unobservable counterfactual
capital ratio. It allows us to capture the effect of capital on securitization
but cuts the reverse influence of securitization on capital adequacy. We ar-
gue that by doing so we use the variable actually relevant to the decision to
securitize: namely, how high the disclosed ratio would have been if the assets
were, instead of being securitized, retained on the balance sheet. Banks with
low counterfactual capital ratios benefit from securitization, as they are able
to remove assets from their balance sheet and free capital to back new loans.
As a result, the standard capital ratios do not appear low any more. Looking
at the extensive margin of securitization we find that a low counterfactual
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capital ratio, measured either via the tier 1 capital to total assets or the to-
tal regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets ratios, increases the probability
of securitizing. Further, we focus on the sample of securitizing banks only
and shed light on banks’ decision on how many assets to securitize. We find
evidence that capital arbitrage is an important determinant of the intensive
margin of securitization too. Furthermore, our empirical results show that
banks facing higher costs of on-balance-sheet debt financing will use secu-
ritization techniques on a larger scale. This finding is consistent with the
efficient risk-sharing view of securitization.
Next, we investigate how securitization affects the quality of securitized
loans. Currently, there is relatively little literature on that topic. We assess
the effects of securitization by comparing the ex-post observed delinquencies
on loans of the same type during the same quarter originated by the same
institution that are securitized with those retained. The observed higher
delinquencies we interpret as evidence of adverse effects of securitization on
incentives for monitoring or adverse selection of loans by originators. We also
analyze how commonly used techniques for overcoming such incentive prob-
lems - the retention of a subordinated stake in securitized assets - affect the
delinquencies of securitized loans. The results suggest that such techniques
are not successful in reducing moral hazard or adverse selection problems in
securitization. Rather the amount of bank capital at originating institutions
influences significantly positively the quality of originated and securitized
loans.
In a way our research indicates that capital adequacy regulation is a
double-edged sword: whereas loopholes in the regulatory framework can se-
duce banks to securitize assets just for the sake of not having to hold regula-
tory capital, sufficient levels of capital do give banks the right incentives for
prudent behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a review
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of the related theoretical and empirical literature. The subsequent section
provides a brief look at our data set. Section 4.4 describes the potential
determinants of securitization activity. In sections 4.5 and 4.6 we present
our empirical models on the extensive and intensive margins of securitization.
The estimation strategy and results are presented too. Section 4.7 looks at
the incentive effects of securitization. Finally, section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Related literature
The theoretical literature on credit risk transfer and securitization can be
traced back to Greenbaum and Thakor’s “Bank funding modes”, published
in 1987 in the Journal of Banking and Finance. They analyze why banks
choose to fund assets via securitization versus the traditional issuance of
deposits in an adverse selection framework. Greenbaum and Thakor (1987)
emphasize the role of bank regulation and the advancing information process-
ing technology. In the equilibrium of their model banks hold riskier assets
and securitize the “good” ones. The subsequent literature can be roughly di-
vided into two main strands. The first one explores the scope for risk sharing
between the banking sector and other sectors in the economy as well as its
effects on the stability of banks and possible contagion. The second one puts
more emphasis on the implications for monitoring of loan applicants and the
quality of originated loans. Those two strands are intrinsically linked. Risk
sharing via securitization insulates banks from losses, and in a world with
asymmetric information and limited liability, alters incentives to prevent de-
faults. Thus, any beneficial effect from risk transfer from the arguably more
vulnerable banking sector to other sectors in the economy will be attenuated
by the adverse effect on monitoring incentives. Additionally, incentive prob-
lems in securitization can lead to the origination of bad loans and thus can
undermine the safety and soundness of banks if part of the risks are retained
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by the originator or banks themselves invest in asset-backed securities.
Let us very briefly summarize the most recent theoretical and empirical
contributions, starting with the theoretical papers on risk sharing and its
effects on the financial system stability. In Allen and Gale (2007) banks se-
curitize assets to circumvent capital regulation. They show that inefficiently
high capital adequacy requirements for banks induce credit risk transfer to
a hypothetical insurance sector. The link between the two sectors gives rise
to systemic risk: problems in the insurance sector can spread to the banking
industry. Based on an augmented version of this model, Allen and Carletti
(2006) focus on the interaction between idiosyncratic liquidity shocks and
credit risk transfer to create contagion. In their model securitization is truly
driven by risk-sharing considerations. Risk sharing is desirable because the
sectors engage in activities with imperfectly correlated returns. Credit risk
transfer, though, induces insurers to hold a long-term security, which oth-
erwise is held by banks only. Contagion arises because bad outcomes for
insurance companies force them to sell the long security. This in turn harms
banks hit by adverse liquidity shocks as they use the long security to refi-
nance in the interbank market. Depressed prices of the long security do not
allow them to collect the necessary resources to pay out depositors and lead
to bankruptcies.2 In all those models banks do not perform screening and
monitoring of borrowers; the emphasis lies rather on the implications for the
stability of individual banks and arising contagion effects.
One of the first papers to focus on incentives is the work of Gorton and
Pennacchi (1995). The authors stress the adverse effect of securitization on
the quality of originated loans. Banks selling a proportional claim on loans
do not bear the full loss if those loans default and, therefore, their incentives
for borrower monitoring are distorted. In a recent paper Fecht and Wag-
ner (2007) show that securitization remedies the hold-up problem between
2Wagner and Marsh (2006) follow a very similar line of research.
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bank managers and shareholders, which ceteris paribus allows a safer capital
structure with a higher equity share. Securitization can therefore potentially
improve stability. However, because rents collected by managers are lower,
their incentives to monitor borrowers are damaged. On the contrary, Chiesa
(2008) shows that securitization can lead to better incentives for monitoring.
The result arises in a framework of banks prone to gamble on a good economic
outlook instead of stringently screening whom to grant a loan. Securitization
alleviates the incentives for gambling and induces banks to exert monitoring
effort. Arping (2004) demonstrates that securitization can have a beneficial
effect on the incentives of borrowers without impairing the monitoring by
lenders. In his framework securitization facilitates the ex-post enforcement
of the debt contract between borrower and lender. Finally, Cerasi and Ro-
chet (2008) show that loan sales and credit derivatives can provide optimal
insurance to banks without impairing incentives.
The existing theoretical literature, while giving a consistent prediction
that securitization leads to contagion effects, is rather inconclusive on both
why banks securitize and whether this leads to the origination of bad loans.
This is the starting point for our empirical analysis. There are several em-
pirical studies on the determinants of securitization and only a few on the
incentive issues.
With regard to the determinants of securitization, most studies cannot
find evidence of a capital arbitrage motive. For instance Minton et al. (2004)
use data on US financial firms, among others banks, in the period 1993-2002.
They show that unregulated finance companies and investment banks are
more likely to securitize than regulated commercial banks, which they inter-
pret as evidence against the regulatory capital arbitrage view. Focusing on
banks only they find that banks with higher capital ratios are more likely
to securitize, which again confirms the previous result. Very similar is the
empirical study of Bannier and Ha¨nsel (2008), suggesting that there is lit-
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tle or no evidence of capital arbitrage in securitization. They use data on
collateralized loan obligations (CLO) issued by large European banks dur-
ing the period 1997-2004. Throughout most of the specifications the capital
ratios seem to have no significant impact on the probability of securitizing.
The only exception is a fixed-effects logit specification based on a restricted
sample of listed institutions only. Bannier and Ha¨nsel (2008) conclude that
securitization is mainly used as an efficient funding tool, especially for banks
with high credit risk and low liquidity, which reduces the overall costs of
financing. Gorton and Souleles (2006) and Martin-Oliver and Saurina (2007)
also do not support capital arbitrage as a driving motive for securitization
but rather suggest that liquidity needs or lower debt funding costs are the
main drivers. Contrary to most of the literature, Calomiris and Mason (2004)
find that circumventing regulation is motivating banks to securitize assets.
Focusing on credit card debt securitizations of US commercial banks, they
find evidence that the desire to reach lower levels of capital than the regula-
tory requirement is a driving motive. Finally, Dionne and Harchaoui (2003)
study the relationship between bank capital, securitization, and credit risk
using Canadian bank data. One result of their analysis is that securitization
is negatively related to capital ratios.
The empirical literature on incentive problems in securitization is some-
how scarcer. In a recent paper Keys et al. (2010) ask whether securitization
impairs the incentives of financial firms to screen borrowers properly based
on US data on securitized subprime mortgages. They use the fact that mort-
gages given to borrowers with a creditworthiness measured by the FICO
scores3 of 620 and above are easily securitized whereas mortgages granted to
borrowers with a FICO of 619 or lower remain on the balance sheet of the
originator with a very high probability.4 Originators take this into account
3Fair Isaac Credit Score. A greater value of the FICO score indicates lower credit risk.
4This threshold arises due to regulation constraints. Ginnie Mae and Fannie Mae
generally do not accept such mortgages.
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at the time mortgages are granted and, therefore, may screen more carefully
loan applicants with a FICO of 619 or lower. Indeed, Keys et al. (2010)
find that securitized loans with a FICO of 619 perform ex post better than
those with a FICO of 621. Hence, securitization has adverse effects on the
screening incentives of loan originators. Dell’ Ariccia et al. (2008) and Mian
and Sufi (2009) also provide some evidence of poor screening due to securi-
tization using loan-level data for sub-prime mortgages, even though this is
not the main focus of their work. Both studies find that denial rates on loan
applications are lower in regions in which a bigger fraction of mortgages were
securitized and interpret it as evidence that lending standards deteriorate
due to securitization.
Our study adds to both strands of the empirical literature. With regard
to identifying a capital arbitrage motive in securitization we propose a cor-
rected version of the standard capital ratios used in empirical works that does
not suffer from endogeneity. Using the proposed corrected capital ratios we
find evidence of capital arbitrage. Additionally to giving evidence of poor
incentives for borrower screening, we show how bank characteristics and the
amount of provided credit enhancements relate to the quality of securitized
loans. Our results suggest that a sufficient level of bank capital rather than
the retention of a first-loss piece gives banks the right incentives and leads
to the origination of better quality loans.
4.3 Data and summary statistics
The data come from the Uniform Bank Performance Report, collected by
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation5, and cover the period starting
in the third quarter of 2003 to the second quarter of 2008. It contains the
5The data is available at the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council web-
page at www.ffiec.gov/ubpr.htm.
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income statements and balance sheet statements, data on regulatory cap-
ital and risk-weighted assets, securitization activities, past due loans and
leases, and off-balance-sheet exposure. In the second quarter of 2008 a total
of 7622 banking institutions insured by the FDIC were operating. For our
analysis of the determinants of securitization we concentrate on the activities
of big commercial banks with assets of more than 1 billion US dollars and
the credit card specialty banks in the United States. This leaves us with a
cross-sectional dimension of our panel of 506 banks. We are aware that we
concentrate on a group of banks that may be systematically different from
smaller banks. Nevertheless, we believe that this is the relevant sample for
our purposes since securitization activity decreases sharply with the size of
institutions. Among the 186 banks with assets of more than $3 billion in the
second quarter of 2008 approximately 33% have securitized assets at least
once during the period. Looking at the 297 banks with assets between $1
billion and $3 billion, we observe less than 5% active banks. If we consider
the peer group of even smaller banks with assets of more than $0.3 billion but
less than $1 billion the share of banks that participate in securitization drops
even further to around 2.5%. Given that bigger banks also securitize bigger
pools of assets, we believe that we cover most of the actual securitization
activities of commercial banks in the United States. In our analysis we also
include FDIC insured banks specializing in credit card loans. We restrict our
attention to private label securitization activities only. We do not analyze se-
curitization transactions settled via the Government Sponsored Enterprises.
Our data sample covers approximately 83% of banking assets and 42% of
securitized assets backing outstanding private label asset-backed securities6
in the fourth quarter of 2007.
Regarding the question of whether securitization leads to incentive prob-
6Asset-backed securities in the sense of our analysis include all the securities issued in
a securitization transaction, which are backed by financial claims to third parties. These
include MBS, CDO, CLO, etc.
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lems, we have a sample of 110 banks that reported past dues and losses for
both their securitized assets and those retained on the balance sheet.
Let us have a first look at the data. Out of the total 506 banks 86 have
securitized assets at least once during the period; 83% of the banks in the
sample are never-securitizers. The left panel of Figure 4.2 reveals that in ev-
ery single quarter a relatively constant number of around 60 banks reported
a positive amount outstanding of securitized assets. Reporting a positive
amount outstanding of securitized assets does not necessarily imply that the
bank has been involved in new securitization activities. Assets that have
been securitized in previous periods and have not matured yet are part of
the reported volume. In the right panel of Figure 4.2 we depict the number
of banks whose reported outstanding securitized assets have increased during
the quarter. These banks engaged in new securitization activities definitely.
However, this measure of issuance activity slightly underestimates the fre-
quency of new securitization activity by banks,7 as the amount of maturing
assets plus the amount charged off due to defaults may be larger than the
amount of assets that were securitized during a quarter.
In the next Figure 4.3 we contrast the size of banks that have never
securitized with the size of banks that have securitized assets at least once.
Active banks were significantly bigger and were able to increase their size
more quickly during the relevant period. The difference in size is remarkable
given that we choose to concentrate on big banks only.
Securitizing banks seem to engage in more risky lending activities or
operate in more risky segments of the credit market. Figure 4.4 depicts
that securitizing banks have been experiencing considerably higher losses on
their on-balance-sheet loans and leases throughout the period. Against the
higher expected losses they also hold higher loan loss reserves on average.
Those riskier lending practices, though, appear to be profitable. The
7And certainly the volume of newly securitized assets.
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Figure 4.3: Bank size
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Figure 4.4: Credit risk
lower-left panel of Figure 4.5 shows that the yields on loans and leases realized
by securitizing banks are slightly better than those of non-securitizers.
The overall profitability of securitizers is higher too; see the difference
in the average return on assets in the upper-left panel of Figure 4.5. It can
be largely explained by the higher non-interest income those banks generate,
including income from securitization and servicing activities. Comparing the
returns on equity, in the upper-right panel, the finding is slightly different.
Securitizers do not perform better throughout the whole period; since the
last quarter of 2006 the return on equity of non-securitizers has been higher
on average.
The lower-right panel of Figure 4.5 shows the ratio of dividends to profits.
Up until the third quarter of 2007 securitizing banks paid out a larger fraction
of net income. The two big negative outliers in the second quarter of 2006
and the second quarter of 2007 arise because banks that had booked losses
nevertheless paid dividends. Since the onset of the crisis this pattern has
changed: in three out of the four quarters since mid-2007 non-securitizers
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Figure 4.5: Bank profitability
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Figure 4.6: Regulatory capital ratios
payed a higher fraction of net income to shareholders.
In Figure 4.6 we compare the regulatory capital ratios of banks. Banks
in the United States are required to hold sufficient capital to maintain both
a ratio of tier 1 capital to total assets of at least 4% and a ratio of total risk-
based capital to risk-weighted assets of at least 8%. There are no systematical
differences in the tier 1 capital ratio shown in the left panel of Figure 4.6. The
ratio of regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets, however, is substantially
higher for non-securitizing banks up until the end of 2006. During the last
7 quarters of the period, the difference in regulatory capital has become
smaller; nevertheless, it remains positive in the data.
The aim of securitization is the transfer of a significant part of the risk
associated with the underlying pool of assets. Banks, though, retain some of
the risk in the form of a subordinated claim, that serves as a credit enhance-
ment, or as a pro-rata share of the issued asset-backed securities. The left
panel of Figure 4.7 shows us how much credit enhancement banks provided
to their securitized assets. On average such enhancements amount to around
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Figure 4.7: Securitization exposure
8 percent of the outstanding securitized assets.8 In the right panel we de-
pict the total of subordinated claims and retained ownership9 in securitized
assets. The total exposure to securitization as a percentage of the amount
outstanding of securitized assets seems to decrease very slowly up to the first
quarter of 2007 and increases quite sharply in the course of the crisis. The
8Interesting is the significant drop in seller-provided credit enhancements from the
third quarter of 2003 to the second quarter of 2004. The regulation regarding the treatment
of securitization exposures in calculating the regulatory capital ratios was changed in
January 2002, see Federal Register (2001). The new rule obliged banks to hold one dollar
of bank capital against each dollar of outstanding retained subordinated claims. The
previous regulation had limited the maximal capital charge to the minimum of either the
retained subordinated stake or the capital the bank would have had to maintain, had
it, instead of securitizing those assets, left them on the balance sheet. Under the old
regulation a bank that securitized a pool of f.e. consumer credit of $100 and retained a
subordinated claim of size $10 had to hold only $8 of capital against the pool, whereas
under the new rule the capital charge increases to $10 - the size of the subordinated claim.
This may have made it no longer profitable for banks to retain a large subordinated
exposure to securitized assets. The data on seller-provided credit enhancements in 2003
partially capture the structure of older securitizations. The retained credit enhancements
starting from the last quarter of 2004 to the second quarter of 2007 amounted to less than
8% of the amount outstanding of securitized assets and thus indeed allowed a lower capital
charge.
9The so-called retained seller’s interest, which does not provide any credit enhancement
and carries a pro-rata share of the risk.
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extreme peak in the second quarter of 2008 is most probably due to banks
providing support to previously securitized assets.10
4.4 Determinants of securitization activity
The observed securitization activity is an equilibrium outcome, determined
by both demand- and supply-side factors. The main aim of our analysis is to
identify the factors affecting the decision of banks to securitize assets. Thus,
we focus on the supply of asset-backed securities by credit institutions in the
baseline analysis, while controlling for possible changes in demand over time
by using quarter dummies. According to theory, there are two main drivers:
risk-sharing considerations11 and the possibility of gaining regulatory capital
relief via securitization.12 Additionally, securitization may allow banks to
fund assets at more favorable debt costs. This is the so-called “efficient
contracting view”. The transfer of the ownership of the underlying assets to
a special purpose vehicle removes them from the bankruptcy estate of the
originating institution.13 Thus, investors in asset-backed securities do not
bear the risk of bankruptcy of the bank itself, but only risks associated with
the performance of the underlying assets.14 We also account for economy
of scale and scope effects and a possible self-selection into securitization of
more profitable banks.
To complement our analysis, we also try to identify demand-side effects by
including a set of macroeconomic variables capturing investors’ risk appetite
10We provide disaggregated data on the seller-provided credit enhancements by type of
securitized loans in Figure 4.9 of the Appendix C.
11See Allen and Carletti (2006) and Wagner and Marsh (2006).
12See for instance Allen and Gale (2007).
13The securitized assets are not part of the bank’s bankruptcy estate and thus investors
in ABS continue to receive the interest and principle payments even in the case it becomes
bankrupt. Special purpose vehicle are structured in a way that makes it impossible to
become insolvent. See Schwarcz (1994).
14See for instance Calomiris and Mason (2004) and Gorton and Souleles (2006).
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and the monetary policy stance. We follow a purely empirical strategy, as
performed in the literature for instance by Minton et al. (2004) and Bannier
and Ha¨nsel (2008), among others.
These are our working hypotheses:
• Regulatory capital relief : The “regulatory capital arbitrage” hy-
pothesis calls for a negative relationship between capital ratios and
securitization activity.15 Capital constrained banks will use securitiza-
tion techniques in order to improve their disclosed regulatory capital
ratios. There are two challenges for the econometric identification of
this causal relationship. First, banks will not wait until the regulatory
constraint becomes binding. We believe that they act in a forward-
looking manner and use the techniques preemptively. Second, if banks
are successful in circumventing capital regulation, the ex-post observed
capital ratio should not appear low any more. We argue that using
such ex-post observed capital ratios in the regression analysis, as per-
formed in the existing literature, is misleading and propose a different
approach: we use a proxy of the unobservable counterfactual capital
adequacy ratio. Since this is a departure from the existing literature,
let us explain our idea in some detail.
Consider a credit institution, which intends to use securitization for
capital relief purposes. Let us assume that it would like to originate
new loans, but by doing so it risks becoming capital constrained. To
prevent this from happening, it can securitize part of its loans. Suppose
that it has risk-weighted assets Yt−1 and regulatory capital Ct−1 and
expects to grant new loans ∆Yt > 0. Without the use of securitization,
its regulatory capital ratio in period t would be lower, equal to Ct−1
Yt−1+∆Yt
,
and possibly leave no buffer to the regulatory threshold. Let Zt denote
the amount of assets to be securitized and zt the size of the first-loss
15See Duffie and Garleanu (2001) and Calomiris and Mason (2004) among others.
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piece. After the assets have been securitized, the capital ratio changes
to:16
Ct−1 − zt
Yt−1 + ∆Yt − Zt (4.1)
If the term zt/Zt is lower than Ct−1/(Yt−1 + ∆Yt), securitization activi-
ties will improve the ratio. This is probably why people find a positive
relationship between securitization and capital adequacy. However,
this is not the casual link from capital constraints to securitization.
We generally do not observe how low capital ratios would have been if
securitization had not taken place. The observed capital ratio suffers
from endogeneity: a low capital ratio induces banks to securitize assets
but once securitization has taken place, capital ratios do not appear
low any more. We construct a proxy for the counterfactual capital
ratio by putting the securitized assets back on the balance sheet and
adding the retained credit enhancements zt to the regulatory capital.
Intuitively, we focus on how low capital levels affect the decision to
securitize by suppressing the positive effect of securitization on capital
adequacy. In this manner we are able to solve the reverse causality
from securitization back to the observed capital ratio.17
Since the capital adequacy regulation in the USA imposes two restric-
tions, we construct the counterfactual proxies for the two minimum
capital ratios required: a Capital/RWA, defined as the regulatory total
risk-based capital as a share of risk-weighted assets, and Tier1/Total
Assets, defined as the tier 1 capital to total assets.18
16The regulatory rules, see Federal Register (2001), for securitization state that the first-
loss piece must be deducted from capital for regulatory purposes; therefore, the numerator
decreases. As the securitized assets Zt are no longer on the balance sheet of the bank, the
denominator decreases too.
17A similar approach is followed by Calomiris and Mason (2004). They use a ratio of
capital to the sum of on-balance-sheet and securitized assets, but do not take into account
the size of the first-loss piece in the numerator.
18We have data on the amount outstanding of provided credit enhancement at period t
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Table 4.10 in Appendix C reports the mean of the “original” and
the “corrected” capital ratios.19 Since those do not differ for non-
participating institutions, we should compare the means calculated for
the subsample of securitizers who were active at least once during the
sample period. On average the corrected measure is about 1% lower
than the standard one.
• Risk sharing: If securitization is used to transfer risk from the bank
to outside investors, we would expect higher risk to be associated with a
higher probability of securitizing. To capture this idea we use the vari-
able loss allowances. The variable controls for credit risk as perceived
by the bank. It is measured as the ratio of the allowances for future
loan and lease losses to total loans and lease-financing receivables.
• Financing costs: Securitization can be used as an efficient tool for
lowering the debt financing costs. The interest and principal payments
to investors in asset-backed securities are not affected in the event of
the bankruptcy of the originator. Consequently, the financing costs by
issuing asset-backed securities do not include a premium for this risk.
We use the average costs of bank debt (including subordinated notes
and debentures) as a measure of financing costs. The more costly debt
financing is for individual institutions, the higher the probability of
securitizing should be.
• Economies of scope: Securitization comprises activities similar to in-
and the amount outstanding of securitized assets by type. We calculate the counterfactual
Tier1/Total Assets ratio by adding the amount of credit enhancements to tier 1 capital
and the amount of securitized assets to total assets; for the Capital/RWA ratio we again
add the provided credit enhancements to the total capital for regulatory purposes and add
the risk-weighted securitized assets to the risk-weighted assets. For weights we use 0.50
for mortgages and home equity loans and 1 for other loans, as required for assets held on
the balance sheet of banks.
19In addition Table 4.8 in Appendix C provides a pairwise correlation matrix for these
capital ratios.
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vestment banking. The key steps in the securitization process - pooling
the underlying assets, underwriting the securities, and placing them on
the market - require expertise that is very similar to the one acquired
in investment banking. Therefore, potential synergy effects arise. To
capture this idea we use the variable investment banking measured as
investment banking income to total income. We expect that the more
strongly involved a bank is in investment banking, the higher the prob-
ability of securitizing.
• Economies of scale: Since there are substantial fixed costs for setting
up a special purpose vehicle, we expect bigger banks that securitize
bigger loan pools to experience lower average costs of securitization.
We capture this idea by using the total assets as the measure of bank
size and expect a positive relationship.
• Profitability: Securitization may be more easily feasible for more prof-
itable banks, as they possibly can afford to pay the high up-front fixed
costs20 of issuing asset-backed securities. Hence, there might be some
sort of “selection” of more profitable banks into securitization. To cap-
ture this idea we use the yield on loans and leases as our measure of
profitability. More profitable banks become more likely securitizers.21
• Average tax rate: Financing through ABS has the disadvantage of
non-deductibility of costs from the pre-tax income compared with on-
balance-sheet debt finance.22 Thus, we expect banks with high effective
tax rates to be less likely to securitize assets. The variable average tax
20These are for example administrative and legal costs for setting up a SPV as well as
rating agency fees.
21Previous studies use return on equity as a measure of profitability. However, this
measure is likely to be endogenous, because securitization itself directly influences the
return on equity via increased non-interest income.
22See Minton et al. (2004).
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rate is defined as applicable income taxes as a share of the pre-tax net
operating income.
We now turn to the possible demand factors. Two macroeconomic vari-
ables are included:
• Fed funds rate: A low level of interest rates and high money supply
might induce investors to search for more profitable investment oppor-
tunities, among others in asset-backed securities. For that reason we
expect a negative sign here.
• Baa risk premium: We want to capture the overall risk appetite of
investors. The Baa risk premium is calculated as the difference between
the yield on corporate bonds with a Baa rating and the yield on 10-year
government bonds.23 We expect a lower risk premium to be associated
with a higher demand for asset-backed securities.
We concentrate on two main questions. The first one asks why do (or do
not) banks securitize assets? Here we try to identify systematic differences
between the groups of securitizers and non-securitizers, which relate to this
decision. We call this the extensive margin of securitization. The second
question we ask is why some banks securitize more than other banks. Here
we identify differences between banks within the group of securitizers relating
to the scale of securitization activity, calling it the intensive margin. Let us
first turn our attention to the extensive margin.
4.5 The extensive margin of securitization
We start with the standard binary choice model, which can be derived from
the following latent variable model. Let ∆pi denote the unobservable change
23We obtain the data from the web page of the Board of the Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, http://www.federalreserve.gov.
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in expected discounted profits if a bank chooses to securitize assets.24 We
assume that it is a linear function of observables:
∆pi = xβ +  (4.2)
where x represents the row vector of determinants of securitization (including
a constant), β is the column vector of coefficients, and  is a random error
term. Let s be a binary choice variable, equaling 1 if the bank securitizes
assets during the quarter and 0 otherwise.
A profit-maximizing bank participates in securitization if ∆pi > 0. Hence,
the probability of securitizing is given by:25
P (s = 1|x) = P (∆pi > 0|x) = P (xβ +  > 0|x) =
= P ( > −xβ|x) = 1−G(−xβ) = G(xβ) (4.3)
where G(.) is the cumulative distribution function of . We further assume
that G(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, which
leads to the probit model.
We estimate the model by maximum likelihood. The log likelihood func-
tion for a sample of N banks observed over T periods is given by:
L(β) =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
{sitln [G(xitβ)] + (1− sit)ln [1−G(xitβ)]} (4.4)
To account for a possible serial correlation within panel units and het-
eroskedasticity across panels, we use a cluster-robust variance-covariance es-
24We use the term profits even though this could stand for any benefits to stakeholders,
managers, or other decision makers that cannot be expressed monetarily.
25Here we assume that the distribution of  is symmetric, with a mean of zero.
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timator, with banks as cluster units.26
Before outlining the estimation results, let us briefly explain how we gen-
erate the left-hand side variable. The most natural way to proceed would be
to define an active bank, sit = 1, if we observe new issuance of asset-backed
securities by bank i in quarter t, as performed for instance by Minton et al.
(2004) or Bannier and Ha¨nsel (2008). Unfortunately, we have data on the
amount outstanding of securitized assets only. Given the available data we
can choose among three strategies:
• treat banks as participating in every period if we observe a positive
amount outstanding of securitized assets at least once. This strategy
is suitable for identifying determinants that do not depend on the par-
ticular time period, like the relative size difference of securitizers vs.
non-securitizers as visible in Figure 4.3. However, it does not allow us
to find factors accounting for the dynamics of the decision of banks to
securitize over time, as their status as securitizer would not depend on
issuance in any particular period.
• treat banks as participating in period t if we observe a positive amount
outstanding of securitized assets. This approach has a drawback: ob-
serving a positive outstanding amount does not necessarily imply that
new issuance has occurred. Bank loans typically have a maturity of
more than one quarter, therefore, a positive amount outstanding can
be observed even though no new assets were securitized. Thus, some
26The alternative strategy would have been to use a random effects probit estimator.
This specification deals with serial autocorrelation in the composite error term due to the
presence of an unobserved random effect. More specifically, it assumes that the autocorre-
lation of the error terms is equal at all lags. We decided to use a pooled probit estimator
with corrected standard errors because Monte Carlo studies, for instance Guilkey and
Murphy (1993), suggest that it performs as well as the computationally intensive random
effects probit estimator. It is further recommended as, first, one does not have to assume
equicorrelated error terms and, second, if there is another form of clustering on the bank
level in our data, inference based on the random effects estimates would be misleading.
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institutions, which were not active at time t, will be misclassified as
securitizers.
• treat banks as participating at time t only if we observe an increasing
amount outstanding of securitized assets. Even though this approach
captures new issuance more accurately, it has a similar drawback to
the previous strategy. Whereas observing an increase implies that new
issuance has occurred, it is possible that the amount outstanding of
securitized assets decreases despite the issuance of asset-backed secu-
rities during the period if the newly issued amount is lower than the
amount of previously securitized loans maturing during the quarter.
Thus, some institutions, that issued new ABS will be misclassified as
non-participating.
Since we would like to capture the possible dynamics in banks’ securiti-
zation activity, we consider the second and third options. Both strategies
lead to a non-classical measurement error in the left-hand side variable. We
believe that the misclassification is only minor if we use the latter one and
treat banks as participating at time t if we observe an increase in the amount
outstanding of the securitized assets. The misclassification biases coefficients
downward in absolute value but preserves their signs.27 Thus, we interpret
the absolute value of the estimated coefficients rather as lower bounds of the
true relationship and focus on the direction of the relation.
Throughout all the specifications we exclude the last two quarters in our
sample, as at that time the crisis had already intensified, asset-backed secu-
rities were considered “toxic” and securitization was for practical purposes
not feasible. We report the estimation results using the counterfactual total
regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets ratio in Table 4.1 and alternatively
using the tier 1 capital to total assets ratio in Table 4.2. In all the spec-
27See Hausman et al. (1998).
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Table 4.1: The extensive margin of securitization: using Capital/RWA Cor-
rected
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Capital/RWA Corrected -6.20* -5.60* -5.60* -7.21* -5.63* -5.73* -6.57*
(3.26) (3.18) (3.13) (3.87) (3.10) (3.11) (3.68)
Log of Total Assets 0.39*** 0.41*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.37*** 0.39*** 0.39***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.042) (0.046) (0.044) (0.045)
Credit Card Bank 1.82*** 1.38*** 1.73*** 1.44*** 1.80*** 1.78*** 1.32***
(0.26) (0.27) (0.31) (0.43) (0.27) (0.27) (0.39)
Yield Loans and Leases 5.30** 2.65
(2.68) (4.32)
Financing Costs 2.52 2.36
(11.1) (12.1)
Credit Risk (Loss Allowances) 10.7 8.89
(8.49) (10.4)
Investment Banking 5.77* 5.81*
(3.48) (3.51)
Tax Rate -0.010 -0.011*
(0.0063) (0.0062)
Fed Funds Rate -0.16
(0.13)
Baa Risk Premium -1.48*
(0.89)
Quarter dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 8445 7875 7941 8372 7941 7939 7873
Number of bank clusters 506 503 506 503 506 506 503
Wald statistic 224 223 240 270 212 214 298
Pseudo R-squared 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.37
Securitization Dummy
Pooled Probit
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. Constant and quarter dummies are suppressed. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the bank level in parentheses. Constant and quarter
dummies are suppressed. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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ifications we use the first lags of the explanatory variables28 to reduce the
problems due to omitted variables or reverse causality, as lags are naturally
correlated with the contemporaneous values and at the same time they are
less likely to be correlated with the error term.29 We control for possible
changes in securitization activity over time for instance due to changes in
investor demand by using time dummies. Only in the last specification in
column (7) we control directly for the stance of monetary policy and the
risk appetite of investors.30 Furthermore, we include a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the institution is a credit card specialty bank in addition to the
variables described in the previous section, as banks specialized in credit card
loans use credit risk transfer instruments more often than other commercial
banks. We finally estimate the model using the standard capital ratios and
compare the results to check to what extent endogeneity is a problem. These
results are reported in Tables 4.12 and 4.13 in Appendix C.
Let us first have a look at Table 4.1. Reported are the coefficients31 of a
pooled probit estimation of the probability of securitizing on the corrected
total capital to risk-weighted assets ratio, the logarithm of total assets, the
debt financing costs, the yield on loans and leases, loan loss allowances, in-
vestment banking activities, average tax rate, and a credit card bank dummy.
Banks indeed seem to use securitization techniques to circumvent capital
regulation. Throughout all the specifications the coefficient for the counter-
factual capital to risk-weighted assets ratio is negative and significant at the
10% level. As expected, banks whose corrected capital ratio is low securi-
28Table 4.10 in Appendix C provides descriptive statistics for all explanatory variables.
Furthermore, Table 4.11 in Appendix C shows their pairwise correlations.
29Non-linear estimation techniques, like maximum likelihood, are particularly sensitive
to small endogeneity problems, which can cause a bias in the set of all the estimated
coefficients.
30We continue to control for other time fixed effects by keeping a set of time dummies.
Compared with the specifications without the two macro variables, we reduce the number
of included time dummies by two.
31Note that in non-linear models the coefficients do not match the marginal effects,
thus one cannot interpret their magnitude in the usual way but only their sign.
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tize with a higher probability. We interpret the result as evidence of capital
arbitrage in securitization.
Using the standard capital to risk-weighted assets ratio, the results are
quite different; see Table 4.12 in Appendix C. The coefficient is positive,
though insignificant, suggesting, contrary to the capital arbitrage hypothesis,
that capital-constrained banks tend to securitize with a lower probability.
Again, as already pointed out, the standard capital ratio is endogenous and
the estimated coefficient biased upwards. The endogeneity problem seems to
be severe enough to alter the sign of the coefficient.
The size of the credit institution also matters for the securitization deci-
sion. The coefficient for the logarithm of total assets is positive and significant
in all the specifications in Table 4.1, implying that larger institutions securi-
tize assets with a higher probability. Our intuition for the result is that high
fixed costs associated with securitization act as a barrier to market entry for
smaller banks. The average securitization cost for these institutions would be
higher, as they would generally want to securitize smaller pools of assets and
the fixed costs cannot be spread across a large pool of loans. Furthermore,
as expected banks specializing in credit card lending also securitize with a
higher probability due to their special business model.32
To test whether profitability influences the probability of securitizing, we
include the yield on loans and leases in columns (2) and (7). The coeffi-
cient reported in column (2) is significant and positive, which at first sight
supports the idea of profitable banks more easily affording the high up-front
costs of securitization. Once we also control for all the other determinants,
though, the coefficient becomes insignificant; see column (7). The estimate
in column (2) possibly suffers from an omitted variable bias. The origination
of riskier credit is associated with higher yields. Therefore, if higher credit
32Gorton and Souleles (2006) point out that credit card securitization is the second
largest segment after mortgage backed securities issuance.
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risk increases the probability of securitizing, the yield on loans and leases
may capture some of its effect. Not controlling for credit risk induces an
upward bias in the coefficient in specification (2). Once we control for it
in column (7), the bias disappears and the coefficient on yield on loans and
leases becomes insignificant.
We are not able to find evidence in support of banks engaging in securiti-
zation either as a means to share credit risk or as a way to fund loans at more
favorable debt financing costs. Both coefficients have the expected positive
sign,33 but are insignificant. Thus, our empirical results do not confirm the
hypothesis of securitization mainly used as a tool for transfering credit risk
from the banking industry to sectors more capable or willing to bear them.
Capital arbitrage rather seems to be the driving motive for the extensive
margin.
The degree to which banks engage in investment banking activities influ-
ences as expected their decision to securitize positively. The coefficient for
investment banking activities is positive and significant in both columns (5)
and (7). Additionally to economies of scope, tax considerations seem to be
important. Banks with higher tax rates benefit more from tax deductibility,
therefore, we expect that higher tax rates correlate negatively with the prob-
ability of securitizing. The coefficient is indeed negative, but significant only
in the last specification.
Even though the main focus of our empirical analysis lies in identifying
supply-side factors in securitization, we include the federal funds rate and
the Baa risk premium in the last specification (7). Both regressors capture
variations in investor demand for asset-backed securitites. The respective
coefficients have the expected negative sign. Loose monetary policy, cap-
tured by low levels of the fed funds rate, generally leads to higher investor
33Both when included individually in columns (3) and (4), respectively, and when
controlling for all the possible determinants in column (7).
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Table 4.2: The extensive margin of securitization: using Tier 1/Total Assets
Corrected
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Tier 1/Total Assets Corrected -5.28** -5.00* -4.82* -6.63** -4.94* -4.76* -5.98*
(2.60) (2.77) (2.57) (3.22) (2.61) (2.52) (3.28)
Log of Total Assets 0.38*** 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.39*** 0.36*** 0.38*** 0.38***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.047)
Credit Card Bank 1.95*** 1.49*** 1.85*** 1.65*** 1.92*** 1.90*** 1.46***
(0.29) (0.28) (0.34) (0.44) (0.30) (0.30) (0.39)
Yield Loans and Leases 5.52** 3.38
(2.67) (4.18)
Financing Costs 2.63 1.54
(10.8) (12.0)
Credit Risk (Loss Allowances) 9.85 7.54
(8.52) (10.3)
Investment Banking 5.18 5.18
(3.30) (3.28)
Tax Rate -0.0089 -0.0095
(0.0062) (0.0062)
Fed Funds Rate -0.14
(0.12)
Baa Risk Premium -1.36
(0.87)
Quarter dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 8445 7875 7941 8372 7941 7939 7873
Number of bank clusters 506 503 506 503 506 506 503
Wald statistic 196 195 220 242 186 187 274
Pseudo R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.36
Securitization Dummy
Pooled Probit
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. Constant and quarter dummies are suppressed. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the bank level in parentheses. Constant and quarter
dummies are suppressed. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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demand for more risky but higher yielding investment opportunities, among
others also in asset-backed securities. In turn, it should increase the prob-
ability of securitizing for all the institutions in the sample. Similarly, low
levels of the Baa risk premium relate to a high appetite for risk of investors
and are expected to lead to a higher probability of securitizing. Only the
coefficient for the Baa risk premium is significant, though. The results are
sensitive to changes in the set of included time dummies and should not be
overemphasized.
Table 4.2 summarizes the results of the same analysis, using the corrected
tier 1 to total assets ratio instead of the corrected ratio of capital to risk-
weighted assets. All the coefficients are very similar in magnitude to those
reported in Table 4.1. Capital arbitrage considerations, economies of scale,
and being a credit card bank significantly influence the probability of securi-
tizing of banks in our sample. The previously significant effects of taxes and
investment banking activities are no longer so.34
Worthwhile is again the comparison of estimation results with those using
the standard tier 1 ratio instead of the corrected one. Table 4.13 in Appendix
C reveals that the coefficient of the standard ratio is positive and significant
at the 5% level throughout all the specifications. Recall that when using the
standard capital to risk-weighted assets ratio the positive coefficient was not
significant. We believe that the endogeneity problem for the standard tier 1
ratio is more severe, as securitization for regulatory capital purposes leads to
a higher increase in the Tier 1/Total Assets ratio than in the Capital/RWA
ratio. The reason is quite straightforward: whereas securitization leads to
a similar reduction in the numerator of both ratios because the provided
credit enhancements have to be deducted, the denominator of the tier 1
ratio decreases typically more strongly as the assets are not weighted and on
average the risk weighting is lower than 1. Again, endogeneity is indeed a
34The p-values rise to 12-13%.
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problem, and if not considered biases the results significantly.
4.6 The intensive margin of securitization
After having analyzed the participation decision of banks, we turn our at-
tention to the question of why some banks use securitization on a larger
scale and/or more often. We label it the intensive margin of securitization.
Among the securitizing banks in our sample, the median bank securitizes in
4 out of 19 quarters, with around 44% of the banks being active only once or
twice during the sample period. The securitized assets of the median bank
amount to only around 3.7% of its on-balance-sheet assets, whereas banks
at the 75th percentile of the distribution have around 23% securitized to re-
tained assets. A natural question, thus, is which factors account for these
observed differences within the group of securitizing banks.
In this section we use a more structural model of securitization activities.
Instead of grouping the banks into securitizers and non-securitizers, based
on the change in the amount outstanding of securitized assets, we try to
model the evolution of the stock of those assets and “difference out” the new
issuance of asset-backed securities.35
We start with the following identity, which shows the evolution of the
amount outstanding of securitized assets:
Sit = Si,t−1 + newissuanceit − repaymentit − chargeoffsit (4.5)
where Sit denotes the amount outstanding of assets securitized by bank i
35Prior literature using stock data, e.g. Gorton and Souleles (2006) among others,
pursues a different empirical modeling strategy. Researchers typically use models that
ignore the dynamics of the outstanding securitized assets. However, given the observed
dependence of the stock data over time, this is an unnatural assumption.
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in period t. The identity simply says that the stock of securitized assets
increases with the issuance of new asset-backed securities and decreases with
loan repayments as well as loan charge-offs. Since we observe the charge-offs
on the securitized assets in each period we can rewrite the equation as:
Sit + chargeoffsit = S
gross
it = Si,t−1 + newissuanceit − repaymentit (4.6)
In the next step we model the unobserved “repayment” term as a func-
tion of observables. The amount of repayments depends positively on the
outstanding amount of assets. Further determinants are macroeconomic fac-
tors like the interest rates or the business cycle, because for example a low
unemployment rate raises the probability that loans will be payed back on
time and low interest rates lead to prepayments and refinancing of loans at
more favorable terms. Finally, we add time-invariant, bank-specific factors
to account for unobserved characteristics that potentially influence the re-
payment series for each bank in our sample. We end up with the following
linear structure on repaymentit:
repaymentit = αSi,t−1 + ωt + ψi + ξit (4.7)
where ωt captures all the relevant time-varying factors (e.g. interest rates, un-
employment rate, GDP growth), ψi stands for time-invariant determinants,
and ξit is a well-behaved random error term.
Plugging equation (4.7) into (4.6) delivers:
Sgrossit = (1− α)Si,t−1 + newissuanceit − ωt − ψi − ξit (4.8)
Next, we use the determinants of new issuance described in the previous
section to complete the estimable equation. Assuming further that there
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are time-specific, but bank-invariant and time-constant, bank-specific factors
that influence the decision to securitize new assets, we end up with our final
specification:36
Sgrossit = (1− α)Si,t−1 + xitγ + ω∗t + ψ∗i + ξ∗it (4.9)
The main advantage of this specification as opposed to the previous probit
model is that here we can partially account for the heterogeneity between
banks using bank fixed effects. Moreover, this dynamic model will allow us
to test whether our main regressors are exogenous and hence whether our
predictions are valid.
Estimating the above relationship via simple OLS and treating ψ∗i + ξ
∗
it
as the composite error term is problematic in several ways.37 First, ψ∗i and
Si,t−1 are mathematically related and this will lead to biased estimates. A
solution is to eliminate the bank fixed effects by substracting the time mean
for each bank.38 However, a problem still remains, because the transformed
lagged dependent variable (LDV) is correlated with the transformed error
term. Nickell (1981) showed that this introduces a bias into the estimates,
that disappears only for T → ∞.39 We use a technique, first proposed by
Anderson and Hsiao (1982) to solve the problem. In order to eliminate the
fixed effects first differences are taken from both sides of equation (4.9):
36ω∗t , ψ
∗
i , and ξ
∗
it are the composite terms. xit is the vector of determinants of securi-
tization as described in the previous section.
37Equation (4.9) is close to the one with a lagged dependent variable because Sgrossit and
Sit are highly correlated. The sample correlation coefficient is corr(S
gross
it , Sit) = 0.999.
Charge-offs are small relative to the outstanding amounts; hence the variation in the
dependent variable is driven by the variation in Sit. Including charge-offs on the right-
hand side (as the regressor) instead of on the left-hand side, which leads to a standard
model with a lagged dependent variable, delivers the same results.
38The within-group transformation.
39Further, Judson and Owen (1999) find that this bias is important (around 20%) even
for T = 30.
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Sgrossit − Sgrossi,t−1 = (1− α)(Si,t−1 − Si,t−2) + (xit − xi,t−1)γ +
+(ω∗t − ω∗t−1) + (ξ∗it − ξ∗i,t−1) (4.10)
Again there is a correlation between the Si,t−1−Si,t−2 term and the trans-
formed error term ξ∗it − ξ∗i,t−1. To solve the endogeneity problem, one uses
an instrumental variable estimator. Anderson and Hsiao (1982) propose the
lagged level Si,t−2 or the lagged difference Si,t−2 − Si,t−3 as natural instru-
ments, because they are correlated with Si,t−1−Si,t−2, but not with the error
term.40 The instruments are valid if ξ∗it − ξ∗i,t−1 is not first-order autocorre-
lated or equivalently the level ξ∗it doesn’t follow a second-order autoregressive
process.41
Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991)
propose a generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation of equation
(4.10), which is more efficient than that of Anderson and Hsiao (1982). As
we go further in time more lagged values can serve as instruments, and more
moment conditions can be used to improve efficiency. The GMM framework
allows us in addition to test for the exogeneity of the instrument set.42
The following moment conditions can be used in the estimation:
40Instrumenting in this manner does not work with the within-group transformation.
41The first-difference representation introduces serial correlation of the transformed
errors (assuming no autocorrelation in levels), but this can be easily treated by using GLS
or by using robust variance-covariance estimators.
42Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) point out that “difference”
GMM may perform poorly when the time series are very persistent. In this case lagged
levels are poor instruments of first differences, which produce the “weak instrument prob-
lem”. They propose the so-called “system” GMM estimator, where an equation in levels
is added to the system of differenced equations. Here the intuition is to instrument levels
with differences. However, a crucial and non-trivial assumption requires that the covari-
ance E[Sitψ∗i ] is constant over time (stationary) so that E[(Sit − Si,t−1)ψ∗i ] = 0. The
condition is required for all the instruments. We believe that the initial stationarity of the
time series for the securitized assets is not satisfied because there is a clear upward trend
in the stock of asset backed securities between 2003 and 2007. Therefore, system GMM is
not appropriate.
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E[Si,t−l(ξ∗it − ξ∗i,t−1)] = 0 for each t ≥ 3 and l ≥ 2 (4.11)
We decide to exploit the “collapsed” version following Roodman (2009b)
to reduce the problem of “too many instruments”.43 Thus, we use the fol-
lowing moment conditions:
E[Si,t−l(ξ∗it − ξ∗i,t−1)] = 0 for each l ≥ 2 (4.12)
The additional usual moment conditions are of the form:
E[(xit − xi,t−1)′(ξ∗it − ξ∗i,t−1)] = 0 for t ≥ 2 (4.13)
where the row vector x contains all the strictly exogenous explanatory vari-
ables. If some of the covariates are potentially predetermined or endogenous
we use suitable lagged levels to instrument the difference xit − xi,t−1.44
We address several issues in our estimation. First, we use the amount
outstanding of securitized assets as a share of the total managed assets of
the bank instead of the level of Sit.
45 The total managed assets are defined as
the sum of the total on-balance-sheet assets and the total securitized assets.
This helps us to avoid problems due to non-stationarity of the series.46 Sec-
ond, we perform the “one-step” GMM estimation and produce test statistics
by applying the cluster-robust estimator of the variance-covariance matrix
43This problem arises because as we go further in time, there are more lags of the
dependent variable, which can potentially serve as instruments.
44We start by treating these variables as strictly exogenous and perform Difference-in-
Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets. If these reject the null hypothesis of
exogeneity we use appropriate lagged levels instead.
45The average bank has about 15% and the median bank about 3.5% securitized in all
managed assets.
46Furthermore, the approach has the following advantage over using on-balance-sheet
assets only in the denominator. If a bank securitizes assets, without expanding its on-
balance-sheet lending, we will observe higher Sit as well as lower retained assets. The
share of securitized to retained assets will increase sharply, since both the nominator
increases and the denominator decreases.
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of residuals, which allows for arbitrary correlation within banks and het-
eroskedasticity across banks.47 Third, we test for AR(1) and AR(2) in the
first-differenced errors using the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation to
check whether our instruments are valid. In theory there is a negative first-
order autocorrelation in first differences, but there should be no second or
higher order autocorrelation. Fourth, we conduct a Hansen (1982) test of
overidentifying restrictions to test for the exogeneity of the instrument set as
a whole. In addition, to test whether our “corrected” capital ratio measure is
exogenous, we perform a Difference-in-Hansen test. We test further whether
all the other strictly exogenous explanatory variables are indeed orthogonal
to the residuals, but we do not present them in the tables for sake of clarity.
Finally, we address the problem of “too many instruments”. Since we have a
relatively small sample “overfitting” endogenous variables by using too many
moment conditions may be a problem.48 Therefore, we decide to restrict the
lag length to using only up to the first five available lags. In addition we
“collapse” them into a smaller instrument set. As a consequence, our system
of equations has two or three overidentifying restrictions.
Table 4.3 shows the estimation results using the Capital/RWA Corrected
ratio, whereas Table 4.4 uses the Tier1/ Total Assets Corrected ratio.49 The
results are qualitatively comparable; therefore, we focus on the results re-
ported in Table 4.3. We use two samples in our analysis. The narrow sample
in columns (3) and (4) consists of all the securitizers from the sample used
47In theory “two-step” GMM estimation produces a heteroskedasticity- and
autocorrelation-robust variance-covariance matrix and is more efficient than the one-step
approach. However, as Arellano and Bond (1991) and Roodman (2009a) point out, stan-
dard errors can be severely downward biased in small samples. In this case standard errors
can then be adjusted using the finite-sample correction of Windmeijer (2005), but since
this is only an approximation we decide to stick to our one-step results.
48Roodman (2009b) emphasizes that the available instruments may rise quadratically
with the number of time periods. For our sample with 18 quarters the maximum poten-
tially available moment conditions amount to (18− 2)(18− 1)/2 = 136.
49We use the xtabond2 command in Stata provided by Roodman (2009a) to obtain our
results.
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Table 4.3: Dynamic difference GMM estimation results using Capital/RWA
Corrected
Dependent Variable:
Sample:
Instruments: L2-L4.S L2-L5.S L2-L4.S L2-L5.S
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L1.(Securitized to Total 
Managed Assets) 0.59* 0.55** 0.81** 0.80**
(0.31) (0.28) (0.41) (0.37)
Capital/RWA Corrected -1.13** -1.15** -1.20* -1.21*
(0.54) (0.54) (0.61) (0.62)
Log of Total Assets -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.15***
(0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Yield Loans and Leases 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12
(0.097) (0.095) (0.11) (0.11)
Financing Costs 1.70*** 1.69*** 1.93*** 1.93***
(0.64) (0.63) (0.72) (0.70)
Credit Risk (Loss Allowances) 0.037 0.071 0.096 0.11
(0.59) (0.56) (0.61) (0.58)
Investment Banking -0.034 -0.034 -0.047 -0.047
(0.066) (0.065) (0.073) (0.072)
Tax Rate -0.000063 -0.000063 -0.000070 -0.000071
(0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00015) (0.00015)
Fed Funds Rate -0.047 -0.042 -0.20 -0.19
(0.37) (0.36) (0.53) (0.52)
Baa Risk Premium -0.039 -0.034 -0.19 -0.19
(0.39) (0.38) (0.55) (0.55)
Quarter dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 1141 1141 955 955
Number of bank clusters 103 103 77 77
Number of instruments 26 27 26 27
F statistic 2.62 2.67 2.33 2.37
F-Test (p-value) 0.0004 0.0003 0.003 0.002
AR(1) Test -1.68 -1.70 -1.83 -1.95
AR(1) Test (p-value) 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.05
AR(2) Test -0.79 -0.75 -1.16 -1.15
AR(2) Test (p-value) 0.43 0.45 0.25 0.25
Hansen-J statistic 0.72 1.20 0.056 0.12
Hansen-J (degrees of freedom) 2 3 2 3
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.70 0.75 0.97 0.99
Diff-in-Hansen statistic for 
Capital/RWA Corrected 0.36 0.03 0.03 0.01
Diff-in-Hansen (p-value) 0.55 0.87 0.86 0.94
Securitized to Total Managed Assets (gross)
broad narrow
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the bank level in parentheses. Estimates are one-
step difference GMM. The table shows the Arellano-Bond test for first- and second-order autocorrelation of
the first-differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is no autocorrelation. A heteroskedasticity-robust test of
overidentifying restrictions (Hansen J-test) is performed. The null hypothesis is that the instrument set as a
group is exogenous. A Difference-in-Hansen test for exogeneity of the instrument subset (here of the capital
ratio) is performed. Under the null the instrument excluded is exogenous. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.4: Dynamic difference GMM estimation results using Tier1/Total
Assets Corrected
Dependent Variable:
Sample:
Instruments: L2-L4.S L2-L5.S L2-L4.S L2-L5.S
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L1.(Securitized to Total 
Managed Assets) 0.70** 0.64** 0.92** 0.87**
(0.33) (0.30) (0.44) (0.40)
Tier1/Total Assets Corrected -1.44* -1.48* -1.63* -1.65*
(0.79) (0.80) (0.84) (0.84)
Log of Total Assets -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16***
(0.054) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052)
Yield Loans and Leases 0.12 0.11 0.099 0.097
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11)
Financing Costs 1.96*** 1.95*** 2.27*** 2.26***
(0.74) (0.73) (0.82) (0.80)
Credit Risk (Loss Allowances) 0.13 0.19 0.30 0.34
(0.57) (0.54) (0.58) (0.54)
Investment Banking -0.028 -0.029 -0.041 -0.041
(0.065) (0.064) (0.072) (0.070)
Tax Rate -0.000064 -0.000064 -0.000049 -0.000049
(0.00014) (0.00014) (0.00016) (0.00016)
Fed Funds Rate -0.22 -0.22 -0.55 -0.55
(0.39) (0.38) (0.56) (0.55)
Baa Risk Premium -0.22 -0.22 -0.57 -0.57
(0.41) (0.40) (0.59) (0.57)
Quarter dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 1141 1141 955 955
Number of bank clusters 103 103 77 77
Number of instruments 26 27 26 27
F statistic 2.26 2.34 2.08 2.15
F-Test (p-value) 0.003 0.002 0.008 0.006
AR(1) Test -1.96 -1.95 -2.00 -2.06
AR(1) Test (p-value) 0.050 0.051 0.046 0.040
AR(2) Test -1.36 -1.39 -1.39 -1.44
AR(2) Test (p-value) 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15
Hansen-J statistic 0.73 1.80 0.48 0.81
Hansen-J (degrees of freedom) 2 3 2 3
Hansen-J (p-value) 0.69 0.61 0.79 0.85
Diff-in-Hansen statistic for 
Tier1/Total Assets Corrected 0.02 0.13 0.06 0.07
Diff-in-Hansen (p-value) 0.89 0.72 0.81 0.79
Securitized to Total Managed Assets (gross)
broad narrow
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the bank level in parentheses. Estimates are one-
step difference GMM. The table shows the Arellano-Bond test for first- and second-order autocorrelation of
the first-differenced residuals. The null hypothesis is no autocorrelation. A heteroskedasticity-robust test of
overidentifying restrictions (Hansen J-test) is performed. The null hypothesis is that the instrument set as a
group is exogenous. A Difference-in-Hansen test for exogeneity of the instrument subset (here of the capital
ratio) is performed. Under the null the instrument excluded is exogenous. *, **, and *** indicate significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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in our binary choice model. In addition, we collected data on all the secu-
ritizers with assets between 300 million and 1 billion dollars in the second
quarter of 2008. There are 30 banks reporting securitization activities in
this sub-group. By adding these banks to our narrow sample we obtain the
broad sample used in columns (1) and (2). Beyond the advantage of using
more observations this allows us to see whether the inclusion of other banks
alters our results. We further present results using two different instrument
sets: the first includes the second, third, and fourth lags of Sit in column (1)
whereas the second includes in addition the fifth lag in column (2).
Throughout all the specifications the Arellano-Bond test suggests the ex-
istence of negative first-order serial correlation in the first-differenced resid-
uals at the 10% significance level, that is expected by construction. The
test cannot reject the null hypothesis of the absence of AR(2) in the first-
differenced residuals, indicating that the lagged levels of the dependent vari-
able are valid instruments. Furthermore, the p-value of the Hansen J-test
ranges between 0.70 and 0.99. The null hypothesis of exogeneity of the in-
strument set as a whole cannot be rejected. Therefore, endogeneity is not
driving our results.
A brief look at the table reveals that the results are in general not sensitive
to different samples or to the use of different instrument sets. Therefore, we
interpret only the results in column (1). Banks with a lower capital ratio
securitize more. The estimated coefficient is significantly different from zero
at the 5% level. To quantify the effect we compare a bank at the 75th
percentile of the distribution of the capital ratio with a bank at the 25th
percentile. The latter has an approximately 2 percentage points lower ratio
of capital to risk-weighted assets. The coefficient of −1.13 implies that this
bank will have 2.26 percentage points higher securitized in total managed
assets. However, since we have a dynamic model, the coefficient represents
only the contemporaneous effect. The long-run impact is given by γ/(1−(1−
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α)).50 Given the estimate for (1 − α) of 0.59, the long-run effect amounts
to 2.26/(1 − 0.59) = 5.51 percentage points. The result suggests that the
capital arbitrage is important for both the extensive and the intensive margin
of securitization. The performed Difference-in-Hansen test cannot reject the
null hypothesis of the exogeneity of Capital/RWA Corrected.51
A second important finding is that the financing costs seem to be a fur-
ther important determinant of the scale of securitization activity. This result
supports the efficient contracting view of securitization and is in line with
other empirical papers. Looking at column (1) of the table, the coefficient on
this variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. An orig-
inating bank in the 75th percentile of the distribution faces 1.5 percentage
points higher debt financing costs compared with a bank at the 25th per-
centile. This bank will therefore have around a 1.7 ∗ 1.5 = 2.55 percentage
points higher share of securitized in the total managed assets. In the long
run the impact is even higher - 6.22 percentage points.52
Another interesting result is the negative, significant at the 1% level coef-
ficient on the total assets variable. Bigger banks seem to have a lower share
of securitized in the total managed assets.
Finally, the variables tax rate and investment banking activities do not
have a significant impact on the decision on the scale of securitization. These
factors seem to determine only the participation decision. If expertise in
investment banking influence only the amount of up-front fixed costs of en-
tering the market, like setting up a special purpose vehicle and placing the
securities on the market, then this variable will influence indeed only the
participation of banks. Bank profitability and credit risk exposure have the
expected positive sign, but are again not significant.
Finally, we want to emphasize the appropriateness of our estimation pro-
50This is approximately true, because Sgrossit and Sit have almost equal values.
51The test statistic is χ2(1) distributed. The computed p-value is 0.55.
526.22 = 2.55/(1− 0.59).
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cedure and the importance of bank fixed effects. Therefore, we estimate the
model in equation (4.9) using the fixed-effects (FE) as well as the random-
effects (RE) estimator. Table 4.14 in Appendix C shows the estimation
results.
First, to indicate the importance of fixed effects, we compare the estimates
in column (1) for the random-effects case with column (2) for the fixed-effects
case, in both of which use the capital/RWA corrected as the measure for the
capital adequacy of a bank.53 There are significant differences. Comparing
the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable, we see in the RE case that
it is biased upwards. The result is reasonable, because we expect a positive
correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the unobserved fixed
effect ψ∗i . Further, we see an upward bias towards zero for the coefficient on
the capital ratio, which is plausible for a positive correlation between it and
the unobserved fixed effect ψ∗i . The table shows in addition the estimated
variance due to the fixed effects relative to the overall variance. The Rho
statistic for the fixed-effects within-estimation is near 1, which confirms the
importance of including bank fixed effects.
Second, we can compare the Arellano-Bond estimates in column (3) of
Table 4.3 with the fixed-effects estimates in column (2) of Table 4.14. Both
use the same narrow sample. Although both estimators account for fixed
effects, the latter suffers from the “Nickell” bias. The coefficient on the cap-
ital ratio is clearly biased towards 0. The bias is significant and amounts to
around 33%54 of the coefficient. Furthermore, the coefficient on the financing
costs variable is around 17%55 biased downward. In line with the economet-
ric literature, this suggests that the within-group estimator is not suitable
53A clearer way to test the appropriateness of both estimators would be to perform a
Hausman specification test. A necessary assumption for the test is that the fixed-effects
estimator is consistent. However, in the presence of a lagged dependent variable this
assumption is not fulfilled.
540.33 = (1.20− 0.80)/1.20.
550.17 = (1.93− 1.61)/1.93
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for our small T sample.
Overall when considering the intensive margin, we find support for both
the capital arbitrage view and the efficient contracting view of securitization.
4.7 Incentive effects of securitization
After having provided evidence that capital arbitrage drives asset securiti-
zation by banks, we turn to the question of whether and how securitization
affects the quality of originated loans. First, we compare the ex-post perfor-
mance of securitized and retained loans and interpret the observed disparity
as evidence of incentive problems. Second, we identify which contractual
features and bank characteristics can remedy such problems.
In this section we focus only on the sub-sample of securitizing banks. We
argue that pooling securitizers with non-securitizers will be misleading and
probably overstate the true impact of securitization on the quality of orig-
inated loans. The intuition is straightforward. Suppose for a moment that
securitization does not lead to bad incentives so that loans originated by the
same bank exhibit the same delinquency rates, irrespective of whether they
are securitized or not. However, securitizing banks may be systematically
involved in a riskier lending.56 There will be a different performance of secu-
ritized loan pools vs. on-balance sheet loan pools simply due to a selection
of securitizers into such riskier business. However, the disparity would not
relate to bad incentives. By focusing on the sub-sample of securitizing banks
we rule out such a selection. In a way our empirical strategy boils down
to comparing the ex-post observed performance of loans originated by the
same institution, of the same type,57 observed at the same time, which are
securitized to those retained on the balance sheet.
56Figure 4.4 indicates this.
57For example, credit card debt or residential mortgages.
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Figure 4.8: Delinquencies on securitized and retained home equity lines
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Figure 4.8 summarizes the delinquency rates of home equity loans for the
time period between the fourth quarter of 2003 and the second quarter of
2008. The blue bars denote the average delinquencies of retained loans and
the red bar the delinquencies of loans originated and securitized by the same
group of banks. The two upper panels summarize data on loans more than
30 days past due. Throughout the time period securitized home equity loans
had a higher fraction of borrowers failing to meet the due payments than
home equity loans originated by the same group of banks and retained by
the originator. The lower-left panel features data on the charge-offs. Up
until the last quarter of 2007 the development resembles the upper panels.
In the last 3 quarters during which the current crisis emerged and intensified,
however, the losses on retained loans were substantially higher. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that securitization in that particular period was practically
impossible and banks were forced to retain loans they planned to securitize.
Additionally, banks had to put recently securitized assets, that had quickly
become sour, back on their balance sheets in an act of implicit support for
reputational purposes. Thus, some of the defaults denoted in the graph as
defaults on retained loans could actually reflect losses on either loans that
were originally securitized but had to be put back on the balance sheet or
loans that were planned to be securitized.
The lower-right panel sums up all the non-performing loans - between
30 and 89 days past due, more than 90 days past due, and those charged
off - as the total delinquency rate on home equity loans. This is how we
measure “quality”. The measure has some caveats. First of all it is an ex-
post measure so the poor performance of securitized assets might be the result
of “bad luck”. A more serious caveat is that the measure does not capture
the true profitability. Even though securitized loans are riskier and default
more often, the interest rates charged for such loans may be sufficiently high
to make them a profitable investment. We do not have any data on interest
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Table 4.5: Mean comparison of total delinquencies on securitized vs. retained
loans
Diff(mean) > 0 
p-value
type of loan  securitized loans retained loans
Residential Mortgages* 0.18 0.17 0.370
Home Equity Loans 3.41 1.29 < 0.001
Credit Card Debt 7.87 6.23 0.046
Commercial Loans 3.05 2.34 0.006
Other Loans 3.02 0.85 < 0.001
Mean of Total Delinquencies
Notes: * The total delinquencies of residential mortgages contain booked losses only. The last column
reports the p-value of a paired t-test with the null hypothesis that the mean for the securitized loans is
equal to the mean for the retained loans vs. the alternative that the mean for the securitized loans is
higher than the mean for the retained loans.
income for securitized loans, thus, we cannot take it into account in our
analysis.
We observe the same pattern for other types of loans too. Table 4.5
summarizes the total delinquencies for home equity loans, credit card loans,
commercial loans, and other loans.58 For residential mortgages we do not
have data on past dues, so instead of total delinquencies we report booked
losses only. The t-test reported in Table 4.5 reveals that total delinquencies
on securitized loans are significantly higher for every loan category apart
from residential mortgages. We interpret this as evidence that moral hazard
and/or adverse selection are a problem in securitization. Obviously banks
tend to originate and securitize substantially riskier loans compared with the
ones they retain and for which they are liable with their own equity.
Complementary to Table 4.5 we perform a regression-based mean com-
58We provide additional details on the quality characteristics of retained and securitized
loans in Table 4.15 in Appendix C.
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parison:
delinqjit = µ0 + ci + ct + µ1 ∗ dummyji + µ2 ∗ controlsjit + ωjit (4.14)
where the subscript j denotes the securitized vs. the retained pool of loans
for each bank i at time t.
We pool the overall delinquency rates for retained loans and for securitized
loans for each securitizing bank i and want to know whether the securitized
loans (dummyji = 1) have higher overall delinquencies than the retained ones
(dummyji = 0), controlling for bank fixed effects, time fixed effects, and the
composition of both pools.59 Compared with the previous by-type-of-loan
comparison, the regression-based analysis using the overall delinquency rates
allows us to exploit a larger fraction of the data.60
Equation 4.14 is estimated using the within-bank-group transformation.
Inference is based on cluster-robust correction of the standard errors. We
again exclude observations after the fourth quarter of 2007.
Table 4.6 shows the results. The estimated coefficient µ1 is positive and
significant at the 5% level, indicating that indeed securitized loans are more
risky than retained loans. On average the overall delinquency rate of secu-
ritized assets in our sample is 1.47 percentage points higher. Given that the
overall delinquency rate on retained loans is 1.29%, this is a large number.
Further, the coefficients on the composition of both portfolios are jointly
59Controlling for the composition of the portfolios here is crucial as certain types of
loan exhibit higher delinquencies. Compare for instance the delinquency rates on home
equity loans with those on credit card debt in Table 4.5. Differences in the average overall
delinquency rate for securitized vs. retained assets in this specification, thus, may arise
ceteris paribus if institutions for example securitize all of their credit card loans and retain
all of their originated mortgages. To rule out biases due to systematical differences in
the composition of the securitized and retained loan pools we explicitly control for their
structure.
60The reason is that even though banks report the overall delinquency rate for retained
and securitized loans some of them do not provide disaggregated delinquency rates by type
of loan.
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Table 4.6: Regression-based comparison of total delinquencies on securitized
vs. retained loans
Dependent Variable: Total Delinquencies
Dummyji 1.47**
(0.35)
Composition of securitized portfolio yes
Composition of retained portfolio yes
Quarter dummies yes
Bank fixed effects yes
Observations 2026
Number of bank clusters 100
R-squared 0.2
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the bank
level in parentheses. The table shows fixed-effects within estimates.
Controls for the composition of securitized and retained portfolios,
quarter dummies, and a constant are suppressed. *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
significant (F-test not reported), which supports our approach.
Once we have stated that indeed securitized loans exhibit much higher
delinquency rates, a natural question to ask is: why? In a next step we
identify and test whether the poor performance of securitized loans arises
due to bad incentives for screening and monitoring.
The quality of securitized assets should depend on the segment of credit
markets in which the bank operates, the screening and monitoring effort
exerted by bank staff, and unobserved bank characteristics, for instance how
accurate the screening technology is, the managerial culture, etc.
We expect that the total delinquencies of securitized loans are higher for
banks operating in riskier segments of the credit market, proxied by the total
delinquencies of retained loans. This measure also captures the efficiency of
the scoring technology available to individual banks for the assessment of
borrower creditworthiness. Intuitively, banks that use a less precise scoring
program and specialize in riskier lending will exhibit higher delinquencies on
both their retained and securitized assets. Any systematical difference in the
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delinquencies of securitized and retained loans of the same type granted by
the same bank is related to the willingness of bank insiders to use the avail-
able technology to screen and monitor borrowers and to possible changes in
the bank’s tolerance to risk for loans to be securitized as opposed to old-
fashioned retained loans. Once we have controlled for the screening technol-
ogy and the segment of credit markets, we can attribute any variation in the
ex-post performance of securitized loans to incentives.
Theory suggests that screening and monitoring incentives could be un-
dermined for securitized loans because the originator sells the assets to a
third party and transfers most of the risk associated with them to the buyer.
The bank is liable with its own equity for any future defaults only up to the
stake it retains in the securitization transaction. This may induce banks to
originate and securitize riskier loans and monitor borrowers less stringently
once a loan is granted. The higher the fraction of the risk in a securitization
transaction the originating bank retains, the less severe such moral hazard
and adverse selection problems are, according to theory. We have data on
credit enhancements and pro-rata stakes in securitizations retained by the
originating banks and use them to test these predictions.
In addition to such contractually specified and disclosed retained risk,
banks may also provide “implicit recourse”, i.e. the bank implicitly promises
to support its securitizations beyond its contractual obligations and thus
bears additional risks. Banks may do this out of reputational concerns.61
Such implicit, non-observable, and non-verifiable to outsiders guarantees
must be self-enforcing in order to be effective. In this sense the amount
of bank equity capital relative to assets influences incentives in two ways.
First, provided that banks care about their reputation and promise implic-
itly to support securitizations, they are liable with their available equity only.
The more capital relative to its assets a bank has, the better are its incen-
61See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006), p. 235.
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tives to screen and monitor implicitly guaranteed securitized loans. Second,
implicit recourse is only self-enforcing for banks with a large capital base
relative to their assets. To put it in a nutshell, if a bank is on the brink
of bankruptcy it would not care much about its future reputation, as the
probability that it has a future is small anyway. Therefore, capital adequacy
ensures self-enforceability.
For our regression analysis we use the overall delinquency rate of secu-
ritized assets (delinqsecit ) as a measure of the quality of these assets. As a
proxy for the quality of retained assets we use the overall delinquencies on
retained loans (delinqretit ). To make sure differences in the average delin-
quencies do not arise because for example riskier types of loans constitute a
higher fraction of the securitized portfolio, we control for the composition of
the retained and securitized loan pools.62
As measures of the retained stake in its securitized assets (retexpit) we use
the size of the credit enhancements provided by the originating bank as well
as the retained pro-rata ownership, both as a percentage of the securitized
pool. We expect that both a bigger first-loss piece and a higher retained
pro-rata share of ownership help overcome incentive problems and thus lead
to a better quality of securitized loans. We further expect that the marginal
effect of credit enhancements is stronger. The intuition is straightforward:
whereas an increase in the first-loss piece of 1 percentage point is associated
with an increase in the retained fraction of the overall risk of more than 1%,63
62Ultimately we are interested in the differences in delinquencies for loans of the same
type. Any comparison of the average delinquencies for all types of loans that does not
take into account that certain types of loans exhibit higher delinquencies, e.g. credit card
loans versus mortgages, could distort the results if banks for example securitize mortgages
more easily than credit card debt and thus the composition of its balance sheet is different
from the composition of its securitized assets. As not all the banks in our sample report
delinquencies for retained and securitized loans by type of loans, we have to use the average
delinquency rate of loans originated by a bank observed during a quarter and control for
possible differences in the composition of retained and securitized loan pools.
63The first losses on the securitized portfolio are born solely by the holder of the first
loss piece.
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increasing the retained pro-rata ownership by the same magnitude increases
the risk by exactly 1%. The higher the retained portion of risk is, according
to theory, the more risk prevention is undertaken.
To test whether reputational concerns play a role we use four different
measures of the capital adequacy of banks (capratioit): a simple tier 1 lever-
age ratio, a ratio of risk-based capital to risk-weighted assets, and the cor-
rected version of the two ratios used previously. In the current setting the
corrected capital ratios measure the consolidated capital base that is there
to back the risk inherent in both the retained and securitized assets of bank
i. We expect that the better capitalized a bank is, the better the quality of
its securitized assets, all other things held equal.
To control for unobservable bank-specific factors we use bank fixed ef-
fects. For example, a different maturity structure of the securitized portfolio
relative to the retained portfolio can account for differences in the delinquen-
cies. If these are correlated with our main explanatory variables, they would
lead to inconsistent estimates.64 We also include quarter dummies to capture
aggregate time-specific effects. Finally, we control for bank size. The control
for size is important, as size and leverage are correlated and thus omitting
size may induce a bias into our estimates.
Our empirical model is given by the following linear relationship:
delinqsecit = β0 + ci + ct + β1 ∗ delinqretit + β2 ∗ capratioit +
+β3 ∗ retexpit + β4 ∗ controlsit + uit (4.15)
We first perform a fixed-effects estimation of equation 4.15 and report the
results from our baseline model in Table 4.7.65 The data sample covers 100
64The only assumption we need is that these factors are constant over our sample
period.
65Table 4.9 in Appendix C provides pairwise correlations of the explanatory variables.
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banks and 1013 bank-year observations. Throughout all the specifications we
control for the composition of the retained and securitized portfolios as well
as time- and bank-specific effects. Clustered standard errors that account for
conditional heteroskedasticity between bank clusters and serial correlation of
the residuals uit within bank clusters are reported in parentheses.
Column (1) in the table reports the results of a regression of the total
delinquencies on securitized assets on the delinquencies of retained assets.
Not surprisingly, the estimated coefficient βˆ1 is positive and significant at the
1% level. The point estimate of 1.58 indicates that indeed the delinquencies
of securitized assets depend closely on those on the retained portfolio.
Next, we include the size of the first-loss piece in column (2). Contrary
to what we expected, the coefficient is positive and significant at the 5%
level. This implies that the higher the fraction of risk is retained, the worse
the securitized assets perform. Subsequently we include the retained pro-
rata ownership instead of the first-loss piece and report the results in column
(3). The coefficient has the expected negative sign but is insignificant at the
10% level. In column (4) we also use both measures for retained risk by the
originator simultaneously. The sign and significance of the coefficients do not
change. We suspect that there may be a problem of reverse causality with
regard to the variable first-loss piece. Banks that securitize assets with a less
good quality must provide higher credit enhancements so that nevertheless
ABS structured out of such collateral are granted a good rating and can be
placed on the market. As the amount of retained pro-rata ownership does
not provide any protection to investors against defaults and, thus, should not
influence the rating of asset-backed securities, there is no reverse causality in
this case. As a result we obtain the expected negative sign but the estimated
coefficient is not statistically significant. In the further regressions we stick
to using the first-loss piece as a control for the retained stake.
In columns (5) to (8) we subsequently use the four bank capital measures
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and control additionally for the size of banks. In all four cases the reported
coefficients have the expected sign and are significant at the 5% level, sug-
gesting that reputational concerns are indeed present. The more capital the
originating banks have, the lower are the delinquencies of assets securitized
by them. The effect of capital is quantitatively meaningful: increasing the
ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets by 1 percentage point reduces ce-
teris paribus the delinquencies on securitized assets by approximately 0.3
percentage points. This makes up one-fifth of the observed discrepancy in
delinquencies between securitized and retained loans. The effect of the other
three capital ratios is even slightly higher. In a sense our results suggest that
a sufficient level of capital rather than the originator’s retained exposure is
an effective tool for assuring careful bank lending. This result stresses the
importance of the equity capital for incentives.
As a sensitivity analysis we also perform a random-effects estimation and
report the results in Appendix C, Table 4.16. This estimator is more ef-
ficient than the fixed-effects estimator, but it is consistent only under the
assumption that ci is not correlated with the covariates. Throughout all the
specifications the estimated coefficients of interest differ from those shown in
Table 4.7. Therefore, we perform a Hausman’s specification test, which al-
lows the use of cluster-robust standard errors.66 It indicates that fixed effects
should be used since the null hypothesis that the random effects estimator is
consistent is rejected.
66The standard Hausman test assumes that the random-effects estimator is fully effi-
cient. In the case that ci and uit are not i.i.d. this test is not valid. In our case this
is indicated by the fact that after random-effects estimation the default standard errors
differ considerably from the cluster-robust ones. Cameron and Trivedi (2009), pp. 261-
262, and Wooldridge (2002), pp. 290-291, describe how one can conduct this test using a
cluster-robust variance-covariance matrix.
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4.8 Conclusion
Financial institutions in the USA have increasingly used securitization tech-
niques since the beginning of the nineties. Prior to the financial crisis, the
general wisdom on securitization was that it is an efficient tool that allows a
better allocation of risks and enhances the resilience of the financial system.
The onset of the current crisis has proved this view wrong and revealed some
serious misalignments in securitization markets.
Using panel data on big US commercial banks we find robust evidence of
banks using securitization techniques to relax regulatory capital constraints.
In order to identify this effect empirically we solve the issue of reverse causal-
ity by using a corrected capital ratio measure. We further put emphasis on
the different behavior of the extensive and intensive margins of securitization.
While capital arbitrage drives both margins, lowering the debt financing costs
via securitization seems to be only important for the scale of securitization
activities.
Subsequently we focus on the incentives for prudent screening and mon-
itoring of securitized loans by originating banks. Controlling for the het-
erogeneity of originators, loan portfolios, and other characteristics, we find
evidence of significantly poorer performance of securitized loans compared
with on-balance-sheet loans. Moreover, tools for overcoming incentive prob-
lems, like the retention of some of the risk in the securitized portfolio, seem
to be ineffective. Finally, our empirical results support minimum capital ade-
quacy regulation as a way to discipline originators to evaluate risk stringently.
However, our research also suggests that loopholes in the current regulatory
framework may have seduced banks to securitize assets only for the sake of
avoiding holding regulatory capital. Such behavior can undermine the safety
and soundness of the financial system.
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C Appendix to Chapter 4
Table 4.8: Pairwise correlations of capital ratios
Capital/RWA Capital/RWA
Cor-
rected
Tier1/Total
Assets
Tier1/Total
Assets
Cor-
rected
Capital/RWA 1.00
Capital/RWA
Corrected
0.97 1.00
Tier1/Total
Assets
0.81 0.74 1.00
Tier1/Total
Assets Cor-
rected
0.80 0.82 0.93 1.00
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Table 4.9: Pairwise correlations
Total Delin-
quencies of
Retained
Loans
90 Days
Past Due
Retained
Loans
First-Loss
Piece
Retained
Securi-
tization
Ownership
Total Delinquen-
cies of Retained
Loans
1.00
90 Days Past Due
Retained Loans
0.85 1.00
First-Loss Piece 0.05 0.01 1.00
Retained Securiti-
zation Ownership
0.01 0.23 0.01 1.00
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Table 4.10: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev. Min Max
Sample All banks
Securitization Dummy 10553 0.06 0.23 0 1
Capital/RWA 10553 0.140 0.088 0 0.79
Capital/RWA Corrected 10549 0.138 0.087 0 0.79
Tier1/Total Assets 10553 0.095 0.061 0 0.52
Tier1/Total Assets Corrected 10549 0.092 0.055 0 0.49
Log of Total Assets 10557 14.58 1.49 8.35 21.07
Yield Loans and Leases 9978 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.22
Financing Costs 10053 0.02 0.01 0.005 0.05
Credit Risk (Loss Allowances) 10475 0.01 0.01 0 0.26
Investment Banking 10053 0.01 0.01 0 0.44
Tax Rate (in %) 10051 32.39 11.31 -5.16 60.83
Credit Card Bank 10740 0.04 0.20 0 1
Fed Funds Rate 10740 3.33 1.61 1 5.25
Baa Risk Premium 10740 2.07 0.47 1.56 3.38
Sample Securitizers (once during sample period)
Securitized to Total Assets (gross) 1487 0.38 0.88 0 5.70
Securitized to Total Assets 1487 0.36 0.84 0 5.37
Total Delinquencies of Securitized Loans (in %) 1344 3.67 4.57 -0.01 45.59
Total Delinquencies of Retained Loans (in %) 1294 0.67 2.93 -17.44 20.89
90 Days and less Past Due Retained Loans (in %) 1340 1.59 1.57 0 27.86
First Loss Piece (share of outstanding amount) 1340 0.08 0.18 0 1
Retained Securitization Ownership (share of 
outstanding amount) 1340 0.05 0.14 0 1
Capital/RWA 2265 0.134 0.058 0 0.79
Capital/RWA Corrected 2261 0.124 0.048 0 0.79
Tier 1/Total Assets 2265 0.096 0.065 0 0.52
Tier1/Total Assets Corrected 2261 0.086 0.042 0 0.49
Sample Securitizers (new issuance only)
Capital/RWA 610 0.142 0.064 0 0.68
Capital/RWA Corrected 610 0.116 0.044 0 0.49
Tier1/Total Assets 610 0.108 0.082 0 0.52
Tier1/Total Assets Corrected 610 0.082 0.039 0 0.43
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Table 4.12: The extensive margin of securitization: using Capital/RWA
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Capital/RWA 0.11 0.37 0.26 0.10 0.18 0.22 0.24
(0.74) (0.79) (0.78) (0.79) (0.77) (0.73) (0.83)
Log of Total Assets 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.39*** 0.41*** 0.41***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043) (0.043)
Credit Card Bank 1.72*** 1.28*** 1.61*** 1.47*** 1.68*** 1.67*** 1.28***
(0.26) (0.24) (0.32) (0.43) (0.27) (0.27) (0.37)
Yield Loans and Leases 4.98** 3.68
(2.39) (3.89)
Financing Costs 3.32 1.19
(10.2) (11.3)
Credit Risk (Loss Allowances) 6.66 4.36
(8.18) (9.81)
Investment Banking 4.70 4.65
(3.45) (3.48)
Tax Rate -0.0089 -0.0092
(0.0060) (0.0061)
Fed Funds Rate -0.13
(0.12)
Baa Risk Premium -1.20
(0.85)
Quarter dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 8445 7875 7941 8372 7941 7939 7873
Number of bank clusters 506 503 506 503 506 506 503
Wald statistic 213 214 226 229 203 206 272
Pseudo R-squared 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.35
Securitization Dummy
Pooled Probit
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. Constant and quarter dummies are suppressed. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the bank level in parentheses. Constant and quarter
dummies are suppressed. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
232
The Empirics of Securitization by Banks
Table 4.13: The extensive margin of securitization: using Tier1/Total Assets
Dependent Variable:
Estimation:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Tier1/Total Assets 2.31** 2.42** 2.44** 2.41** 2.38** 2.37** 2.38**
(0.99) (1.04) (1.04) (1.00) (1.03) (1.02) (1.10)
Log of Total Assets 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.41*** 0.43*** 0.43***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.043)
Credit Card Bank 1.47*** 1.09*** 1.34*** 1.22*** 1.42*** 1.42*** 1.07***
(0.27) (0.26) (0.31) (0.41) (0.28) (0.28) (0.38)
Yield Loans and Leases 4.28* 2.72
(2.34) (3.72)
Financing Costs 4.95 3.25
(8.64) (10.0)
Credit Risk (Loss Allowances) 6.25 4.64
(7.66) (9.24)
Investment Banking 4.48 4.51
(3.54) (3.61)
Tax Rate -0.0088 -0.0088
(0.0062) (0.0062)
Fed Funds Rate -0.13
(0.12)
Baa Risk Premium -1.19
(0.86)
Quarter dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 8445 7875 7941 8372 7941 7939 7873
Number of bank clusters 506 503 506 503 506 506 503
Wald statistic 250 260 246 268 242 244 316
Pseudo R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.35
Securitization Dummy
Pooled Probit
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. Constant and quarter dummies are suppressed. *, **, *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
otes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the bank level in parentheses. Constant and quarter
dummies are suppressed. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.14: The intensive margin of securitization: random- vs. fixed-effects
estimates
Dependent Variable:
Capital Ratio:
Estimation: RE FE RE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L1.(Securitized to Total 
Managed Assets) 0.96*** 0.71*** 0.96*** 0.73***
(0.029) (0.088) (0.026) (0.082)
Capital Ratio -0.17 -0.80 -0.13 -0.99
(0.15) (0.52) (0.16) (0.66)
Log of Total Assets -0.0014 -0.073** -0.0014 -0.081**
(0.0013) (0.032) (0.0014) (0.036)
Yield Loans and Leases 0.23 0.21 0.25 0.20
(0.16) (0.16) (0.17) (0.16)
Financing Costs 1.18** 1.61*** 1.18** 1.81***
(0.53) (0.55) (0.53) (0.63)
Credit Risk (Loss Allowances) 0.36 -0.13 0.33 -0.069
(0.26) (0.46) (0.27) (0.42)
Investment Banking 0.065 0.00068 0.037 0.047
(0.067) (0.038) (0.044) (0.051)
Tax Rate -0.00014 -0.000063 -0.00012 -0.000021
(0.00017) (0.00018) (0.00016) (0.00016)
Fed Funds Rate -0.019* -0.014 -0.018* -0.012
(0.010) (0.0093) (0.0098) (0.0078)
Baa Risk Premium -0.066 -0.067 -0.061 -0.056
(0.055) (0.057) (0.054) (0.050)
Credit Card Bank 0.0054 0.0056
(0.019) (0.018)
Quarter dummies yes yes yes yes
Bank fixed effects no yes no yes
Observations 1043 1043 1043 1043
Number of bank clusters 88 88 88 88
R-squared 0.98 0.69 0.98 0.70
Rho 0.97 0.97
Securitized to Total Managed Assets (gross)
Capital/RWA Corrected Tier1/Total Assets Corrected
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on bank-level in parentheses. The table shows random effects (RE) and fixed
effects (FE) within estimates. Constant and quarter dummies are suppressed. Rho is the fraction of variance due to the fixed
effects. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Notes: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering on the bank level in parentheses. The table shows
random-effects (RE) and fixed-effects (FE) within estimates. Constant and quarter dummies are sup-
pressed. Rho is the fraction of variance due to the fixed effects. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 4.15: Mean comparison of delinquencies by type of loan and time past
due
securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained
mean . . . . 0.18 0.17 . .
sd . . . . 0.85 0.50 . .
N* 0 0 0 0 709 709 0 0
min . . . . -3.12 -0.21 . .
max . . . . 12.01 6.39 . .
securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained
mean 1.67 0.66 0.96 0.16 0.99 0.46 3.61 1.28
sd 2.66 0.67 1.57 0.18 1.87 0.92 5.55 1.53
N* 170 170 170 170 170 170 170 170
min 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 -3.43 -0.07 0.00 0.04
max 14.52 3.52 8.40 0.90 6.91 7.15 22.33 9.98
securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained
mean 1.85 1.95 1.49 1.55 4.71 4.21 8.06 7.70
sd 0.90 0.86 0.80 0.86 2.35 2.24 3.72 3.65
N* 304 304 304 304 304 304 304 304
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.35 0.00 0.00
max 6.50 4.41 4.15 4.00 10.85 9.81 17.36 17.20
securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained
mean 1.01 0.79 0.88 0.42 1.17 1.14 3.07 2.35
sd 1.65 0.95 2.16 0.76 2.72 2.28 4.57 3.44
N* 153 153 153 153 153 153 153 153
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.11 -0.41 -3.11 -0.16
max 8.56 8.52 18.36 5.19 9.73 10.35 18.36 15.36
securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained
mean 1.24 0.55 1.00 0.13 0.80 0.18 3.04 0.86
sd 1.70 0.51 1.50 0.19 2.29 0.31 4.37 0.72
N* 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.24 -0.14 0.00 0.00
max 8.47 4.32 9.78 1.32 18.98 2.38 21.66 4.32
securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained securitized retained
mean 1.39 0.96 0.81 0.30 0.51 0.17 2.71 1.42
sd 2.11 0.68 1.83 0.55 1.35 0.58 3.93 1.24
N* 1067 1067 1067 1067 1067 1067 1067 1067
min 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -3.43 -3.29 0.00 0.00
max 19.97 4.89 25.87 10.43 12.01 5.50 39.86 14.31
Residential first lien mortgages
30 days past due 90 days past due Booked losses Total delinquencies
Notes: N* denotes the number of time*bank observations. Sample statistics are computed for the sample that is not missing for any of
the four variables within each type of loan.
Total
30 days past due 90 days past due Booked losses Total delinquencies
Other loans
30 days past due 90 days past due Booked losses Total delinquencies
Commercial loans
30 days past due 90 days past due Booked losses Total delinquencies
Credit card debt
30 days past due 90 days past due Booked losses Total delinquencies
Home equity loans
30 days past due 90 days past due Booked losses Total delinquencies
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